The revolt in the Russian Polish provinces in the interest of reconstructing an independent Poland on liberal lines provided Bismarck with his first opportunity to reinforce Prussia’s international standing, which augmented the positive relationship between Russia following Prussia’s benevolent neutrality during the Crimean War. A unified Poland under the sovereignty of Russia would be devastating for Prussia’s position in eastern Europe and the Baltic Sea. He chose to side with Russia in this uprising to preclude Napoleon III from helping the Poles against Russia, just as he had argued against Prussia taking any part in Austria’s war against Piedmont-Sardinia in 1859, and maintained the position that Prussia would not interfere in what he considered was a domestic affair in Russian territory. Since there was a serious danger that this conflagration could spread, he also ordered the Prussian army to mobilise and immediately dispatched troops into Prussian Poland, and dispatched General Gustav von Alvensleben to St. Petersburg to discuss military cooperation with Russia through taking joint military action to seal off the disaffected frontier regions, regardless of how there were not any such nationalist disturbances in Prussian Polish territory, which only took place in Russian territories that were a distance away from the Prussian frontier. Prussia and Russia agreed to provide mutual support against this uprising in the Alvensleben Convention of 8 March 1863. The two countries established a military cordon on their respective frontiers to prevent their respective Polish subjects from providing assistance to this revolt, and prevent the rebels from evading lawful authority. Russian authorities were empowered with pursuing Polish insurgents into Prussian territory, and public meetings were forbidden in Posen. Polish nationalism in these occupied territories controlled by Russia, Prussia and Austria was thus stifled.
Bismarck claimed was necessary to protect Prussian subjects, and also intended to strengthen the influence of Russian conservatives against the faction led by Alexander Gorchakov who was rumoured to favour a liberal Polish policy, to which Bismarck was completely antagonistic, fearing that a complete Russian withdrawal would oblige to annex greater amounts of Polish territory. This convention could also undermine the entente between France and Russia that was formed at the end of the Crimean War (1853-1856), and thereby improve relations with Russia. Bismarck also refused to concur with the governments of Britain, France and Austria to present a joint note to apply diplomatic pressure on Russia by formulating six demands for an amnesty for the rebels, establishing a Polish parliament and a Polish National Executive, allowing the Polish language in official communications, religious freedoms and legal recruiting. Maintaining positive relations between Prussia and Russia was a cornerstone of Bismarck’s foreign policy, and therefore refusing to sanction this note provided practical evidence of Prussia’s goodwill toward Russia. Alienating Russia, especially following the humiliation of the Crimean War peace settlement, by facing further hostility from western European powers, would not serve Prussia’s national interests. Bismarck also disapproved of those six demands, believing that these concessions would consequently encourage liberal interests in Prussia. He also believed that approving these demands risked the possibility of war with Russia, while also anticipated the failure of Britain, France and Austria to create an alliance, from which Prussia could derive advantages, particularly a chasm between Austria and France and Russia, whereas Britain’s influence, which could only be exerted through its superior naval strength, could be dismissed. Prussia thus received Russia’s diplomatic goodwill to a degree owing this gesture of monarchical solidarity rather than due to any practical necessity, as Russia was capable of suppressing the revolt without Prussia’s assistance. The possibility of a hostile Russian policy against Prussia was averted, along with the possibility of an alliance between Russia and France. Furthermore, Prussia secured good relations with Russia in a virtual alliance, which Bismarck believed would reinforce Prussia’s strength and independence, while Austria was left to deal with irreconcilable hostility from the Italian states, and France could be rendered to a state of benevolent neutrality.
During the international debates on the Polish insurgency, another crisis broke out over the question of the future governance of a combined duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and of Lauenburg, as the First Schleswig War of 1848-1851 made them independent possessions of the Danish monarchy, albeit with unfulfilled nationalist demands. Danish nationalists, who had been extending their influence in the national government since 1857, pressured king Frederick VII in March 1863 to take advantage of the European preoccupation with Poland to make a renewed attempt, just as in 1848, to incorporate the duchies into Denmark, which would also entail assimilating the German populations therein. This new international crisis later especially uplifted Bismarck’s status through further exerting his influence by harnessing the contemporary force of nationalism in 1848 and in 1864 that demanded the unification of peoples defined under a common language and culture. It appeared possible that the male line of the Danish royal house would become extinct, which would contribute to the unification of the German states by reverting the Schleswig-Holstein duchies to the Augustenburg line, and thereby sever all ties with Denmark, whereas the Danes dissented from this view by maintaining that at Schleswig would remain under Danish rule by virtue of its Danish origins. Holstein and Lauenburg were predominantly German, whereas Schleswig had a predominantly Danish population with a considerable German population. Moreover, Holstein had always been a part of the Holy Roman Empire, whereas Schleswig had not, which was reinforced in 1815, when the king of Denmark as upheld as a member of the German Confederation for Holstein, but not for Schleswig, as the duke of Schleswig-Holstein.
These Elbe provinces revolted against the rule of the Danish king Frederick William VII, to whom they were subject as the duke of these provinces, in 1848, as according to the 1815 Congress of Vienna settlement. They demanded joint admission to the German Confederation, and were supported by the Duke of Augustenburg, who claimed to be heir to these duchies. Augustenburg’s claims were supported by Prussia and German Confederation allies. Their troops invaded Holstein on 4 April 1848, with fighting continuing until a truce was called in overran Schleswig prior to the truce of Malmo on 26 August. Fighting resumed in April 1849, before the Danes compelled Prussia to withdraw its troops following a second truce in July 1850, in the face of opposition from the European powers, as well as concentrating their military forces to suppress the revolutionary outbreaks throughout the German states. The Danes resumed their offensive against German nationalists in the duchies who were devoid of German Confederation support throughout 1850-1852. that were supported by European powers, including Great Britain and Russia, against Prussia.
