Bismarck maintained peace in international European relations by maintaining the Triple Alliance, and blocking the formation of an opposing alliance, while fostering good relations with neighbouring states. Of the five major powers in Europe, three were now allied with Germany, Britain was not interested in European alliances, while the main rivals of the British were the French in Africa and the Russians in Iran and the Far East. Hence, although Bismarck’s agreements represented only informal commitments rather than strict alliances, he succeeded in staying on good terms with all powers, apart from France. The Triple Alliance completed Central Europe by closing the Alpine passes, and barred the gateway to Vienna through which Napoleon had advanced in 1796, and opened the Mediterranean to Germany, while also denying France the possibility of Italy as an ally, against which it would have to protect an additional border. It appeared unlikely that France, Great Britain and Russia could find allies among the European powers, whereas the Triple Alliance constituted the chief factor with Germany as its most powerful member exercising control over in European international relations, which superseded referring to discuss conflicting interests in formal deliberations in congresses by challenging other nations. Meanwhile, government factions in France seeking to wage a war of revenge against Germany remained an underlying unpredictable element, although France had for the time being turned from engaging in European affairs toward turning its strength toward distant colonial enterprises in Africa and Asia, while those in Russia remained subject to leading to hostilities with Austria-Hungary that posed a greater threat.
The Congress of Berlin from 13 June to 13 July 1878 that provided a means for revising the Treaty of San Stefano, where Bismark sought to adjudicate as an “honest broker,” and placate all interested parties ultimately led to alienating Russia against Germany, with prejudice to upholding those of Austria-Hungary to a wider degree. Whereas Britain sought to limit Russian access to the Mediterranean as well as raised objections to the creation of a Bulgarian state that would be in Russia’s sphere of influence, Austria-Hungary was determined to prevent the creation of a large pan-Slavic state, whereas Russia sought to consolidate its gains to the greatest extent possible. Although Britain’s suspicions of extending Russian interests were allayed, an amicable compromise between Austria-Hungary and Russia could not be reached in a manner that would stabilise their relations and competing interests in the Balkans. Bismarck claimed the alliance with Austria was a warning and not a threat to Russia, which was reinforced by not theoretically exercising the option of entering into an alliance with Britain while Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli was in office. However, Russian authorities accused Bismark of causing their diplomatic isolation, especially due to their various disputes with Britain in the Near East and Asia.
Hence, the Russian ambassador to Germany, Peter Saburov, conferred Bismarck for a secret mutual defence agreement in September 1879 to marshal potential support against Britain, to which Bismarck agreed with the understanding that Germany did not harbour any interests in Russia’s designated sphere of influence in the Balkans. They agreed that Germany would remain neutral in the event of a conflict between Russia and Britain, whereas Russian pledged to remain neutral in a conflict between Germany and France. Russia also pledged to respect Austria-Hungary’s territorial integrity, in exchange for Austria-Hungary maintaining the terms of the Treaty of Berlin.
Potential conflicts with Britain as a result of Prime Minister William Gladstone in Britain reinforced plans for an agreement between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia, due to his foreign policy of advancing national self-determination within constituent empires in Europe, which directed hostility against the Ottoman and the Hapsburg empires, and was counter to Bismarck’s foreign policy of European states pursuing their separate interests, and mediating conflicts to maintain a balance of power status quo, with the underlying elements being the diplomatic isolation of France, preventing war between Russia and Austria-Hungary, and maintaining the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary. British foreign policy during this time therefore negated the possibility of reaching an alliance agreement between Britain and Austria-Hungary as Germany’s primary ally. Austro-Hungarian authorities later consented to entering into an agreement with Germany and Russia, which resulted in creating the secret Second League of the Three Emperors on 18 June 1881. Russia pledged to stay neutral in the event of a war between France and Germany, whereas Germany would remain benevolently neutral in any conflict between Russia and Britain. Apart from stating if one of the three signatories was at war with a fourth, the others would remain neutral, they pledged to keep the Dardanelles Straights to foreign warships, and declared they would not allow any changes in the Balkan status quo, apart from by mutual agreement. If one of them waged war against Turkey, the other two pledged to remain neutral on the condition that prior agreement had been reached about subsequent territorial changes in a postwar settlement. Russia recognised the right of Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina, in exchange for Austria-Hungary acknowledging Bulgaria was in the Russian sphere of influence, and pledged not to raise any objections to the unification of Eastern Rumelia that was under Ottoman empire administration and independent Bulgaria. Bismarck’s underlying object was thus re-establishing a conservative alliance precluding conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary by commending peaceful coexistence between them, and setting a Russian eastern sphere of influence in the Balkans that would be preserved in the face of British opposition to Russian aims against Turkey, while Austria maintained a western sphere of influence in the Balkans and allayed Russian suspicions about the effects of the Austrian-German Dual Alliance. This agreement also ensured Germany would not be engaged in a two front war, in the event of a conflict with France.
