The international power politics competition marked by the new imperialism and the system of alliances continued influencing Europe until the outbreak of the First World War. Bismarck’s dominance on the continent had been facilitated by the fact that the other great powers of Europe were engaged in and distracted by imperialist rivalries overseas, but this began to weaken after Bismarck was forced to resign by Kaiser Wilhelm II in on 18 March 1890. The outcome was the division of Europe into two blocs that were increasingly beset by rivalries. Among the causes for increasing international tensions was the steady growth of Germany’s growing influence in diplomatic and economic conditions during the nineteenth century, following the restoration of European powers during the 1815 Congress of Vienna, and Prussia gradually assuming leadership of the German states. The international political system became increasingly exposed during ongoing tensions that ignited armed competitions in the interest of striving for increased power that would be tested through military strength, which included the German government using the threat of war as an instrument for acquiring diplomatic leverage.
Germany continued gaining power by taking advantage of the enmity between Great Britain and Russia, which led to making it a dominating power in Europe at the 1878 Congress of Berlin. However, Germany’s military strength and also its industrial and commercial development that secured worldwide commercial interests caused suspicion in Britain that had exercised more control in Europe than any other power, while also being absorbed with restricting Russia’s expanding interests. Germany thus posed more of a menace to Britain than the policies of other nations, especially in terms of its international trade as a great asset of the British empire, which contributed to drawing Britain and France together. Another consequence of mutual international suspicions was France and Russia serving mutual interests. One of the key assumptions of Bismarck’s foreign policy had been the separation of France and Russia, which had been allowed to move together while both feared international isolation. One cause was the German emperor’s most influential adviser, Baron Fritz von Holstein, changed direction by arguing that the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, which both the emperor and Russia were keen to renew, could damage relations with Austria if it became known, and that if war broke out between Germany and France, Russian neutrality was not guaranteed. After Bismarck resigned in 1890, the Reinsurance Treaty was not renewed after it was scheduled to for renewal on 18 June.
The French quickly seized the opportunity presented by this unexpected turn of affairs. As early as 1886, private pressure groups in France and Russia had taken advantage of the anti-German feeling prevailing in both countries to urge a Franco-Russian alliance. However, Russia, traditionally suspicious of and hostile to France – especially Republican France – had preferred to seek accommodation with Germany. Now there was nowhere else to turn. Both France and Russia were also disturbed by the German pursuit of a relationship with Britain, and the renewal of the Triple Alliance. The French had hoped to obtain a definite treaty of alliance, but the Russians were still moving cautiously. The best the French could obtain in 1891 was an entente cordiale (cordial understanding) and an agreement for joint consultation in the event of any “threat to peace.”
The chiefs of staff of Russia and France agreed on a military convention in the following year that provided that each would come to the aid of the other if either were attacked by Germany, whether alone or in league with Austria or Italy. Significantly, the convention was to have “the same duration as the Triple Alliance.” As a result, France and Russia established a secret military convention in 1892 in response to the Triple Alliance. A political agreement then followed in 1894. The immediate effect of the alliance was to restore the balance of power that was a fragile equilibrium: neither France nor Germany, nor Austria nor Russia, had an obvious advantage over the other. For the future, however, Bismarck’s nightmare came closer to reality: if war should come, Germany would be forced to fight on two fronts. The German general staff, which could override the civil authorities whose executive was largely independent of the legislature, thus made plans for the prospect of a war on two fronts. Britain’s involvement on either side could upset the new balance of power.
Another factor that led to the dismantling of Bismarck’s foreign policy was Wilhelm II undertook personally to direct the German government as well as make his mark on history through pursuing a policy of “worldwide policy” (Weltpolitik), arising from Germany’s unusual increasing economic strength, and the corresponding development of its land and especially naval forces. He was deeply impressed by the arguments in favour of sea power presented by the American Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan in his book, The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783. Consequently, he determined to build a powerful German navy that could rival the British one to be used as a diplomatic tool to threaten Britain, while also putting out feelers to the British government for an alliance that were without success. Germany’s commercial expansion and its efforts to build a powerful navy and its intention to become a world power like Britain was inevitably disturbing for Britain, in terms of its own naval supremacy and world power status, and the naval rivalry of the next few years was to create a growing atmosphere of mistrust between Germany and Britain. As long as Britain pursued its policy of nonalignment with European powers, Bismarck had been content to let Anglo-German relations continue unchanged.