The terms of the Treaty of London Protocol of 8 May 1852 determined their future status in what later proved to be unsatisfactory, and consequently could not be maintained in the face of opposition from unfulfilled both Danish and German nationalist interests that had been expressed in 1848 were ignored. Schleswig and Holstein would remain under the sovereignty of king of Denmark, Frederick William VII, who would remain the duke of Schleswig and Holstein, while Holstein was to remain a member of the German Confederation, on the condition that they would remain undivided. Since the Danish king did not have male heirs, Prince Christian of Glücksburg was acknowledged as the successor, again under the strict condition that he should rule them as independent duchies, and never seek to incorporate these duchies into the kingdom of Denmark. This protocol was signed by Frederick VII, and prince Christian of Glücksburg, who was appointed to the united dukedom of Schleswig-Holstein and of Lauenburg, and was ratified by Britain, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Although the nearest male heir was prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburg, who renounced his right of succession in favour of the prince of Glücksburg in exchange for 2.5 million Danish thalers, this settlement was met with protests from his sons, the princes of Augustenburg. Continuing uncertainty about the disposition of these two duchies later led to the gravest crisis that the German states had since 1848, at a time when there were domestic dissensions in Prussia relating to the military funding deadlock in the Prussian national assembly, while being diplomatically isolated.
The status quo arrangement remained in place until king Frederick VII of Denmark issued a proclamation on 30 March 1863 that separated Holstein from Schleswig by granting it a separate legislature, budget and army, and would subsequently unite Schleswig to Denmark by a common constitution through a de facto act of uniting these duchies by a common constitution with Denmark, which was in violation of the 1852 Treaty of London. This decision making angered the populations of the duchies that claimed to be autonomous and inseparable in perpetuity according to their historical custom of unity with a personal union to the Danish king as the duke of these duchies since the 1460 Treaty of Ripen, as well as the populations in the German states, where this was interpreted as a Danish determination to absorb Schleswig into the Danish kingdom. The German Confederation, which had not been a signatory to the London Convention of 1852 that regulated the succession to the Danish throne and the relations of the duchies to the Danish monarchy, passed a resolution on 9 July to restore the conditions that were defined in this treaty.
Danish nationalists in the parliament ignored this resolution, and accepted and approved this proclamation on 13 November 1863, passing the Joint Constitution for Denmark and Schleswig, as well as respecting the autonomous nature of the duchies in which Danish law would only be binding on the condition of being acceptable to their provincial estates extending to the Eider River, and thereby integrating northern Schleswig into Denmark. This resolution dissolved the constitutional relationship with the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, and thus making them tributary provinces with a view toward incorporating them into the Danish kingdom. Danish nationalists maintained the Eider River separating Schleswig from Holstein was the natural boundary between Denmark and the German Confederation on the strength of its historical significance, as well as guaranteeing a defensible frontier in the Dannevirke fortifications, regardless of the population of southern Schleswig was solidly German-speaking. Schleswig was thus to be incorporated into Denmark, whereas Holstein as a constituent state of the German Confederation would only remain united with Danish monarchy on the basis of a personal union, whereas the populations in these duchies maintained their right to their autonomous self-government set apart from the monarchy. The constitution also outlined how German influences were to be opposed in Schleswig, with prejudice to everything Danish, such as the exclusive use of language in in church, school and public life. This view was in contrast to the view of German nationalists who maintained Schleswig and Holstein were to be retained as a single unit, as was determined according to continued centuries old custom, and that the Kongeaa/Königsau river separating Schleswig from Sonderjylland was a historical frontier, despite the presence of a Danish speaking population in northern Schleswig. However, accepting the Danish nationalist demands to mark the Eider River as Denmark’s southern border and thereby incorporating Schleswig into the Danish kingdom violated the 1852 Treaty of London.
Germans in these duchies emigrated to Prussia in the face of nationalist oppression, while generating sympathy for their cause, and hostility to the Danes, while a conclusive resolution for their governance remained lacking. Moreover, the law of succession of the Danish monarchy did not conform to the tradition of inheritance to the paternal line in the duchies. The king died suddenly on 15 November without male heirs, and without approving this resolution. In the absence of a direct male heir, the Danish monarchy hereby passed to the maternal line to Prince Christian on 16 November, who was hereafter proclaimed king of Denmark, and duke of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg, under the title of Christian IX, under the terms of the London Convention. In spite of German opposition, the Danish resolution was nevertheless signed by Prince Christian of Sonderburg-Glückstein on 18 November to comply with public opinion and the demands of the Eider Danes, under pressure of the Danish ministry that claimed his refusal to do so would threaten the maintenance of law and order and endanger the monarchy. Christian IX thus risked facing a revolution in the duchies than in Copenhagen, without consulting the signatory parties of the London Convention.
These developments led to a dispute over who had a legitimate hereditary claim, and a dispute over whether nationalist interests or the 1852 Treaty of London were to take precedence. Prince Friedrich of Augustenburg laid a rival claim in a formal proclamation in Holstein on 19 November, maintaining that the death of King Frederick ended the duchies connection with Denmark, and therefore made them independent. He therefore proclaimed himself as the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein by virtue of his right as the legitimate male heir, regardless of his father, Christian of Augustenburg, having had agreed with renouncing it as part of the 1852 Treaty of London that had ruled out his claim, which he claimed did not apply to his own claims. His claim was enthusiastically supported by the nationalist movement throughout the duchies and the German states. Civil servant officials in Holstein, which was predominantly German and part of the German Confederation, refused to swear allegiance to King Christian IX that would lead to Danish assimilation, and the Holstein estates appealed to the Confederation Diet to recognise Duke Frederick. The Diet refused to admit Christian IX’s envoy to the Confederation on 28 November, and suspended the vote of Holstein and Lauenburg until the succession question was resolved.