The stability of the Triple Alliance was further reinforced with a secret agreement with a secret agreement with Serbia in 1881 that practically made it an Austrian vassal state, and another agreement with Rumania in 1883 provided for joint military action against Russian aggression. This alliance was further renewed in 1884, when Bismarck effected a meeting of the three emperors in the interest of satisfying the Tsar by providing reassurance that the Triple Alliance was not in any respect inimical to Russian interests, and attempt to renew the cordial understanding that had been in place between Germany A rapprochement between Russia and Austria prior to the Russian-Turkish war would ensure Germany’s international position, provided that European conditions remained the same without an opposing alliance being formed, as Bismarck used every diplomatic resource to keep Russia and France divided from each other.
The League of Three Emperors was later renewed in 1884, when it committed each signatory to maintain benevolent neutrality in the event a fourth power attacked one of them. This also applied to Turkey, but only if previous agreement had been reached on territorial changes after the war. Thus, Germany and Austria would not assist Britain against Russia, and Russia would remain neutral if a Franco-Russian or Austro-Italian war ensued. They would also permit no changes in the status quo of the Balkans, and the eastern and western halves of the Balkans were considered to be separate Russian and Austrian spheres of influence. Russia recognised the right of Austria-Hungary to administer Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Austria acknowledged that Bulgaria was in the Russian sphere of influence. When Austria was consolidating its influence in Serbia was being consolidated, and Russia’s suspicions about Germany became placated with this new agreement, tensions in the Balkans again broke out in September 1885, when a revolt against Ottoman administration in Eastern Rumelia and the future disposition of a unified Bulgaria ruined the Three Emperors’ Alliance, and undermined Bismarck’s alliance system by causing suspicion against Germany in Russia, while France followed a conciliatory stance toward Russia throughout this crisis. Relations between Germany and Russia were further strained by the tsar stationing the bulk of Russian troops in Russia’s western provinces bordering Prussia during 1887, in proximity of German landholdings, while the Russian press published contents that were hostile Germany. These actions in turn led to German economic measures against Russia, and thus further weakening this alliance, while Russia’s relations with Austria-Hungary remained damaged owing to their conflicting interests in the Balkans.
Bismarck’s foreign policy of maintaining Germany’s predominance in international politics from 1871 was primarily centered on the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and promoting its interests, regardless of how they could be prejudicial to those of Russia, and therefore its importance took precedence over the League of Three Emperors. The Dual Alliance conditions were renewed in 1882, with Italy as a new and unexpected ally, which sought an alliance with Austria-Hungary in reaction to the French annexation of Tunis in 1881, which outraged Italian public opinion by abruptly ending Italian colonial aspirations in this part of northern Africa. Bismarck envisaged that an alliance with Italy would at least deprive France of a potential ally, and would relieve pressure on Austria-Hungary in the event of war in the Balkans, as well as possibly stabilise the Italian monarchy. The newly-established Triple Alliance created on 20 may 1882 committed the signatories to uphold the monarchical principle and the extant social and political order. Each of the three signatories pledged to assist the others if one or both became engaged in a war with two or more great powers, and remain neutral in the event of a war with one. An additional protocol expressed the hope that this alliance would not disturb Italy’s customary friendship with Britain.
This alliance did support Italian expansionism in Africa, Bismarck was not interested in the race for colonisation while securing Germany’s European position was of much greater importance, unless colonies could be used for concessions by European powers. Moreover, overseas colonies could only be defended by powerful naval strength, which Bismarck believed would have to rival that of Britain, or would otherwise be subject to British attack. The greater priority for Bismarck’s foreign policy nevertheless remained that European alliance systems that were directly posed against France, while the Austro-Italian part of the Triple Alliance swore to maintain the status quo in the Balkans, but promised reciprocal compensation if changes in territory occurred. A Second Mediterranean Agreement was signed in December 1887, which merely stipulated that an understanding would be reached on measures to respect the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, following the Bulgarian Assembly’s election of Ferdinand Saxe-Coburg as prince of Bulgaria in April 1887. The European nations otherwise did not have much to fear from the unified Germany under Bismarck’s leadership. Italy distanced from France without any probability to call on Germany for support while pursuing its separate interests, while the Triple Alliance could not protect the Italian coastlines, particularly from British sea power. Bismarck thus sought to secure goodwill from Britain, which could be applied against France and Russia in their colonial competitions.