William II had begun his independent direction of foreign policy with earnest attempts to formulate an Anglo-German alliance while demanding overseas colonial concessions as signs of British good faith, such as the disposition of Portuguese and Spanish overseas possessions, which Britain could not accept. Clumsy German eventually diplomacy served to alienate the British government and public. In the first example, William’s ill-advised telegram to President Kruger of the South African Republic in 1896 congratulating him for suppressing a raid against the Boer government in which the British government was implicated, and hinting at promises of German support, thus demonstrating that a conflict with the Boers might be dangerous. More fundamental forces also acted to produce an estrangement between the Britain and Germany, while Russia remained committed to its alliance with France, and therefore any agreement between Germany and Russia could not be reached while France remained hostile to Germany as a result of the consequences of the Franco-Prussian war, especially Germany returning Alsace and Lorraine, which had contributed to reinforcing Germany’s economy during a time when colonial interests had been established earlier, and the German navy did not compose a factor that would represent a potential threat to international stability. Rather than being involved in political interference overseas, German foreign policy concentrated on penetrating world commercial markets. This form of competition based on profit and international confidence in German manufactured products directly threatened British industry and trade as it became its chief competitor by 1900, and commercial expansion could also provide the means to develop a war fleet by investing available public funds in the military establishment.
The British had the dominant navy and a colonial empire that stretched around the world. Germany thus decided that it would need to expand its navy if it were to keep pace with Britain, after having already built the greatest military power in the world, and now intended to establish naval supremacy. Because of the extension of Germany’s overseas commerce as well as its debut as a colonial power, the German Admiralty had little trouble in 1898 in persuading the Reichstag to grant funds for a naval building program. In 1900, the German naval program was enlarged, and German naval strategists developed the theory of the “risk fleet.” They did not expect to surpass Britain as a naval power, but they reasoned that if their fleet and the next largest were together larger than the British, Britain would be unwilling to go to war against Germany in support of a third power. Under the leadership of Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany set out to create a new and improved navy, expressing his desire to compete with the British navy when he said that Germany “must have a fleet equal in strength” to Britain’s.
He wanted to create such a navy that no one, not even the British, would run the risk of challenging the German High Sea Fleet. As early as 1889, however, the British navy had become alarmed by the growth of French and Russian sea power and had adopted the so-called two-power standard. This implied that Britain must have a fleet equal to the combined fleets of the next two largest navies. Thus, the German decision touched off a naval armaments race that theoretically had no limit. Britain upset the German plans by deciding to outbuild them, thus leading to a naval arms race that Germany had precipitated in the interest of maintaining their security and that of the British Empire. In 1905, with the launching of the Dreadnought class of battleships, which was the biggest, fastest and most heavily armed class of ships that the world had ever seen, making previous battleships obsolete, the naval race continued and the rising tensions contributed to the coming of the outbreak of war. The increasing menace of German naval armaments primarily led to Britain abandoning its earlier policy of isolation and re-entered international diplomacy in Europe in the interest of ensuring its own protection as an island nation that was highly dependent on international trade and was suspicious of Germany challenging its worldwide empire that required its powerful navy to ensure the protection of its commercial and communications links, which was already challenged by increasing rapid German economic growth. Meanwhile, France and Russia began to see the real character of the post-Bismarck Germany, fearing what would happen if Germany grew too powerful. During the same time, German authorities became increasingly more paranoid about being surrounded with enemies.
The Triple Alliance also began to weaken in the face of new international circumstances. A pro-French government in Italy in 1896 led to Italy effectively recognising the French protectorate over Tunisia, commercial treaties between Italy and France were signed in 1898 and 1900. France recognized Italian interests in Libya, after Italy had agreed recognise Morocco as a French sphere of interest. Italy meanwhile strove to preserve its interests while losing interest in the Triple Alliance that it had entered due to political and economic considerations, as Austria-Hungary maintained control over territories with resident Italian populations in the face of a powerful irredenta movement for the redemption of “unredeemed” Italian territories to complete the unification process. A few days after the renewal of the Triple Alliance, the Franco-Italian Agreement of 1902 established the demarcation of French and Italian interests in the Mediterranean, France did not have any objections to Italian actions in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, whereas Italy would not object to French action in Morocco, without obliging either signatory to mutually support each other in attaining their objectives in these regions. This agreement guaranteed neutrality if either was attacked, but this also meant that if either of them declared war in response to provocation, the other hand the option to remain neutral if the provocation could be interpreted as an attack. This agreement led to the practical result of demilitarising their border districts by removing the concentration of the French and Italian armies along the French-Italian frontier. Although this was not entirely compatible with the terms of the Triple Alliance, Italy was following a policy that would allow it to acquire new colonies without international interferences, along with reducing tension with France, while Italy had expected to require assistance with defending itself against French or Austrian aggression since 1882.