Bismarck maintained that this breach re-opened the entire question of the future disposition of the duchies in view of the changed circumstances in which the Danish kingdom sought to present Europe with a fait accompli, and sought to annex Schleswig-Holstein with its excellent naval base at Kiel that would establish Prussia’s presence in the North and the Baltic Seas. European powers had broadly decided in 1852 that the integrity of the Danish kingdom was an essential element in the balance of power, and severing these duchies from Denmark was a grave violation of this balance in view of their strategic position value. Schleswig had a large Danish population, and there were many Danes also living in Holstein, which appealed to Danish nationalist sentiments. However, legal and political remedies were lacking in view of Denmark’s violation of the 1852 convention, and also placating public opinion in the German states that also repudiated this convention, while European powers would not take action to maintain the integrity of the Danish monarchy.
The Schleswig-Holstein issue had a galvanising effect on the German nationalist movement in 1863-1864, which demanded that these duchies were to be constituted jointly as a new German federal state under the rule of the Augustenburg dynasty. This was also a crucial issue for the Danish nationalist movement that demanded Denmark defend its claim to Schleswig. There were thus three conflicting positions on the future of these duchies: the Danes insisted on incorporating Schleswig, as was stated in the November 1863 Constitution; the German nationalist movement in the Confederation supported the Augustenburg claims, including by launching an armed intervention; the Prussians and Austrians opposed the Augustenburg claim, and demanded that he and the Danes abide by the terms of the international treaties of 1850 and 1852. This third position was narrowly supported by one vote in the Confederation parliament in December, and an intervention was to proceed on the basis of the London treaties. During this time, Bismarck immediately took action to forward Prussia’s interests, following earlier developments that had prepared the way for independent action. France was conciliated, and Russia remained allied to Prussia due to Bismarck’s support during the Polish revolt.
Bismarck began manipulating the state of affairs by seeking to ultimately annex these duchies, which were jointly administered by Austria and Prussia in a condominium as a provisional arrangement, into Prussia. He believed this could only be accomplished by waging war, while precluding the possibility of adding a new state to the German Confederation that could support Austria. He entered into negotiations with the Austrian government, claiming that the movement for the independence of Schleswig and Holstein was the result of radical revolutionary propaganda, which was to be countered by both Prussia and Austria to prevent the question of their future disposal by these means. Austria supported Bismarck’s policy on Schleswig-Holstein as a result of fears of radicalism, and thus concurred to join Prussia in staging a joint military action against Denmark on the justification that it was their duty as signatories of the 1852 Protocol to enforce its provisions.
Austria and Prussia then passed a resolution in the Frankfurt national assembly on 7 December 1863 to seize Holstein as a member of the German Confederation. While acting outside the mandate of the German Confederation, a formal agreement between Prussia and Austria was concluded in the Treaty of Vienna on 14 January, and then issued an ultimatum to Denmark on 16 January 1864 stating the following conditions, with the underlying threat of occupying Schleswig: 1. demanding Denmark withdraw its November constitution within forty-eight hours; 2. taking independent joint action if the Confederation Diet refused to their proposed measures; 3. preparing the necessary military sources; 4. suppressing any possible hostile demonstrations in the event of an occupation of Schleswig; 5. only accepting a conferences of involved powers after the withdrawal of the November constitution; 6. staging further consultations in the event of interference by either power. Prussia and Austria thus stated they would determine the future of the duchies by joint agreement, and decide the succession question by common consent, while ruling out agreements with a third party. Frederick von Augustenburg’s claims and those of his supporters were ignored, and the Confederation Diet was excluded from dealing with the future disposal of the duchies, including whether they were to be both admitted into the Confederation. The Danish kingdom rejected the Austrian-Prussian ultimatum to withdraw the new constitution and place the situation into the hands of the European powers, which effectively made the 1852 Protocol obsolete.
A Confederation task force of Prussian, Austrian, Saxon and Hanoverian troops crossed the Danish frontier on 23 December 1863, and occupied Lauenburg and Holstein south of the Eider River, while Danish forces withdrew to Schleswig without confronting them, which marked the beginning of the Second Schleswig War. Since the Danish government would not concede to an ultimatum to withdraw the November constitution, Prussian and Austrian troops on their own accord, rather than with Confederation, continued advancing onto the Danish mainland over the Eider River on 1 February 1864. Stiffer resistance than in Holstein was met in Schleswig until it was occupied by 28 February, and then in Jutland in April when Britain initiated proposing a conference of the London Treaty powers in April, before Austrian and Prussian troops stormed the Düppel fort near the island of Alsen on 18 April following two months of artillery bombardment, with roughly ten percent of the entire Danish army suffering casualties, leaving Austria and Prussia in practical possession of the duchies. The invigorating influence of well trained and disciplined troops was exercised, while also possessing the advantage of the Dreyse Zündgewehr, or the “needle gun,” which was a breech-loading essentially modern bolt-action rifle that could be fired at least three times as rapidly as any other firearm then in existence, with which Prussian troops were equipped than any other military force at the time. Troops were enabled with the critical advantage of reloading and firing between three and five times faster than traditional muzzle-loading weapon, although it was less accurate and had a shorter range. In comparison, the Danes were armed with a muzzle-loading rifle, and fought with an undertrained army of 44,000 soldiers that was not as well funded as that of Prussia’s, which also possessed four and six pounder breech-loader steel cannons.
The demonstration of Prussian power made the probability of maintaining the status quo unlikely. The belligerents signed an armistice on 9 May 1864. Having extended the mandate that was allowed by the German Confederation, Bismarck formally renounced the London treaty on 15 May, and declared himself to have a free hand to reach a peace settlement during peace negotiations, and dismissed the Duke of Augustenburg’s claims during an interview on 1 June, where he refused to be installed as the nominal sovereign of the duchies as Prussian provinces on the conditions of being the president of a Prussian province as a virtual protectorate, while Prussia would maintain military and administrative control, rather than the duke exercising autonomous and liberal rule. Augustenburg would hereafter become irrelevant in connection with the disposal of the duchies for as long as Bismarck was in charge of Prussian foreign policy, while liberal elements could only expect to advance their interests through their annexation by Prussia, on the condition that Austria would provide its consent. The congress of the German Confederation ended on a deadlock over their future disposition, apart from determining that the 1852 Convention was no longer valid without an alternative settlement having been arrived at, while it was apparent that the 1815 Concert of Europe was longer in operation as Bismarck intended to prevent those powers from reuniting while harnessing the element of German nationalism.