German overseas territories were acquired in Africa and the Pacific under strong domestic pressure for German traders to acquire outlets for exports to colonies outside Europe, outside of the other colonial powers’ spheres of interests, with the status of “protectorates.” A new departure in foreign policy thus took place when Germany acquired colonies in Africa and Asia as a result of the expansion of manufacturing capacity, overseas commerce and shipping and therefore consolidating its position as a world power. Bismarck had opposed this movement while concentrating on the developing the unity of the German states, since he had envisaged that a successful colonial campaign would inevitably embroil Germany in rivalries outside of Europe, particularly with France and Great Britain. This could react on Germany’s European position, including the possibility of a Franco-British alliance that would entail Britain intervening in European affairs if its overseas possession and naval supremacy were threatened. Moreover, it was also necessary to maintain goodwill with Britain to maintain the interests of the Triple Alliance, in terms of protecting the Italian coasts from being threatened by the British fleet. However, he later encouraged the German colonisation movement to some extent in the interest of placating public opinion for foreign expansion, while declining to assume responsibility for the administration and development of overseas colonies by adapting the British method of developing chartered companies with assistance of a subsidy to a steamship line. A Kolonialverein was founded in Germany in 1882 with support from industry considerably interested public opinion in overseas expansion, while the state was already intervening more extensively in overseas trade as an inevitable consequence of transitioning from free trade to mercantile protectionism. The union of two separate colonial organisations in 1887 in the German colonial society showed the solidarity of this movement, and a “colonial group” was set up in the Reichstag as early as 1883 to press demand for this purpose. Official support was given to German merchants seeking concessions abroad at a time when states were intervening more extensively in overseas trade as a consequence of the transition from free trade to protectionism, and German traders sought outlets for capital and markets outside of Europe. Enterprising German merchants looked for economic opportunities worldwide in the face of dramatically increasing industrialisation in Germany through mechanising the means of production. German traders established over sixty stations along the western coast of Africa by 1883.
Increasing demand for requisite raw materials and markets that could not be obtained in Europe, which could be secured by colonies, as well as building a vast fleet to defend them. In one specific example, rich prospects were sought in southwestern Africa near the mouth of the Niger river, where factories were established, which then attracted others to the same region, which led to increased German territorial acquisition and an establishment of a German colony. As this community required military protection, rather than under a foreign authority or at their own risk, Bismarck recognised this necessity, and consented to a new departure from earlier colonial policy in 1884 owing to mercantile pressure during a time when all of the European powers were seizing whatever territory they could obtain in Africa and Asia. He explained to the Reichstag that it was not his intention to form colonies with large numbers of officials, and establish garrison troops with fortresses and harbours, but protecting German subjects who had undertaken enterprises and needed protection was a separate matter. The underlying importance of establishing German overseas colonial possessions remained that the most powerful continental state was to demonstrate evidence of strength as a world power that was equal to the status of other European powers that administered colonies for mercantile commercial purposes to secure markets and sources of raw materials, which led to pro-colonisation arguments that political rivals could theoretically jeopardise the sustainability of German industry. Colonisation was therefore considered to be necessary for economic efficiency and prosperity, and an absolute necessity of power.
German traders were obligated to explore new potential venues independently under the protection of a foreign country, or at their own risk. The Godeffroy company in Hamburg initially established a commercial presence in Samoa in 1860, and the German government later established a protectorate in New Britain and northeastern New Guinea in December 1884. A tiny German colony was expanded into German Southwest Africa, apart from Walfish Bay, between 1884 and 1886. New colonies began becoming established in Togoland and the Cameroons, along with a large portion of Zanzibar extending toward Lake Victoria Nyanza, and a third of New Guinea in 1884, German East Africa, the Marshall Islands, and the Bismarck Archipelago composed of islands east of New Guinea in 1885, and the Solomon Islands in 1886, as part of a new expansionist movement to encourage German international trade, with Bismarck insisting that all administrative costs to be managed by the chartered companies, rather than by the state. The primary and certainly genuine economic concern relating Bismarck’s view toward colonies was having as much territory as possible that could be developed for German economic enterprises. Bismarck also used colonialism to encourage rivalry in Africa between Britain and France as the two primary colonial states in Europe, and diverted French public opinion from Alsace-Lorraine, while France and Germany encouraged each other’s colonial claims, and jointly opposed British financial reform in Egypt.