The Triple Alliance was then further threatened by Britain affecting the balance of power. Britain began departing from its traditional policy of isolation in view of the different causes in the international situation. One of the first was the revision of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended Sino-Japanese War of 1894 in the following year, whereby France, Germany and Russia, which had interests in China, put pressure on Japan to refine its gains so they would be threatened by excessive Japanese influence. Britain also had strong interests in the region, but was not consulted. Britain and France also came to an understanding about their territorial claims in Africa, which removed one obstacle to international agreement between these two powers. In order to escape isolation, Britain looked to Japan, since both were interested in blocking Russian expansion in Manchuria. On 12 August 1905, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was signed to maintain general peace in eastern Asia and India, preserve all of the common interests of the powers with a presence in China by ensuring its independence and integrity, maintaining the principles of equal opportunities for commerce and industry of all nations’ interests in China, maintaining territorial rights of the high contracting parties in eastern Asia and India, and defending their special interests in these regions. Britain recognized the special interests of Japan in Korea, and both recognized mutual spheres of interest in China. Britain was thus partially relieved of the burden of safeguarding Britain’s far eastern possessions against attack, which enabled reducing the British fleet numbers in the Pacific region that could added to the British home fleet in response to the growth of the German navy, while Japan was secured from possible Russian attack.
The two states also agreed to observe strict neutrality of either of the two was involved in a war with a third power, and if either was involved in a war with two powers, the other would help actively. France was also interested in avoiding the danger of being involved in a Russian-Japanese war, as well as strengthen France’s position in Europe. An agreement was also reached between France and Britain, which would not join with Britain to block Russian expansion in China through establishing a buffer presence in Tibet, while Britain would not join the Triple Alliance. France and Britain could also reach an agreement on African possessions. On 8 April 1904, Britain sided with France and created the Anglo-French Entente, with France joining Britain on the condition of mutual support in colonial matters in Asia and Africa, including that France was to support Britain taking absolute control in Egypt while Britain was to support France’s direct control in Morocco. The Anglo-French entente of 1904 did not commit the two nations to a military alliance, but subsequent conversations and negotiations resulted in a close understanding on many questions and placed Britain under a “moral obligation” to come to the aid of France in the event of an unprovoked attack on it.
The strength of this new alignment was tested in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905, when it was maintained in spite of Russia, which was supported by France, was defeated by Japan that was supported by Britain. The Entente had thus shown its value. It was also strengthened by the outcome of a conference over the future of Morocco, after William II spoke out against French influence there during a 1905 visit and strongly indicated German support for Moroccan independence. His action led to an uproar not only in Paris, but also in London, where the government had already taken alarm at Germany’s naval program. Germany had no important interests in Morocco, economic or otherwise, whereas the French had common borders with Morocco in both Algeria and French West Africa. The frequent Moroccan tribal revolts occasionally spilled over into French territory. The French, therefore, made agreements with Italy, Spain, and Britain in the hope of establishing an eventual French protectorate over most of the country, with Spain having the northern tip. Germany, however, was determined to use Morocco to test the strength of the new Anglo-French Entente of 1904 by provoking France into staging aggressive action by mobilising, preparing the military, for war, and therefore drive a wedge between Britain and France while showing that France’s opposition to Germany was too dangerous, while the alliance with Britain was uncertain.
