The British Entente Cordiale with France in 1904, and the subsequent agreement with Russia in 1907 resolving potential disputes, thus composed a Triple Entente that was directly opposed to Germany and its allies. The German fleet building, aimed at protect the German coastlines against the Russian and French fleets, as well as protecting its overseas empire and commercial interests that were to be maintained by naval bases worldwide, was an aggravating factor in causing Germany’s diplomatic isolation in the face of British opposition. Not any other fleet would have an interest in destroying the power of the British Royal Navy, after theoretically engaging in a decisive battle against the German fleet. Although British governments took up negotiations with Germany in 1908 and 1912, they aimed at stopping the naval arms race and were unwilling to conclude an alliance while perceiving Germany as a menace to lasting peace that spurred constantly augmenting the size of the British fleet. Meanwhile, the British succeeded in preserving and increasing their naval superiority between 1904 and 1914, which consequently always placed the German navy in danger of being destroyed. Meanwhile, the German government had to resort to loans to maintain the fleet building program that increased the state deficit, especially after it began building dreadnought class battleship vessels in 1906. Moreover, the naval alliances allowed the British navy to concentrate most of its ships in home waters, and by 1911, it was enabled to impose a far blockade rather than a narrow one. By the time war broke out in August 1914, it remained too dangerous for the German fleet to provoke a decisive battle with the British navy, and was therefore inactive. Apart from the previous tensions between Germany and Britain, other separate tensions were likewise increasing before the outbreak of what became the First World War.
Austrian authorities were alarmed by the results of the Balkan Wars that led to a precarious situation in the Balkans, following the Balkan War of 1912, when Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro combined to drive the Turks out of Europe. Austria-Hungary supported the creation of an independent Albania to prevent Serbia from establishing a foothold on the Adriatic, while Russia supported Serbia. Meanwhile, Russian influence in the Balkans increased along with the Pan-Serb movement that threatened Austria-Hungary’s multinational composition, including in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the local populations were mostly Serbian, as well as among the large Serbian populations in Croatia, Dalmatia and southern Hungary. Turkey and Rumania supported the victors of 1912 who turned against their former ally Bulgaria, which was prompted defeated in 1913. This regional instability in the face of Serbian ambitions supported by Russia led to further tensions over Austria-Hungary making plans to settle accounts with Russia that threatened the multinational Hapsburg empire by maintaining its pledge to uphold Serbian sovereignty.
The chief of the General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke had pledged to his Austrian counterpart, Conrad von Hötzendorff, s early as during the 1908 Bosnian annexation crisis that Germany would support Austria under any circumstances if it became engaged in a war in the Balkans, which definitively exceeded his jurisdiction by making a political commitment of converting the defensive Dual Alliance of 1879 into a blank cheque for Austria to attack Serbia, including at the risk of Russian intervention. This action would then commit Germany to attack France through Belgium, which would in turn involve Britain in a European-scale war. Count Hoyos went to Berlin on 5 July 1914 to clarify German intentions, and returned with the firm promise from William II with a firm promise that Austria-Hungary could “count on Germany’s full support,” even in the case of “grave European complications.” This “blank cheque” was based on the assumption that Russia and France were not yet strong enough to risk a European war, including since a series of revelations in the French Senate in April 1914 demonstrated a lack of efficiency in the army organisation. Although William II had to consult the chancellor before making such a decision, he consulted with chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg only after the blank cheque had been signed. However, the Chancellor agreed with the underlying consideration that the future sustainability of the Austro-Hungary justified the risk of a European war, which was reinforced by claims made the chief of the general staff, Helmuth von Moltke that Russia would technically complete its offensive capability by 1917, which could inevitably overwhelm Germany’s defences in combination with French offensive potential. Furthermore, the German military leaders all provided reassurances that they would be ready of war should break out, while the emperor was determined not to retreat from military confrontation, as had been the case during the Moroccan crisis in 1911 on the advice of the military establishment.
The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenburg in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, first with a bomb throwing attempt and then gunshots, were directly caused by perpetrators of Serbian nationalist sentiments, which Austria-Hungary had reason to accuse Serbian authorities of aiding and abetting as part of their anti-Austrian agitation. Austria-Hungary’s diplomacy thereafter was motivated by revenge and maintaining the monarchy, beginning with issuing an ultimatum composing a series of demands that were unacceptable to an independent state, and were thus aimed at launching a war against Serbia.
Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg offering unconditional support for Austria taking stern action against Serbia on 5 and 6 July to clear relations by whatever means necessary, including waging war, to demonstrate that Austria could maintain its standing in the Balkans, and thereby prevent the encroachment of Russian power in the region that would correspondingly offset Austrian and German influence. Both German and Austrian authorities may have believed that a war between Austria and Serbia could be localized and would not lead to a major conflagration, expecting that Russia and France lacked the strength to intervene, while Britain would not wage war against a Balkan issue. It is also clear that German authorities were prepared to face an inevitable major war at the earliest opportunity as the only means to bolster Austria-Hungary and preserve the Triple Alliance, as well as preclude the increasing threat of Russian rearmament with the support of the Triple Entente. Germany sent a note to European powers on 21 July denouncing Serbia’s interference in Austria-Hungary, and declared this dispute only concerned these two countries. Austrian authorities determined to contain the steady decline of its power and maintain its alliance with Germany by sending an ultimatum on 23 July with the underlying threat of waging war, as its terms would certainly be rejected owing to demanding violations of Serbian sovereignty, and would then provide a pretext for military action. Serbian authorities would not comply unconditionally in view of indications of receiving Russian support for maintaining Serbian sovereignty, which France reinforced. Austria-Hungary in turn broke off diplomatic relations with Russia on 25 July, while Germany was not prepared to restrain further Austrian action. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July and bombarded Belgrade on the following day. Ensuing events demonstrated how this conflict could not be localized as a result of a combination of tragic miscalculated risks over this unrealistic belief.
The were evident dangers of an outbreak of a localised war, which would involve the engagement of Russia as an ally of Serbia, with France supporting Russia, while France opposed Germany, while Germany supported Austria-Hungary’s aggressive demands. Speculation over the consequences of Austria-Hungary at this time could not be envisaged, which were revealed in the subsequent chain of international events that brought the opposing European alliances in an open and uncontrollable conflict. The shifting international situation in the Balkans that led to a corresponding decline in Austria-Hungary’s prestige led to an attempt to regain advantages, which Germany encouraged for the purpose of seeking to bolster its own international prestige in the face of what German statesmen considered to be located among hostile powers, which was in turn opposed by the Triple Entente. Launching a war against Serbia appeared to be an ideal opportunity to restore its national prestige, as well staging a rebuff to Russia, which Germany and Austria-Hungary expected to be able to subdue, and thereby establish their prominence in Europe. The murder of Franz Ferdinand was considered by the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff to be an ideal opportunity to conclusively settle accounts with Serbia, which had long supported the agitation for greater freedom for the Slav minorities within the empire, and had known about the assassination plans, although it did not condone them. Although the Hungarian Foreign Minister and Hungarian Prime Minister urged caution, as did the German ambassador in Vienna, the Austrian emperor Franz Joseph supported von Hötzendorff, and the German emperor decided that action was to be taken immediately. Austria could not risk a move against Serbia without German support, since Serbia was supported by Russia. A European wide war was practically inevitable while military and political decisionmakers did not take sufficient action to prevent the chain of events that led to its outbreak.
Only Count Tisza objected to an attack on Serbia in the Austro-Hungarian Ministerial Council on 7 July 1914, but agreed that an ultimatum should be sent to Belgrade first to localize the conflict. Conrad von Hötzendorff, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, was determined to take rapid military action against Serbia before disruptions could become overwhelming in Austria itself, and Russia was prepared for war. Berchtold, the foreign minister, concurred with Hotzendorff about taking immediately action against Serbia upon the assassination of Francis Ferdinand. Meanwhile, the German authorities, including William II and Bethmann-Hollweg, gave their consent for Austria to act quickly, following the same “blank cheque” support Germany pledged to Austria during the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, regardless of the risk of war with the Triple Entente, and expected that the ultimatum note be strongly unacceptable to Serbia. On 18 July 1914, the British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey told the German ambassador in London that England would never back an aggressor, whereas the German authorities were determined to split the Entente and bring about an international relations realignment that would be favourable to Germany, and attempts to moderate Austria-Hungary’s demands against Serbia came too late to change the outcome of the subsequent sequence of events that led to the outbreak of a continental conflagration. A fundamental error of German policy makers before the outbreak of the First World War was miscalculating the chances of Britain remaining neutral, while there was also a growing feeling throughout all Europe that war was inevitable. Meanwhile, the Germans felt themselves encircled and gradually outmaneuvered by the growing military strength of France and Russia, which prompted von Moltke, to ask the Foreign Minister Jagow to precipitate a preventive war.