Fighting continuing on 26 June owing to the failure of reaching an agreement, leading to a decisive Danish defeat with the island of Alsen overrun on 29 June. Danish resistance officially ended by 1 July to prevent the fall of Copenhagen, and the German armies completed the occupation of Jutland by 20 July, before Denmark officially surrendered on 24 July. The war officially ended on 1 August 1864 with the signing of a preliminary peace when Copenhagen was threatened, while Denmark was militarily defeated and diplomatically isolated, while Russia supported Prussia as a result of its neutrality during the Crimean War and demonstrating monarchical solidarity in the Alvensleben Convention, and Denmark remaining in control of the entrance to the Baltic Sea did not affect British naval power. King Christian of Denmark ceded all rights to the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg to Prussia and Austria, which then jointly imposed their military occupation, pending decision-making their future governance. Austrian authorities proposed in the autumn of 1864 that the Prussians could either recognize the duchies as a separate state under Augustenburg, or annex them outright to Prussia in exchange for compensating Austria with territorial concessions along the Silesian border. Bismarck rejected both options, and sought to extend their control in these duchies, which Austria countered by proposing in the Confederation parliament that the Augustenburg succession was to be re-considered with Austria’s encouragement, and was also supported by the people of the duchies and middle German states. These parties and foreign powers, with the possible exception of Russia in view of Prussia’s neutrality during the Crimean War and providing assistance in suppressing the 1863 Polish revolt, were opposed to Bismarck’s policy of annexation to the confederation that was favoured in Prussia. Bismarck thus successfully completed the first stage of his policy toward the duchies through their complete separation from Denmark. However, their ultimate status had not hitherto been determined.
The Treaty of Vienna that was signed on 30 October 1864 stipulated Denmark ceded all rights in the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein, apart from the island of Ærø, which remained Danish, and Lauenburg in favour of both Prussia and Austria. Danish nationalists were granted a six year period in which they could emigrate to Denmark. Rendsburg would become a federal fortress. Prussia was allowed the use of two roads through Holstein for military purposes, and postal and telegraphic communications, and agreed to build a railway from Lübeck to Kiel. Prussia would also be allowed to build a canal through Holstein to link the Baltic and the North Seas. The port of Kiel became a federal harbour in accordance with proposals for establishing a German fleet for the German Confederation under Prussian administration, while Schleswig came under the control of Prussia, and Holstein under Austria. Both duchies would accede to the German Customs Union. The duchy of Lauenburg was acquired by Prussia in exchange for a payment of 2.5 million Danish thalers to Austria, and Bismarck was appointed as its duke. Prussia and Austria would establish joint sovereignty over Schleswig-Holstein. Tension mounted during the summer with the Prussians insisting on expelling Duke Friedrich from Holstein, and the ongoing uncertainty over the provisional joint administration remained a subject for negotiations, until the conclusion of convention reached at Bad Gastein on 14 August 1865. Austria and Prussia agreed to exercise joint administrative sovereignty over the duchies, placing Schleswig under Prussian and Holstein under Austrian control. As Austria faced the threat of civil war and hostile nations outside its borders, it was forced to tentatively accept this unsatisfactory status as a temporary solution that Bismarck intended to set.
Prussia and Austria ratified the Gastein Convention on 20 August, but this was merely a fragile interim arrangement that Bismarck used to eventually gain complete control over them, which included dismissing the Duke of Augustenburg claims as a same type of difficulty that the other small German states would pose to establishing Prussia’s influence, as well as neutralize Austrian political influence in the German states. Augustenburg who belonged to the ducal family of Holstein meanwhile claimed the territory as being his by right of descent, and established the apparatus of a state government in his residency in Kiel. The two representatives in the duchies acted according to different instructions, with Prussia treating Augustenburg as a private nobleman and apprehending and imprisoning those who led agitations in his favour, while Austria encouraging these agitations, and protesting against Prussia’s actions while Bismarck sought to maintain Austria in the alliance that had been formed on 16 January 1864 and also make the joint administration of the duchies unworkable. Whereas Austria proposed handing control of the duchies over to Augustenburg, Bismarck argued that their disposal was within the decision-making authority of Prussia and Austria alone, and forced the Frankfurt Diet to withdraw Confederation forces from Holstein in November 1864, leaving Prussia and Austria in complete control, while Bismarck simultaneously maintained a tenuous alliance with Austria, and also planning for war by provoking disputes with Austria over the administration of the two duchies, and also securing alliances with other states hostile to Austria, while Prussian bureaucracy throttled Austria’s connections with Holstein.
Bismarck sought to suppress public support for Augustenburg’s claims to Schleswig-Holstein during this time. He launched a vitriolic campaign in November against this movement in Holstein, and directed Prussian authorities in Schleswig to interfere in Holstein’s affairs, but this only reinforced agitation for Duke Friedrich to call the Schleswig-Holstein estates together. The Austrian governor of Holstein also allowed a mass demonstration in Altona to agitate for this cause on 23 January 1865 on the condition that not any definite resolutions should be adopted, which was nevertheless to provide advantages to Austria with prejudice to Prussia as the speakers at this assembly, which included representatives from Frankfurt, Hesse and Bavaria, made violent recriminations against the Prussian government, following those that had been made in the Frankfurt Confederation diet, while offering support for Augustenburg. This event gave Bismarck a pretext to demand joint action against “revolutionary” movements in the duchies, at the cost of reconsidering the Gastein Convention, which would open the way for Prussia to act according to its own independent interests. In contrast, Austria could not abandon Holstein, which would be tantamount to surrendering its primary position in the German states, whereas Bismarck maintained the position of provoking war with Austria over this same underlying matter.