The Algeçiras Conference in January 1906 recognised the special interest of France and it keeping order there together with Spain, and also isolated Germany, which meant only Austria could be relied on, since only Austria supported Germany’s position. Meanwhile, Russia relied on France after its defeat by Japan, and after being weakened by this war in 1905 and enduring domestic tension. Russia as Germany’s main enemy military power opened the way for Germany to nullify the effects of the Entente Cordiale between France and Britain by reasserting its position and influence, as France’s diplomatic approaches to Italy, which weakened the Triple Alliance, and its understanding with Britain. German statesmen considered Germany’s leadership in international affairs to be threatened German threats to peace continued during this time through its warship building programme to compete against Britain. William II met with the Tsar in the Baltic in Björko on 24 July 1905 and tried to revive the old agreement for mutual defence in Europe in order to place Germany at the centre of a coalition that would also involve France accepting the status quo if Russia would bring France into the alliance after this treaty was ratified.
However, this was never ratified due to Russia’s earlier commitment to France, while the German chancellor von Bülow maintained that the mutual defence in Europe would not put enough pressure on Britain by potentially threatening its colonial interests. Britain considered the German peril to be a real and menacing threat to its international interests, in view of German control being developed in Turkish Asia Minor that potentially threatened India and the Suez Canal more directly than Russian ambitions for control of the Dardanelles, which could preclude Russia from using its natural resources while they were under Turkish control, which was subject to German influences. Meanwhile the size of the German navy was growing faster than the English. Russia also remained dependent on allies, considerably due to after it had been weakened by its war with Japan, in terms of prestige and military strength due to the casualties that had been incurred, the destruction of its naval power, and enormous economic costs. Russia thus became amenable to an agreement with Britain on 31 August 1907 over the future of their spheres of colonial interests in Tibet aimed at containing Russia’s expansion in Manchuria, Afghanistan and Persia to maintain British interests in India against Russian encroachments. This new agreement thus further consolidated Europe into two opposing alliances. Britain could depend on Allies on the continent to allay the necessity for a mass conscript army, and Russia and France were likewise no longer isolated diplomatically. On the other hand, Germany and Austria maintained their interests that conflicted with those of Russia, and relations between Germany and France remained tense, while Italy looked to maintaining its own advantages.
The international situation became increasingly tense after Russia signed the Anglo-Russo Agreement in 1907, as crises in Morocco and the Balkans where several countries competed for various territorial interests, led to growing tension between the two blocs that solidified the division between competing European powers. First, the Bosnian Annexation crisis of 1908 split Russia and Austria. Austria and Russia had agreed to maintain the status quo in the Balkans in 1897 and 1903. However, Russia’s expansion in Europe was threatened by German and Austrian expansion in the Balkans, which conflicted with its own interests. Russia tenaciously pursued the ideal of ultimately acquiring control of the Dardanelles, and therefore engaged in seeking influence among the Balkan states, whereas Austria-Hungary, which had lost its influence in Italy in the wars of 1859 and 1866, had likewise turned attention to extending its influence in the same region to counteract Russian influence, as well as preserve its independent statehood that was perceived to be threatened by Balkan nationalist interests.
The German government had cultivated good relations with the Turks, and had recently become influential in Turkey, where there were huge German investments. In order for the German Empire to control the Turkish dominions, it seemed necessary that Austria-Hungary and Germany together should control the Balkan Peninsula that lay in between. This suited the Dual Monarchy that wanted to expand to the south, and this plan gradually took shape. In order to dominate the Balkans by carrying on trade and to defend it in time of war, a great railroad was being built. From the ports of the North Sea and the Baltic, lines ran to Berlin, then to Vienna and Budapest, then to Belgrade, and on to Constantinople. The Germans were extending this line of communication by building the Baghdad Railway, which started on the shore of the Bosporus opposite Constantinople and would run across Asia Minor and across Mesopotamia to the city of Bagdad, and then onto the Persian Gulf, while a branch would extend along the Mediterranean past Egypt to the Middle East.
Britain looked on this scheme to extend control through the Balkan as a natural corridor between Europe and Asia, with suspicion and hostility. This German penetration of Turkish Asia Minor was expected to allow for its economic and political control of Turkey. Any possible extensions toward central Asia or toward the Persian Gulf would allow open the way for mining, commercial and industrial concession along the same railroad concession lines. German control in these regions could potentially allow for a base from which Germany and Turkey could seize the Suez Canal and attack Egypt. The railway extension to the Persian Gulf and central Asia could also threaten British ships, as well as weaken Turkey economically in Germany’s favour, which could jeopardise British investment interests there. The British and Russian governments thus agreed to set up spheres of influence in Persia in 1907 to guard against the extension of the German line to central Asia.