The ultimatum to Serbia with a wide-ranging set of demands was to be delivered on 23 July 1914, before the French president Poincaré and the French foreign minister Viviani would leave from a visit to Russia on 25 July, which would mean postponing the French and Russia reply to the ultimatum. England, France and Russia were to be pressured to keep the controversy and expected military conflict localized in the Balkans. Grey made an offer of mediation after the ultimatum was published, but Germany undermined these mediation attempts, such as only passing Grey’s request for an extension of the 48 hour time limit on to Vienna after the hour had passed, with the subtle suggestion that it was to be rejected. Although Germany agreed to four power mediation between Germany, Austria, Britain, and Russia, Germany rejected Vienna’s suggestion that the existing power relationships in the Balkans be maintained. Austria-Hungary would have to become predominant there at the expense of Russia, and Serbia rejected some of the ultimatum clauses while knowing that this would mean war with Austria with the encouragement of Russia, which pressed Serbia not to give in completely.
Grey and king George V then made another proposal for a conference of ambassadors, including Italy, to put great power pressure of Serbia to satisfy Austria’s demands. However, Berlin rejected this proposal, arguing that it could not bring Austria’s dealing with Serbia before a European tribunal, urged Vienna to take the same line. Meanwhile, Moltke drafted a demand to Belgium for passage of German troops through this neutral country, thereby clearly indicating that Germany was expected a European war. Grey made a final attempt to urge Germany on 27 July to influence Austria into accepting the Serbian reply, implying that only in this case could London ask for moderation in St. Petersburg, but this appeal was rejected.
Austria-Hungary sent an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July 1914 with extreme demands that would mean the end of Serbian independence. Austria-Hungary blamed the Serbian government for the assassination, and therefore demanded that the Serbian press immediately stop saying anything against Austria; demanding the removal of hostile officials, and allowing the Austrian police into Serbia to look for the Black Hand members and arrest them. Although the German government assumed that the Russians could never mobilize to support a small country that had lent support to the assassination of a monarch, the world was surprised by the Russian Tsar’s abrupt reaction that “Russian cannot allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the dominant power in the Balkans.”
When these demands that would mean Serbia foregoing its sovereignty went unanswered, while Russia had encouraged Serbia to not comply completely, Austria-Hungary maintained its uncompromising position and declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, with Germany’s support. The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, and many other Germans were obsessed by fears of Russian expansion and favored a preventive war. The German emperor, therefore, assured his confrere in Vienna of his support with the remark that he appreciated the necessity of “freeing your Serbian frontiers of their heavy pressure.” The remark was interpreted by the Austrian government as the offer of a blank check from Germany. The French regarded it as simply another test of the strength of their alliances, similar to the Moroccan crises, and assured Russia of their support. Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, proposed an international conference, but Austria refused point-blank to submit “a question of national honour” to arbitration. This time, the Russians did not give in as they had done in 1908, and came to Serbia’s aid against the Austrians by mobilizing first on the borders with Austria, followed by general mobilization soon thereafter, which soon affected other European nations.