Austria’s proposal for Prussia to annex the duchies in exchange for an equivalent amount of territory to Austria, and thereby abandon Holstein as an enclave within Prussia that controlled its land route with Austria, that would necessitate ceding a part of Silesia was dismissed. Bismarck’s proposed terms on 22 January 1865 for appointing Augustenburg as the puppet ruler of the duchies in exchange for concessions effectively making them new Prussian provinces was likewise refused as being totally unacceptable. Bismarck likewise aggravated the tension with Austria by protesting about agitations opposing Prussia in the duchies, and pointed out the probability of Prussia taking independent action, although the Prussian king remained hesitant about mobilisation against Austria, whereas Bismarck was convinced that war with Austria would be inevitable to settle the question of the duchies’ conclusive disposition. Austria likewise aggravated tension by violating the pledge to not consult the Confederation over Schleswig-Holstein by supporting a Bavarian-Saxon motion in March 1865 calling for recognising Augustenburg, which carried in April with Austria and Prussia on opposing sides. Bismarck meanwhile would reject any opportunity to avoid the outbreak of war with Austria, such as being amenable to any negotiated solution. Only defeating Austria in a military conflict would drive Austria out of the German states, and establish Prussia’s hegemony therein. Establishing this Prussian supremacy required new territorial acquisition through waging warfare, which would also assert the authority of the monarchy over the Prussian parliament, with which the constitutional conflict remained unresolved.
Bismarck sought more definite guarantees from France under Napoleon III, who intended to recover his waning political and popular prestige through new conquests. A foreseeable conflict between Prussia and Austria could theoretically lead to acquiring the long-coveted Rhine provinces. During the process of taking any decisive steps against Austria, Bismarck came to an understanding with the French emperor as part of preparing Prussia’s international position in the event of the outbreak of war, first by preventing an alliance between France and Austria by assuring Napoleon III Prussia would not support Austrian attempts to maintain France’s occupation of Rome, and thereby allay French intervention in the event of war between Prussia and Austria. Bismarck in a secret meeting with Napoleon at Biarritz in southwestern France, where an understanding was reached on 12 October 1865. This agreement exposed the fragility of the Gastein Convention, as it became apparent that Bismarck was already anticipating a forthcoming war with Austria. Napoleon agreed for France to remain benevolently neutral in the event of a war between Austria and Prussia, as well as sanction a Prussian alliance with Italy, whereas Bismarck offered vague pledges of territorial compensation on France’s western borders, or “wherever French was spoken,” thus offering his potential consent for France’s acquisition of Belgium, regardless of opposition from Britain maintaining the Treaty of 1839, and Luxemburg in the form of verbal pledges, in exchange for allowing for Prussia’s own aggrandisement, without any awkward written records that would require repayment for favours at some future date. Bismarck thus successfully allayed French fears about the Gastein Convention.
Napoleon hereby anticipated war between Prussia and Austria, in which both states would be weakened, and thus leave France as the sole arbiter of western Europe that could bring territorial acquisitions in the Rhineland on the strength of the threat of French intervention. Napoleon postponed compensation claims to be defined, having expected that an armed conflict between Prussia and Austria would be destructive and indecisive, which could then lead to French intervention and dictate compensation terms on either or both combatants. However, Napoleon failed to recognise the actual strength of the Austrian military, the preparedness of the French army, and completely disregarding the modernisation of the Prussian army and its potential.
Prussians continually staged provocations in Holstein over continual agitations supporting Augustenburg, and claimed that a pro-Augustenburg nationalist meeting held in Altona on 23 January 1866 was a violation of the Gastein terms while unsuccessful negotiations for a peaceful resolution remained underway. Von Gablenz, the Austrian governor, initially forbade this demonstration, but later provided a special permission for it to take place. The speakers demanded summoning a parliament of the Schleswig-Holstein estates while offering their support for Frederick of Augustenburg, while fierce invectives were used to denounce Prussia. Bismarck protested against this assembly at Vienna on 26 January, while maintaining for Prussian and Austrian cooperation against revolutionary elements, including in Holstein, which he accused the Austrians of supporting Augustenburg agitation against the Prussian kingdom that had to be promptly suppressed, while declaring that the Austrian administration of Holstein was intolerable as “championing revolution.” The Austrians denied these allegations, and assembled troops in Bohemia and Moravia to prepare for war against Prussia, in addition to addressing the various German states, excluding Austria, to leave the disposition of Schleswig-Holstein to the German Confederation, as well as prepare for on the side of Austria. Bismarck’s own address to the Confederation to consider reform based on the Vienna and Gastein treaties was dismissed. Austria informed Prussia on 9 February that the alliance of 1864 was at an end, thus reverting their position to before the Second Schleswig War against Denmark.
Bismarck next sought an offensive alliance with Italy while deliberately preparing for war against Austria. Following Bismarck inviting Italy to conclude a commercial alliance with the Zollverein as an economic understanding that would have great future political significance, a drafted was drafted by 15 November 1865, and was later ratified on 2 March 1866. A secret treaty was later signed on 8 April 1866, in flagrant violation of article eleven of the federal constitution that forbade member states to enter into any binding commitments that were directed against any other members. Prussia and Italy were committed to provide each other with assistance in the event of an outbreak of war with Austria. Italy was hereby committed to declare war on Austria and launch an attack from its southeast within three months of an outbreak of hostilities between Austria and Prussia to divert Austrian troops southward while Prussia would attack Austrian troops stationed in the north, in exchange for acquiring Austrian Venice and the Papal States in a peace treaty between Prussia and Austria to complete the process of national unification. There was to be neither peace nor an armistice without the consent of both states, but this consent was not to be withheld if Venice were ceded to Italy and an equivalent in Austrian territory to Prussia, and the Italian navy was to hinder Austrian ships from reaching the Baltic from Trieste. Italy also acquired an immediate advantage from Bismarck to conclude a commercial alliance with the Zollverein, which was later concluded on 15 November, before being ratified by Prussia and Italy on 3 March 1866. Prussia thus secured three vital guarantees. Waging war against Austria over the question of the federal reform of Germany would be contingent upon Prussia taking action for this purpose, and Napoleon III was blocked from claiming to be the protector of Italy as the protector of Italy from hostilities with Prussia.