The French-German entente reached its height at the Berlin Conference of December 1885 that was called to regulate affairs in the Congo, and settled rules for the unpartitioned parts of Africa. As Bismarck envisaged that the European scramble for overseas colonies required introducing order in their internal relations, he invited representatives of all involved parties to meet at a conference in Berlin in November 1884 to preclude a conflict between them in the lower Congo territory. They would determine the appropriate justifications for annexations of territory, and establish a uniform system of laws and regulations for inter-colonial relations While relations between France and Germany remained tense, Bismarck recognized how retaining Italy’s support for the Triple Alliance, which was renewed in March 1887, remained contingent on British goodwill, and therefore Great Britain could not be harassed over its colonial acquisitions. Whereas from chartered companies handling all administrative matters for colonial endeavours, the government subsidised steamer lines to the colonies in Africa and Asia from 1885 to enable them to become profitable. A Colonial Office in the central executive was later established in 1907 that gradually transferred all of the colonies to direct imperial administration. The only failed endeavour being obtaining a foothold in the Caroline Islands that was challenged by the Spanish government and adjudicated by the papacy in 1885 in order to conclude the Kulturkampf and secure support from the Centre party.
The detente between France and Germany also proved to be short-lived, following the Jules Ferry, the French prime minister who had cooperated with Bismarck, falling from power in March 1885, which in turn led to the increasing influence of French nationalists, and the appointment of General Georges Boulanger became minister of war in January 1886. Although French political authorities were willing to deal with Germany over colonies, French public opinion would not allow for dependence on Germany and losing hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. Boulanger’s military reorganisation was met with enthusiastic approval among French nationalists, who spoke openly about waging a war of revenge against Germany in an alliance with Russia at a time when Austrian-German relations had reached their nadir. Pan-Slav advisors who were sympathetic to France and hostile to Germany aggravated the tension by exerting considerable influence in official circles in the Russian government, which contributed to the expiry of the Three Emperors’ Alliance in the summer of 1887, when Russia unequivocally stated it would not sign an agreement with Austria-Hungary. Bismarck would consequently no longer have the confidence of Russian foreign policy decisionmakers when the Three Emperors’ Alliance ceased functioning, as well as due to the rupture that was caused by the succession dispute in Bulgaria. Another consequence of Bismarck’s duplicitous manner of forming alliances would eventually lead to Russia and France forming an alliance as a result of mutual suspicion against Germany.
Although Russian Pan-Slavs encouraged forming an alliance with France, Boulanger’s expulsion from the French government precluded this possibility when the French government exercised caution in conducting foreign affairs, and therefore would not respond to this possibility. Russian conservative diplomats preferred advocating for the advantages of forming an alliance with Germany, which was concluded on 18 June 1887 to avoid international isolation – the secret so-called Reinsurance Treaty, in which the Russians proposed to Bismarck, and remained part of the crucial balance for maintaining relations between Germany and Russia, as well as Russia and Austria by keeping the latter under control from making further encroachments in the Balkans with prejudice to Russian foreign policy interests, in the event of the Russians taking action to take greater control of establishing its interests in Bulgaria, as they disapproved of Ferdinand of Coburg as the governing authority, and could potentially act upon removing him from power, which could result in an outbreak of war. It became necessary for Bismarck to reach this agreement with Russia without the knowledge of Austria and Italy, since Austria had refused to renew the Three Emperors Alliance due to the pressure of earlier events in Bulgaria. Russia was eager to stay in good relations with Germany, largely to check Austrian expansion in the Balkans, while refusing to sign an agreement with Austria.
The Reinsurance Treaty guaranteed that if one of the three contracting parties waged war on a fourth power, the other two were to maintain a benevolent neutrality. They would consult their own interests with regard to problems in the Balkan Peninsula, but in cases of disagreement between two powers, there was to be a casting vote with the third. Turkey was to be placed under a joint protectorate that would be responsible for the execution of the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, while the occupation of the Balkan principalities was forbidden to all of the three signatories.