The German government pressured Austria into resuming direct negotiations with Russia immediately after the Austrian declaration of war on July 28, while it tried to separate France from Russia and offered Britain a guarantee that it would not annex any part of France or Belgium in return for a British promise of neutrality. Neither France, which mostly had a defensive policy although they hoped to regain Alsace-Lorraine, nor Britain would make a firm commitment, but Britain demanded that Germany respect the neutrality of Belgium, to which Germany would not commit itself. The first nation to respond to this small regional conflict was Russia. Tsar Nicholas II ordered the mobilization of the Russian army, calling up the troops and sending them to the frontier on 30-31 July, which constituted an act of war. This also meant that Russia was going to take on Germany as well as Austria in accordance with its mobilization plans that could not be easily modified. The Russian government, which had ordered a general mobilization of the army immediately on receipt of the news of the Austrian declaration, changed its order to limited mobilisation against Austria when informed of the apparent German efforts to make peace. When the final Austro-Russian negotiations broke down, it again ordered general mobilisation with France’s support. Germany and France then ordered general mobilization almost simultaneously.
When the authorities in Berlin received the news that Russia had declared partial mobilization against Austria, there was also the report from the German naval attaché in London that the British fleet would mount an immediate attack on Germany at sea if it came to war with France, which made it clear that Russia would fight with British support, while it was hoped that Russia would not fight if Britain remained neutral. When general mobilization by Russia against both Austria and Germany was confirmed on 31 July, William II proclaimed “a state of imminent threat of war,” and Germany gave Russia a twelve-hour ultimatum to stop mobilization. The Russian government did not reply, which prompted the German declaration of war on 1 August in accordance with the German general staff’s only plan for a two-front war with France and Russia. War was then declared on France on 3 August while planning for a fast knockout of the French, and then turn to the eastern front where it was expected that Russia would mobilize slowly. Britain made an offer to guarantee French neutrality, and William II accepted the offer, but the military informed him that nothing could be changed for technical reasons. This was followed by gathering support against Russia and Britain by making an alliance with Turkey on 12 August.
Bethmann-Hollweg then urged Berchtold to present a declaration of war on Serbia, which Franz Joseph signed on 27 July to be sent to Belgrade on 29 July to prevent any more mediation efforts, although William II was willing to accept Serbia’s reply and Grey’s full mediation proposal. Meanwhile, Bethmann-Hollweg and the military seemed to be prepared for a general war if localization failed. However, this war was to be fought under favourable conditions, which meant that Russia was to be made responsible, and England would be neutral. Bethmann-Hollweg assured Russia that Austria was not interested in any territorial extensions in Serbia, and therefore Russia would be responsible for maintaining peace, while Germany could only count on British neutrality and support from the Social Democrats if it were attacked.
Austria presented its declaration of war on Serbia at 11:00 A.M. on 28 July. William II urged a “halt in Belgrade for the Austrian armies, but this was message was not delivered until the afternoon, when it was too late. Meanwhile, Germany continued to expect British neutrality, with any responsibility for aggression to be blamed on Russia, which was a mistaken assumption. Moreover, there was an inevitable connection between mobilization and the alliance systems, which would lead to a world war, as there was the causal link between Austria’s intervention against Serbia that would lead to Russian partial mobilisation against Austria, followed by Russian and German mobilisation that would inevitably bring in France as the first objective of German military strategy. Russia was then to first to mobilise on 29 July, calling for partial mobilisation against Austria when the latter mobilised against Serbia. While the German general staff remained confident that German mobilisation scheduling would outpace the speed of Russian mobilisation, Bethmann-Hollweg waited for Russia to declare general mobilisation in order to maintain British non-involvement.
The German general staff meanwhile planned for a European-scale war. The general staff sent a request to the German minister in Brussels to allow the passage of German troops through Belgium on 29 July, which the chief of the German general staff, von Moltke, had drafted on 26 July – two days before the outbreak of Austria-Hungary’s war against Serbia – while anticipating implementing the Schlieffen Plan by attacking Belgium. Luxemburg and France, and disregarding political considerations. Bethmann-Hollweg was speaking with the British ambassador in Berlin during this time, and tried to persuade Britain to stay neutral by promising not to seek French territory, and also revealed Germany’s intention to violate Belgian territory. Grey called this an “infamous” offer, and the British government now knew that Germany was intending to start a general war. This was the end of Germany’s policy of localization, while Bethmann-Hollweg was wholly unprepared for Britain’s response. Grey repeated his proposal for four-power mediation and stated that Britain would fight on the side of France if it were attacked. von Moltke, superseded the authority of the emperor and the chancellor by sending a telegram to the chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, von Hötzendorf, on the evening of 30 July to order mobilisation against Russia immediately, regardless of British proposals for peace negotiations, which began on 31 July.