Napoleon III pressed for his own diplomatic advantages prior to the outbreak of war, by proposing a treaty with Prussia in which should Prussia declare war within ten days of its signing, France would also declare war immediately against Austria. Venetia would be ceded to the new kingdom of Italy, Prussia was to receive German territory, and also obtain the right to implement reforms in the German Confederation, whereas France was to take the territory between the Mosel and the Rhine, apart from Koblenz and Mainz, Rhenish Bavaria, Birkenfeld, Homburg, and Rheinhesse as elements of the peace settlement. However, this treaty was not concluded, without considering French military support, and thereby maintaining a free hand for Prussia without making territorial sacrifices. In practice, these vague promises that were not recorded in writing only led to diplomatic defeats for France. While Russia’s relations with Austria were not cordial following the Crimean War, he had likewise cultivated relations with Russian authorities when he was posted at the Prussian embassy in St. Petersburg, and therefore did not express any concern about intervention from that source, expecting Russia to be benevolently neutral. Bismarck likewise sought to unsettle public opinion in the German Confederation.
Bismarck made an unexpected proposal for federal reform on 9 April 1866, a day after the alliance with Italy was secured, to marshal support for Prussia from German nationalists when war with Austria appeared to be inevitable. The Prussian government introduced an official resolution to reform the German Confederation that would exclude Austria, with joint military alliances led by Prussia in the north and Bavaria in the south, and a joint confederate navy. A German national parliament was to be elected by direct universal male suffrage, which would discuss drafting a new constitution for the German states that would include these terms. A treaty was to be formulated to regulate relations between the German states in the present form and Austria. This attempt to marshal support from the conservative peasants, and expelling Austria from the German Confederation would also reduce the probability of external powers intervening in this conflict.
International tensions rose following news of troop movements in Italy, which in turn led to a partial Austrian mobilisation against Italy on 21 April, which then triggered a series of further troop deployments in both Prussia and Austria, while Bismack demanded Austria’s full demobilisation against both Prussia and Italy in response to Austria’s request for Prussia to suspend its war preparations. The Austrian delegate to the German Confederation denounced Prussia on 1 June, for being determined to resolve the question of the Schleswig-Holstein administration by force, and seeking assistance from Italy as Austria’s enemy. In view of having failed to negotiate a resolution with Prussia, he then proposed passing responsibility for the duchies to the German Confederation, and the Austrian governor of Holstein was ordered to summon the local estates to express the future of the duchies. Bismarck correctly stated Austria breached the Gastein Convention, since the duchies were to be administered without external influences, and therefore argued that this violation entitled Prussian troops to enter Holstein on 7 June, and marched therein on 9 June, where they prevented the local estate representatives from meeting. Austrian troops withdrew peacefully to preclude an outbreak of war. Bismarck then reinforced this provocation on the following day by submitting a proposal for constitutional reform to the German Confederation that recommended excluding Austria as a member state.
Napoleon III sought advantages for France during this time by precluding Prussia from re-establishing the triple alliance of 1815 by uniting with Austria and its southern German state allies, expecting them to overwhelm Prussia, as well as complete the war aims of 1859 by procuring Venetia for Italy, and secure French territorial concessions, while Britain would oppose the acquisition of Belgium in the face of the 1859 treaty with Great Britain. Napoleon III expressed his support for Austria on 12 June, and the middle-sized German states against Prussia by concluding a secret treaty with Austria, which primarily cited ceding Venice to Italy, offering Austria territorial acquisitions in southern Prussia, and creating a Rhineland German state that would be separate from the German Confederation that would be allied with France. This attempt at assisting Austria to preserve the European balance of power, in contrast to Prussia’s determination to destroy the status quo, followed Napoleon III’s mistakenly exaggerated estimate of Austrian strength. Potential French allies among the anti-Prussian German states, Hanover, Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Darmstadt were likewise as unprepared for war while France itself lacked military preparations as a result of these resources having been drained in its intervention in Mexico. Meanwhile, Bismarck would not tolerate Napoleon III mediating between Prussia and Austria and defining the terms of a peace settlement, or cede any German territory as compensation in the event of a Prussian victory, and was also prepared to resist French armed intervention, including with the support of the southern German states following their defeat.
The Austrian ambassador to the Confederation denounced the occupation of Holstein on 11 June 1866 as a breach of the terms of the Vienna treaty and the Gastein Convention, and Austria and Prussia then severed diplomatic relations on 12 June. Austria then proposed calling for ordering the mobilisation of the armies of the Confederation states against Prussia, which was passed by a majority vote of nine to six at its last plenary meeting on 14 June, regardless of the Confederation Diet not having been a signatory to the Gastein Convention. Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony, Hanover, Hesse-Kassel and Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau voted in favour, with Baden abstaining, while the remaining states, including the dukes of Oldenburg, Mecklenburg, the Saxon duchies, Luxemburg, and the free cities apart from Frankfurt, sided with Prussia. The chambers of Kassel, Nassau and Darmstadt refused to appropriate funding for a military campaign. The Hanover assembly passed a resolution in favour of neutrality, and the people of Leipzig petitioned the king of Saxony to follow a similar course.