This scheme would also make it impossible to fulfill the ambitions of the Slavs for self-determination, while Russia wanted to unite Greek Orthodox Slavs under their patronage. Russia also remained interested in opening the Dardanelles Straights to Russian shipping as an outlet to the Mediterranean, especially when Russia was prepared to exert its influence in Eastern Europe again after its defeat in the Far East. These Straights were absolutely controlled by the Turks at Constantinople. If Russia succeeded in acquiring Constantinople, then some of the greatest ambitions of Germany might come to nothing, and Austria-Hungary would be largely at Russia’s mercy. Not only did Austria-Hungary desire to expand southward through the Balkans, but the Danube River flowed into the Black Sea, and much of Austria-Hungary’s commerce went out past Constantinople. If Russia succeeded in its ambition, then Austria-Hungary, could be largely closed in and at Russia’s mercy, while if Austria got what she wanted, then Russia would be largely at her mercy in like manner, since the Black Sea was Russia’s only all-year-round ice-free body of water, and was a vital outlet for immense grain harvest exports, which could likewise be closed by any foreign power controlling the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The field in which these conflicting ambitions most clashed was the Balkan Peninsula, the mastery of which was indispensable to success for either side. Hence the Balkans became the principal danger spot of Europe.
Further tension was found in the Balkans, and keeping Austria-Hungary and Russia separated, as had been attempted under Bismarck, was no longer possible as tensions between them grew as a result of nationalism. Serbia had a deep sense of nationalism and its king, Peter I, wanted to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was home to hundreds of thousands of Serbs, which would also isolate Serbia from Montenegro, Albania and the Adriatic as well as prevent the union of south Slavs under Serbian leadership and have a commercial and military window to the sea. Austria had thus destroyed the dream of a “greater Serbia” that required including Bosnia and a part of the Adriatic coast to have an access to the Adriatic Sea.
Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina on 7 October 1908, following a thirty-year period of civilian administration after the Congress of Berlin in 1878, with the consent of the Sultan of Turkey who surrendered the last vestiges of rights he had in these two provinces, which further benefited Austria-Hungary’s economic interests in the Balkans and also constituted a defensive bulwark against Serbia. This action caused consternation among Serbian statesmen who looked forward to their eventual independence in the interest of their own foreign policy plans for territorial aggrandisement ambitions, as well as thei aim to acquire access to the Adriatic Sea. The ongoing decay and later collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to a chain of events that culminated in the outbreak of the First World War due to conflicting interests and competition for influence in the Balkans. Austria expected to forestall continued Turkish influence in these provinces, following the recent establishment of its new constitutional regime in July 1908.
Austria-Hungary acted with the assurance of German support, since Germany was dependent on its one reliable ally, while also acting while Russia could not intervene in its weak state that precluded taking aggressive action, in view of not yet having recovered from the effects of the Russo-Japanese War, and facing the need to re-establish internal stability due to ongoing political unrest throughout the country. It was also intended to put pressure on the Triple Entente that was not yet firmly established, and would not be ready to fight against Austria’s unilateral abrogation of Article 26 concerning Bosnia-Herzogovina in the Treaty of Berlin. This led Serbia to turn to Russia to support their territorial ambitions, but Russia still needed time for military reorganization during ongoing enmity against the Dual Alliance.
Another consequence of this crisis was the defensive Dual Alliance was hereby used to back aggression, and strengthened the hand of the Austrians to take further aggressive measures against Serbia, while Serbian nationalism remained potent and hostile against Austria. Meanwhile, these events also had the effect of solidifying the Triple Entente, especially as Russia was compelled to yield to Austria’s demands while earlier treaty agreements were revised at Serbia’s expense, while Russia was under Pan-Slavic pressure to support Slav interests to combine the Balkans into a single political group with Constantinople, the centre of the Greek Orthodox faith, as its capital of a Greater Russia as Russia’s “historical mission.” This crisis also influenced Italy into abandoning its allies in the Triple Alliance, while Russia, like France in 1902, contributing to undermining Italy’s alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. On 23 October 1909. the King of Italy and the Russian Tsar signed a secret agreement following discussions during the summer of 1909 at Racconigi, providing that neither government would make any future agreements concerning the Near East without mutual consultation, which meant that the status quo was to be preserved in the Balkans. This meant sharing a common policy of preventing further Austro-Hungarian encroachments in the Balkan peninsula, following the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Germany was thus placed at a weakened position, as Austria’s own Slavic elements could not be relied on in the face of local nationalist sentiments, and nevertheless remained bent on incorporating further Slavs in the Balkans in the interest of the Austro-Hungarian empire’s own self-preservation, which necessarily drew the animosity of the Russians. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary appeared to be Germany’s only reliable ally, as Italy’s lengthy coastline could make it vulnerable to British and French sea power, as well as Austria-Hungary having a stronger economic base. As Russian Pan-Slavism and Austria-Hungary’s imperialist interests in the Balkans remained in hostile contact, it no longer became possible to maintain Bismarck’s policy of entente with Russia. Other aggravating factors were Germany’s continued possession of Alsace-Lorraine that continued being an issue with France, and German foreign trade continued causing tension with Great Britain. The overall international tension continued worsening in the face of reactions to further international developments that causing greater suspicion between the two major European alliances.