Russia failed to restrain Serbia as its ally, and its Entente allies did not exercise a moderating influence on the exertion of its influence while maintaining their own interests that were inimical to Germany. Russian partial mobilization against Austria in support of Serbia on 25 July practically represented an act of war, since early mobilization at the time gave powers a nearly decisive advantage, or a weapon of diplomatic coercion to induce a retreat. On 26 July, Grey recommended convening a European Congress with Russia’s approval, which was immediately accepted by the French and Italian governments. However, the head of the German foreign office secretary von Jagow rejected this proposal on 27 July, and also refused to advise Austria-Hungary to desist from its hostile measures, while insisting that diplomatic efforts were to be directed toward localising this conflict. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg urged Austria-Hungary on 30 July to respond to Grey’s offer of mediation to attempt to ensure that Russia would appear to be responsible for the foreboding European war.
The German and Austrian general staffs had not expected Russia to mobilise in support of Serbia, which was followed by a full mobilization on 30 July. Austria in turn ordered general mobilization with the pledge of full German assistance. Germany in turn ordered its mobilization and dispatched an ultimatum to Russia on 31 July demanding cancelling its mobilization within twelve hours or otherwise face the possibility of a German attack. The ensuing crisis escalated with Austria-Hungary declaring war on Serbia on 28 July, to which Russia responded by mobilising troops along the Austrian frontier on 30-31 July, as well as taking preliminary measures to mobilise along the German frontier districts, which in turn led to German mobilisation upon not receiving a demand to Russia on 31 July to cancel their mobilization.
Russia failed to restrain Serbia as its ally, and its Entente allies did not exercise a moderating influence on the exertion of its influence while maintaining their own interests that were inimical to Germany. Russian partial mobilization against Austria in support of Serbia on 25 July practically represented an act of war, since early mobilization at the time gave powers a nearly decisive advantage, or a weapon of diplomatic coercion to induce a retreat. The German and Austrian general staffs had not expected this reaction, which was followed by a full mobilization on 30 July. Austria in turn ordered general mobilization with the pledge of full German assistance on 31 July. Germany in turn ordered its mobilization on 31 July, and dispatched an ultimatum to Russia demanding cancelling its mobilization within twelve hours, or otherwise face the possibility of a German attack. The Russians refused to comply with what would mean suffer a humiliating diplomatic defeat, and German in turn declared war on Russia on 1 August. The Russians refused to comply with what would mean suffer a humiliating diplomatic defeat, and German in turn declared war on Russia on 1 August, and then against France on 3 August, alleging there had been several acts on French hostility. As the German general staff’s single military plan required attacking France by striking a rapid and decisive blow through Belgium, regardless of its guaranteed neutrality by the treaty of 19 April 1839, which was considered vital for maintaining British security to preclude a hostile presence across the English Channel.
Austria-Hungary thus escalated the conflict with Germany’s encouragement, having wanted a reason to crush Serbia for some time due to competing interests in the state of Bosnia, and the assassination on 28 June 1914 provided this pretext. Austria blamed Serbia for the assassination, claiming that Serbia had supported the terrorist organization known as the Black Hand with which Princip was affiliated, and in fact the Serb government was involved in underground and terrorist activities serving its designs for a greater Serbia, although it did not condone the assassination while it had knowledge about this plan. The Austrian government thus accused the Serbs of complicity in the crime, and demanded terms for satisfaction in an attempt to crush Pan-Slav nationalism that was the main factor of instability in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as being concerned about a loss of face after the murder of Franz Ferdinand. Since Russia was certain to support Serbian interests, Austria therefore looked to Germany for help against Serbia supported by Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm gave the Austrians his full unconditional support for the invasion of Serbia, since there was fear in Germany about growing isolation and Austria-Hungary was Germany’s last ally, and thus seemed to deserve support at all cost to prevent the breakdown of the Hapsburg Empire, as well as the modernization, population and industrial growth of Russia would eventually menace Germany. Hence, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg made it clear that Germany would support Austria-Hungary even if an attack on Serbia provoked Russia, Serbia’s ally, to declare war on Austria-Hungary.
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