It was generally understood there would be reciprocal neutrality of Russia or Germany if the other was attacked by a third power. If France attacked Germany or Italy, both were to join in defence; if Russia attacked Germany or Russia, both were to unite in defence; if France and Russia attacked any one of the three allies, all three were to unite in defence. This thus placed Bismarck as the arbiter between Russia and Austria. This did not apply if one of them attacked France or Austria, and therefore was compatible with the Dual Alliance of 1879, since Russia would be neutral if France attacked Germany, and Germany would be neutral if Austria or Britain attacked Russia. This agreement did not resolve the conflicting interests between Austria-Hungary and Russia, but both Germany and Russia pledged to support the status quo in the Balkans. Germany specifically recognised Russian interests in Bulgaria, and reaffirmed the principle that the Dardanelles Straights were to be closed in the event of war, with Germany pledging to provide moral and diplomatic support for any actions that the tsar could find necessary pertaining to Constantinople and the Dardanelles Straights. Secret protocols in this agreement required Germany to support Russian efforts to recover influence in Bulgaria, and oppose the restoration of the Prince Alexander of Battenberg as its head of state.
This agreement also temporarily prevented a Franco-Russian alliance in the short term, as the tsar renounced the possibility of allying with France, should Bismarck force a war on France. Germany also recognised Russian claims in Bulgaria as a satellite state, and its right to take Constantinople, which was counter to Austrian and British interests, but it was a safe presumption for Bismarck, since the First Mediterranean Agreement would keep Russia from acting on it, while Russia agreed to this agreement in order to prevent being diplomatically isolated, but could yet form a defensive alliance with France, just as Germany and Austria were allied against Russian or French aggression, while it precluded German or Austrian aggression. Bismarck thus secretly entered this defensive alliance with Russia against Austria as Germany’s primary ally, and published the text the Dual Alliance on 3 February 1888 to reassure Austria of Germany also supporting Austria’s interests, and also providing assurance to Russia that Germany did not compose a threat to Russia, while also warning the Pan-Slav elements in the Russian population that Germany would aid Austria in the event of an outbreak of war with Russia. As Austria and Russia had been consolidating their respective spheres of influence in Balkans, and Austria had great success in Serbia, Russia faced great difficulties in Bulgaria due to resentment against autocratic Russian officials and officers that exposed the opposition between the interests of Austria-Hungary and Russia.
Russia had been consolidating its interests in the Balkans until a rebellion in Eastern Rumelia led to amalgamating Bulgaria, where there was a great deal of resentment against Russian officials, with Eastern Rumelia, which constituted a violation of the Berlin Treaty of 11 October 1878. Although Germany was almost indifferent to the whole matter, there ensued a polemical dispute between Alexander Battenberg, the German candidate for the throne of greater united Bulgaria, and Alexander III, the tsar of Russia, who opposed a German on the Bulgarian throne. Prince Alexander as the head of state in Bulgaria acted independently with the full support the nationalist Bulgarian national assembly to stage the union of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria in September 1885, without consulting the Russian Tsar Alexander III. Tsar Alexander III in turn demanded a return to the status quo. Soon afterward in November, Serbia attacked Bulgaria in reaction to Prince Alexander’s growing ambitions, which in turn resulted in a Serbian defeat at Slivnitza and preparations to invade Serbia. In the face of a danger of a new conflagration as a result of a network of commitments that Bismarck had created, Austria pledged to protect Serbia against Bulgaria, which stopped the offensive, but also strained Austrian-Russian relations, while Bismarck would not fight Russia over this issue. Serbia ultimately extricated itself from its earlier position without territorial loss, while Russia and Austria agreed to the new union of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. Nevertheless, this crisis greatly strained Austrian-German relations.
Since he was an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army, Russia asked Germany for support through his influence, which he refused and stopped granting loans to Russia, which put on brake on Russia’s expansionist aims in Europe, and therefore Russia was eventually forced to go to France for loans. However, the Bulgarian crisis continued thereafter. Alexander von Battenburg became prince of Bulgaria in 1885, as had been agreed in 1879, and was encouraged by Austrian and British authorities to annex Eastern Rumelia, and thereby assert his independence from Russia, which was acting against the letter and spirit of the League of Three Emperors. Prince Alexander was declared deposed during a state visit to St. Petersburg on 21 August 1886, and was abducted by pro-Russian Bulgarian officials. He was forced to abdicate on 9 August 1882, and was later set at liberty in Rumania. prior to retiring into obscurity in Germany, while a Russian general took over as governor of Bulgaria with Austria-Hungary denouncing this Russian conspiracy. However, the Bulgarian premier Stambulov resisted a Russian dictatorship, and diplomatic relations with Russia were broken off in November, which resulted in continued tension about the possibility of war launched by Russia and continued Austrian aggression.