Tension mounted further as a result of Germany’s aggression, when France violated the Algeciras Convention and the French-Spanish Agreement of 1904 dividing Morocco into separate spheres of influence by sending troops to occupy Fez, the capital of Morocco, in 1911 in an unnecessary show of force, as a result of anti-foreign demonstrations. Germany tested the resolve of the Triple Entente in July 1911 by dispatching a gunboat to Agadir, Morocco, ostensibly for the purpose of protecting Europeans and their commercial interests in and near that port area, in response to this French occupation. The actual purpose was to intimidate the Entente to test its resolve through pursuing a belligerent foreign policy, while the Russian and British press and foreign offices supported France’s actions. Germany’s aggressive move mainly merely aggravated international tensions, and also exposed how Italy would not support Germany’s interests with prejudice to its own agreement to occupy territory in Libya. Britain broke the deadlock by having Germany agree to recognising a French protectorate over Morocco, and in return for territory in the Congo. More importantly, the true significance of the Moroccan crises for European power politics was that they converted the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 from a mere agreement to settle colonial disputes into an active military alliance, which also allowed the British to reinforce their home fleet by leaving the French navy to patrol more of the Mediterranean.
There was a possibility of reaching a compromise about a naval agreement between Germany and Britain when Lord Haldane, the British Minister of War, went to Berlin in February 1912, but this ended in a further failure. The British offered to make no unprovoked attack upon Germany and not pursue any aggressive policy toward Germany, but the Germans demanded a strict agreement for British neutrality in any European war. This led Haldane to believe that Germany’s drive for hegemony would have to be resisted in the face of Britain maintaining that they were to maintain control of the sea for its continued national security, regardless of Germany’s demand that it needed a strong navy to maintain its international prestige, empire and commerce.
The factor of tension between Germany and Britain in addition to German aggression in Africa led to Britain and France making arrangements to making their naval security interdependent. France and Russia also agreed on mutual military support in August 1912, if Russia went to war with Austria over the defence of Serbia, and Germany attacked Russia in keeping with the Dual Alliance. Germany’s imperialist interests was thus provoking England on one hand through the naval race that aroused hostility from Britain, and on the other hand, supporting Austria’s interests in the Balkans prevented coming to terms with Russia, and further tensions in the Balkans brought Europe closer to war. While Germany refused to come to an agreement with England on the naval issue, it was also bound to Austria-Hungary’s interests of self-preservation in the face of nationalism that could only be maintained by force. Another source of conflict emanated from the continuing decline of Turkey’s hold on its former Ottoman empire possessions. Different other countries laid claim to various of these territories led to different Balkan conflicts. These were precursor signs leading to a wider European conflagration over further tension resulting from different territorial ambitions.