The Prussian representative at the confederation diet responded at this meeting by declaring that any member states who voted for it would be considered waging war on Prussia, declared the Confederation dissolved, and proposed founding a new German state under Prussia’s leadership. Apart from a few small northern states, the remaining members aligned with Austria. Prussia then delivered ultimatums to Saxony, Hanover, and Hesse-Kassel, ordering them to demobilize and accept the Prussian reform proposals. Hostilities began on 16 June with Prussian troops entered these states after satisfactory replies were not received. Prussian armies entered Hannover on 17 June, Hesse-Kassel on 19 June, and Leipzig and Dresden on 20 June. Italy then declared war on Austria on 20 June and commenced hostilities three days thereafter, and thus opening the way for Prussia to go to war against Austria in what was in effect a German civil war, with the virtual assurance of Russian and French neutrality. Italy as Prussia’s ally forced the Austrians to open a second front that diverted 100,000 troops to successfully counter the Italian offensive in Venetia on their southwestern front at Custozza on 24 June, and in a single naval engagement at Lissa in the Adriatic Sea on 20 July.
Austria possessed certain advantages. These were having sophisticated accurate rifled cannon artillery operated by well-trained battery teams that could fire shells at long ranges, although Prussian artillery could fire faster. In addition, most of the middle German states sided against Prussia, with Confederation armies numbering about 150,000 troops dispersed among separate armies. While they had never trained together and did not possess a unified command structure, the Prussian chief of the general staff since 1857, Major-General Helmuth von Moltke, turned it into an efficient planning body that coordinated all aspects of mobilisation. The staff corps was reorganised in accordance with adapting tactical and strategic methods to new telegraph communications to control dispersed forces, putting railway transportation systems and road networks to effective uses by enabling rapid deployment of troops to key strategic defensive points, and studying European politics in connection with potential military actions. Both Austria’s and Prussia’s alliances forced them to wage war over a wide area, as Hanover, Bavaria, Baden and Hesse threatened Prussia to the west and north, and Saxony to the south. Prussia’s alliance with Italy balanced the disadvantage by forcing Austria to maintain three corps of troops in Venice. Moltke divided the Prussian army into four different blocks that could be transported rapidly over separate rail lines, which reduced the logistical strain on narrow roads and single track railways. The increased speed and manoueverability of deployed forces thus increased the possibility of the Prussians to determine the timing and setting of a decisive engagement. They would then converge to attack points on the Austrian, Saxon and Hanoverian frontiers to deliver knockout blows at a precise time, whereas Austria would operate on a more concentrated terrain with the advantage of using interior lines.
The Prussian general staff’s innovative strategic conception of combining converging units at the final time of engagement, involving armies shifting on trains and then marching separately before striking together, which reduced logistical strains and increased speed and manoeuverability, to deliver a decisive blow. In contrast, the Austrian armies functioned in a less methodical manner. General Helmuth von Moltke, the chief of the German General Staff, divided the Prussian forces into three large armies launched against the recalcitrant German states. Moltke developed combining flexibility and speed in offensive strategic deployments of large units with controlled and defensive tactical deployment of infantry units, whereas the Austrians tended to be strategically defensive and tactically offensive. In addition, Austrian troops proved to be less motivated and had inadequate communications. Another Prussian advantage was establishing a superior infantry force by being the only European force to arm them with a breech-loaded (bolt action) rifle, or the needle gun that remained the most effective weapon in Europe that could be reloaded faster than Austrian Lorentz muzzle loaded musket, or approximately seven rounds per minute, and could be fired from a prone position, in contrast to up to three rounds per minute and had to be fired while standing, albeit having a shorter accurate firing range. Another German advantage was the innovative use of dividing company sized units into smaller platoon sized units and applying skirmish tactics, in contrast to the outdated Austrian assault columns by battalions that could not provide sufficiently rapid effective return fire.
Separate battles against Austria’s German allies led to decisive Prussian victories. Hanover was compelled to surrender at Langensalza on 29 June, which reinforced the southern German states decisions to concentrate on taking defensive positions. Prussia encountered relatively slight resistance from the states siding with Austria, which were slow to mobilise. Bavarian and Prussian troops clashed in an indecisive battle in Dermbach in Thuringia, with the Bavarian troops then retreating following the news of the Prussian victory at Königgrȁtz on 3 July to defend their borders. Prussian forces defeated the forces of Hesse-Darmstadt at Laufach on 13 July, and occupied Frankfurt-am-Main on 19 July, and then crossed the Main to face Württemberg forces at Taubenbischofsheim, who could not halt the Prussian advance, while Baden forces disengaged altogether. Final battles between Prussians and Bavarians were fought on 25-26 July, which did not influence the outcome of the war. Resistance offered by federal forces was subdued outside Würzburg on 27 July, before Prussian troops entered this city, the Bavarian capital, on 2 August.
The Austrians and their Saxon allies were in full retreat in Bohemia by the end of June. This seven-week long conflict ended between the river fortress of Königgrȁtz and the town of Sadowa, where deployed Austrian and Saxon troops were pinned down by the Prussians with the Elbe River behind them, while the Austrian commanding general, Ludwig von Benedek, was forbidden to attack the communication line flank of one of the second Prussian army while having to hold a completely defensive position, but demonstrated the advantage of their superior artillery and using effective cavalry forces. Over 40,000 Austrian troops were killed or wounded in engaging three separate Prussian armies that had advanced at different times into Bohemia, which left the Austria without any combat effective Austrian infantry brigade. The defeat of Saxony forced the Austrians onto taking a defensive stance, as the Prussians controlled mountain passes that protected their borders. The Prussian forces were hereafter successful wherever they advanced, with the next decisive victory acquired at Tobitschau on 15 July that forced the Austrian army to retreat into Hungary, while the second and third Prussian armies pressed toward Vienna. The Austrian government surrendered Venetia to France with the underlying hope that Napoleon III could use it as a counterweight to detach Italy from the Prussian alliance, and thus enable them to withdraw a hundred thousand troops to defend Vienna, to which king Victor Emmanual of Italy responded by declining this offer, rather than remaining allied with France, which had remained precluding the unification of Italy by occupying the Roman republic since 1849, and ordered the invasion of Venetia to take advantage of the change of affairs while choosing to ally Italy with Prussia.