Another German prince, Ferdinand von Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, was elected prince of Bulgaria in 1886, but Russia refused to recognise this status, while Bismarck would not intervene to help Austria, apart from publishing the secret provisions of the 1879 Treaty text, which also had the effect of halting any Russian action. Bismarck defused the situation in February 1887 by arranging the First Mediterranean Agreement, in which Britain, Italy and Austria agreed to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas, as barriers to French and Russian expansion. The situation also changed the nature of the Triple Alliance, so Bismarck made necessary adjustments that kept Italy in the alliance. Danger of war was resolved, but tensions owing to international competitions over acquiring overseas colonies and territorial revisions and likewise continued in the Balkans. Russia withdrew from the League of Three Emperors, since German foreign policy did not support Russian ambitions that were opposed by Great Britain, as well as conflicting Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests in the Balkans. This loose alliance thus lapsed in 1887 as a result of these acute competing interests, which was likewise incompatible with the interests of the Dual Alliance, and therefore Bismarck and his successors could not maintain them indefinitely, in view of how the Dual Alliance was anti-Russian and pro-British, whereas the League of Three Emperors was pro-Russian and anti-British, with Germany at the centre of managing these relations, while remaining facing irreconcilable enmity from France.
The inherent contradictions in Bismarck’s foreign policy toward both Russia and Austria remained increasingly difficult to maintain in view of how Germany’s scope of interests were with prejudice against Russia in favour of Austria-Hungary’s interests in the Balkans. Discontent in Russia with the alliance with Germany thus provided an opportunity for France to approach Russia with providing loan assistance to alleviate monetary concerns in Russia that benefited French financial interests from 1888 onward. Meanwhile, further tension also arose from France, where General Boulanger was appointed the Minister of War in 1886, and openly demanded vengeance against Prussia that threatened the outbreak of war. Although he was dismissed from military service for insubordination as an army office in March 1888, lasting French enmity against Germany remained, and a rapprochement between Russia and France led to Bismarck alliance system further disintegrating. Russia obtained the first of large loans from France in October 1888, and then bought rifles from France in January 1889, with the promise that they would never be used against France.
Bismarck turned to England for an alliance in an attempt to counter the possibility of a French-Russian alliance. The British Foreign Minister Salisbury was interested in this possibility, but the Parliament was not. Bismarck then had no choice but to renew the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, which the tsar was willing to do, but others in both Russia and Germany were not. Bismarck’s foreign policy situation worsened after William II became German emperor on 15 June 1888, who did not want Bismarck to have complete control over him, while Bismarck maintained full control over German statesmanship and foreign policy, which inevitably led to conflict between them. In addition to their disagreements over extending welfare policy that could appease the working class, rather than Bismarck’s own beliefs in using repressing tactics against socialists, another dispute was the new emperor’s considerations regarding waging preventive war against Russia, which was inimical to Bismarck’s foreign policy machinations.
One of the primary cornerstones of Bismarck’s foreign policy machinations was maintaining ties with Russia, which had become increasingly difficult to reconcile along with commitments to Austria, while also facing hostility from France that was to be precluded from forming an alliance with Russia. However, supporting Russia’s interests were subordinated to those of Austria-Hungary, while Germany guaranteed the latter’s security. Bismarck’s successor, General Leo von Caprivi, allowed the Reinsurance Treaty to lapse in 1890 over Bismarck’s quarrel with the emperor over a fundamental difference in foreign policy toward Russia. Firstly, the Reinsurance Treaty was considered to be incompatible with the Austrian-German alliance of 1879, and much more so with the German treaty of alliance with Rumania in 1883. Secondly, it would make Germany vulnerable to the Russians exposing its existence that would destroy confidence in Germany’s good faith, especially potentially weakening Germany’s ties to Austria, which would undermine a future war effort. As long as Bismarck was in control and would not provide unconditional support for Austria against Russia while not dismissing the opportunity of a close, including secret, understanding between Germany and Russia and also unconditionally supporting Austrian policy in the Balkans, the alliance system appeared to maintain stability. However, nearly all of the provisions of these alliances were secret. Only Bismarck fully understood them, while his successors were neither able nor willing to handle the complexity of his foreign policy, whereas his successor Caprivi preferred avoiding unnecessary complications that were entailed in Bismarck’s continued attempts to preserve the status quo by ensuring permanently isolating France, and suppressing Polish independence while maintaining good relations with Russia, while also facing how Russia’s foreign policy interests were inimical to those of Austria-Hungary. A shift in foreign policy from concentrating interests in Europe to a worldwide scale likewise led to changing priorities for Germany’s international interests.
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