The Italian government initiated a conflict with Turkey in the interest of fulfilling nationalist ambitions through making colonial acquisitions in northern Africa, where France and Britain had established colonial possessions. Italy thus aimed to fulfill its ambitions to establish its position in the balance of power in the Mediterranean through acquiring its own colonial possessions in this region by challenging Turkey for control of Ottoman Libya, at a time when the Ottoman empire was in a continuing state of military and economic decline, as well as facing the effects of domestic political divisions. While Britain, France and Germany were opposed to weakening the Ottoman empire, and Austria-Hungary wanted stability in the Balkans, Italian authorities acted independently by concluding an agreement with France, pledging non-interference in Tunisia and Morocco in exchange for having a free hand to intervene in Libya. An ultimatum was issued to Turkey on 27 September 1911 to either allow an Italian occupation of Libya or face military intervention, alleging that legitimate Italian commercial interests in Tripoli and the neighbouring district of Cyrenaica were threatened. Italy dismissed Turkey’s offer of concessions, and declared war on 29 September, This led to an annexation of Tripoli and Cyrenaica of 5 November, and thus fulfilling a cardinal point of Italian colonial policy. Italy thus acquired this territory at Turkey’s expense while it was in a weakened state, akin to Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also with the tacit approval of France, as Italy had supported France’s colonial aims in Morocco. Following securing its hold on these coastal regions and a settlement was not forthcoming, Italy continued attacking Turkey in its European territories and Syria in attempt to bring Turkey to terms, until the Peace of Lausanne was signed on 18 October 1912, whereby Libya acquired sovereignty, albeit under Italian control, and Italy agreed to return the Dodecanese islands.
Further turmoil in the Balkans followed due to conflicting territorial claims by various populations aiming to establish their nationalist aspirations in the Ottoman empire’s possessions in the Balkans. Another crisis arose in December 1912 as a consequence of the successful war that Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece constituting the Balkan League waged against the Turks, which affected the balance of power in Europe since this conflict affected how Ottoman territory was to be divided that jeopardised all existing frontiers, and the involved states were allied to the great European states. In this instance, the Serbs and Montenegrins were attached to Russia, and so to the Triple Entente, while the Bulgars were friendly with Austria and so were connected with the Triple Alliance, which raised tensions in Austria about waging war against Serbia that sought access to the Adriatic Sea, which would lead to Russian as well as British intervention. Territorial disputes were resolved to a degree when the First Balkan War ended on 30 May 1913 with the signing of the Treaty of London, which reduced Ottoman Europe to a small strip of land outside of Constantinople, and established Albania as an independent principality. However, further territorial disputes among the belligerents remained, ultimately leading to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War on 29 June 1913, pitting Serbia, Greece, Rumania and Turkey against Bulgaria, with the prompt capitulation of Bulgaria forestalling any widening of the continued conflagration, with further peace settlements concluded in August and September 1913, with boundaries being redrawn to Bulgaria’s disadvantage. Serbia’s population also increased by fifty per cent, and therefore was a much more direct threat to Austria and its trade through the Balkans to the Middle East.
Tensions remained between the separate international alliances that supported their conflicting interests. Austria remained supported by Germany while Russia supported Serbia as a means of extending its own ambitions in the Balkans. Contemporary tensions increased during 1913, as Germany, Russia and France all made arrangements to increase their military establishments, including France issuing further loans to Russia that were used for the complete reorganisation of the Russian army and building strategic railroads along the German and Austro-Hungarian frontiers. For more than forty years – the longest period in modern history – no major Western nation fought another despite the many rivalries and conflicts of interest. Nevertheless, it was in the nature of the alliance system that if war between two or more of the great powers should begin, no matter where it started or how trivial the cause, it would become a general war involving all. The stage was thus set for the outbreak of World War I, after Germany and Austria tested the resolve the Entente powers, which led to a tightening of the Entente that considered having to prepare itself for a future conflict, while Germany and Austria-Hungary sought to assert their national authorities. War appeared inevitable to relieve the international tension, which superseded applying diplomatic remedies. An almost trivial occasion in the Balkans would then lead to war breaking out when there was little chance for maintaining international order and security in the face of mutual suspicions between competing alliance systems, regardless of only Austria-Hungary and Russia having direct interests in the Balkans.
Serbia as the focal point of Pan-Slavism in the Balkans had long intended to create a Greater Serbia incorporating all the Slavic peoples in the Balkans. The Serbian government made or tolerated anti-Austrian propaganda, gave haven to political refugees, and generally hampered Austrian efforts in the Balkans. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 particularly incensed the Serbs, who regarded the provinces as properly belonging to Greater Serbia. Austria long since would have squelched the Serbs if it had not been for the threat of Russian interference, and the government now resolved to take action, regardless of this threat that could lead to a wider conflict in the face of accumulated bitter suspicions between different European nations.