The decisive battle of Königgrȁtz led emperor Franz Joseph to agree to an armistice on 4 July, which the Prussians refused to accept, and advanced to take Prague unopposed, as well as resumed advancing toward Vienna on 7 July. At this time, the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph I had telegraphed Napoleon III on 4 July to request him to intervene to call for the hostilities to cease and begin peace negotiations for an armistice. Although Napoleon III was unable to prevent the Prussian army from advancing on Vienna, he accepted the peace proposals consisting of allowing Prussia to have a free hand in northern Germany, while the southern states would be excluded from the newly planned North German Confederation, and Venice would be ceded to Italy. While the Prussian continued advancing to nineteen kilometres from Vienna by 18 July, Bismarck hereafter concluded that the political objectives of the war were fulfilled, and moderate peace settlements were to be concluded with Austria and its German allies, in the face of potential opposition from the Prussian general staff members who would aim for further military victories, which were to be tempered in view of foreign policy considerations, in the form of potential opposition from other European powers, particularly from France. Hostilities were suspended on 2 August in both Germany and Italy, and Bismarck began prepare for the postwar order, in which he envisaged France would wage war against Prussia in the indefinite future to challenge its growing influence as a result of the shift in the European balance of power. It would therefore become necessary to re-establish this balance on an enduring basis in which Prussia had acquired an advantage, and it therefore became necessary to consolidate its power that could be threatened from a hostile European coalition.
Bismarck was thus faced with overcoming opposition from the Prussian general staff who would protest against political meddling in military matters, whereas he contemplated the possibility of Austria potentially establishing a future alliance with France against Prussia. It was also necessary to resolve the political dispute with the Prussian Landtag that had sought to limit the monarchical prerogative, while demanding greater decision-making jurisdiction over the national budget, and acquire the support of the liberals and nationalists who supported the cause of national unification of the German states, yet they would not reach a compromise over budgetary legislation with the monarchy since 1862. A cooperative working relationship with a parliamentary government was thus to be restored following the peace settlement with Austria. An additional difficulty was determining the postwar organisation of the German states under Prussian leadership that would exclude Austrian influences.
While both Prussian and Austrian forces were slowed by extended communication lines and cholera outbreaks, Napoleon III witnessed how the Seven Weeks War was contrary to his expectations and upset his plans for extending French international prestige at Prussia’s expense. In contrast, Bismarck sought to gain Napoleon’s acquiescence for a considerable extension of Prussia by annexing smaller German states that were allied with Austria, whose forces were also defeated by early August. Napoleon sanctioned these annexations in late July, prior to the peace settlement with Austria, while Bismarck persuaded the William I to exercise military restraint and open armistice negotiations.
The capitulation on 22 July 1866 at Nikolsburg led to signing the preliminary arrangements on the 26 July, which were then ratified on 28 July. Austria would be required to pay a comparatively insignificant indemnity of roughly twenty-five million thalers, which signalled generosity that Bismarck could be reciprocated in the indefinite future by maintaining positive relations with Austria, and the southern German states would not be intimidated by Prussia preponderance as a new European power. The Danes in northern Schleswig would be allowed to vote on whether it would belong to Denmark or Germany. Austria was to withdraw from the German confederation and from all inference in German affairs. Venetia was to be surrendered to Italy, and a strip of territory was to rectify the boundaries with Silesia. Saxony was obliged to pay a small indemnity with its territory and kingdom remaining intact, along with sovereignty remaining intact for Nassau, Hanover and Kassel. The south German states were to pay indemnities, and form a military confederation under the leadership of Bavaria. The reigning princes were to be deposed and their territories incorporated into Prussia, while their families were to remain their estates, or receive a monetary compensation, as in Hanover. The northern states were to enter into a confederation with Prussia, led by the king of Prussia as their military commander.
The German Confederation voted to dissolve itself on 28 July, and the history of Prussia and Austria competing for hegemony over the German states consequently came to an end, the eastern and western regions of Prussia were united, and peace settlements were resolved thereafter. Hostilities in the German states and Italy were suspended on 2 August. Separate peace settlements were reached in Württemberg on 13 August, Baden on 17 August, Bavaria on 22 August, and Hesse-Darmstadt on 3 September, by which they obtained peace and the integrity of their territories upon the payment of an indemnity, apart from northern Hesse that was incorporated into the new North German Confederation, in which Prussia maintained seventeen votes in the leading federal council, with twenty-six votes assigned to the twenty-one other states. These southern German states also agreed to renew the customs trade union, and to arrange their railway systems in common with the northern states.
The French ambassador to Prussia, Vincent Benedetti, presented demands on 5 August for territorial compensation along the Rhine, including Rhenish Bavaria, Rhenish Hesse and the fortress of Mainz, as well as the 1814 boundaries, with a favourable outlook in the direction of Luxemburg for the future, which had been parts of France. Bismarck presented these states with confidential revelations about Napoleon III’s demands for territorial compensation in the German states, which revealed aggressive French foreign policy aims with the underlying purpose of retaining his power in France, and also led to creating defensive nationalism among the German states in view of potential French aggression. Although peace preliminaries between Prussia and Austria had left the southern German states wholly independent, they were also practically defenceless against foreign opposition, and therefore chose to rely on Prussia’s military leadership and enable separate German state armies to function as a coherent whole. The separate peace settlement terms between Prussia and the southern states were thus being supplemented with separate secret treaties that provided for mutual territorial guarantees, which required the contracting parties to be united for the common purpose of united resistance in the event of war, and placed under the command of the king of Prussia.
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