The chain of events that led to the outbreak of war began in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 28 June 1914, the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the imperial throne of Austria-Hungary, decided to visit Bosnia-Herzegovina and inspect the Austrian troops stationed there. This day was also the anniversary of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, which added insult to injury. However, he was known to be more liberal than his aged uncle, the emperor. It was widely believed that on his accession to the throne he would give the Slavic inhabitants of the empire much greater autonomy, and perhaps a position similar to that enjoyed by the Magyars, in a federal empire. Since that might postpone indefinitely the creation of a Greater Serbia, the Pan-Slav secret society Union or Death, also known as the Black Hand that sought to unite ethnic Slavic populations in the Balkan Peninsula into one nation under Serbia’s leadership, akin to the unification of the German and Italian states, decided on his assassination to undermine the influence of Austria-Hungary. An assassination attempt was made on the drive toward this official visit in Bosnia, a contested region between Austria-Hungary and Serbia when a bomb thrown at the open top automobile in which he and his wife were travelling on only injured him. Gavrilo Princip, a member of the Black Hand, a Serbian nationalist group with secretive connections with the Serbian military that likely provided weapons, made a second assassination attempt that killed both the archduke and his wife while they were riding through the streets of Sarajevo on the way to a local hospital.
Austria-Hungary had wanted a reason to crush Serbia for some time due to competing interests in Bosnia, in the interest of securing control of necessary rive and rail routes to Turkey, as well as the redressing how the Balkan wars in 1912-1913 had not conformed to Austro-Hungarian plans regarding Turkey and Bulgaria that led to increasing Russian prestige and influence in the region through supporting Serbia’s territorial expansion in the region following the peace settlements. A successful invasion of Serbia would not only from the field of competing states in the Balkans, but also influence other Balkan states, especially Bulgaria that had territorial designs on Macedonia that was occupied by Serbia and Greece, to align themselves with the Dual Alliance in the interest of attaining their own territorial ambitions in the region. The assassination provided a pretext for aggression against Serbia to fulfill territorial ambitions through a forcible readjustment, at a time when Serbia’s military force was weakened following these earlier Balkan wars. Russia was likewise weakened due to internal economic conditions, while Austria-Hungary had the support of Germany, as in 1908, which also sought to reassert its great power status.
Austrian authorities, particularly the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorff who had argued for necessity to wage war for several years, used the assassination as a pretext for aggression, claiming that Serbia had supported the terrorist organisation known as the Black Hand with which Princip was affiliated. In fact, the Serb government was involved in underground and terrorist activities serving its designs for a greater Serbia, although the political leadership did not condone the assassination, while also did not sanction a sufficiently thorough investigation of this event, which was ended within a week with the claim that Serbia was not complicit. The Austrian government thus accused the Serbs of complicity in the crime, and demanded terms for satisfaction in an attempt to crush Slav nationalism that was the main factor of instability in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as being concerned about the murder of Franz Ferdinand causing a loss of international prestige with prejudice to Serbia.
Russian political authorities supported Serbian interests, since it was also concerned about its own loss of international prestige due to incurring several diplomatic and military defeats, including the war against Japan in 1904-1905, and then the Bosnian crisis in 1908. The Russian government was also concerned about domestic instability, and hoped to gain a foreign political success, with the ultimate underlying goals of re-establishing its credibility with its western allies, and ultimately opening the Dardanelles to Russian warships. Pan-Slavism sentiment and the feeling of an inevitable clash with the Germanic peoples also played a role in making war acceptable to Russia, and a newspaper article published on 13 June stating that Russia and France must be prepared for a forthcoming war against Germany, which was sanctioned by the Russian Minister of War. Russian political authorities reacted to the assassination with mostly indifference, claiming that there was not any Serbian involvement, regardless of Austria providing evidence to the contrary, thus implying that the Austrians were taking advantage of the assassinations as a pretext to attack Serbia, and also refused to sanction independent Austrian investigations in Serbia.
The Austrians therefore looked to Germany for help against Serbia supported by Russia. Kaiser Wilhelm gave the Austrians his full unconditional support for the invasion of Serbia, since there was fear in Germany about growing isolation and Austria-Hungary was Germany’s last ally, and thus seemed to deserve support at all costs to prevent the breakdown of the Hapsburg Empire following Slav agitation. Moreover, the modernisation, population and industrial growth of Russia would eventually become a threat to Germany, while the outbreak of war would prevent the growth of its influence in the Balkans, which would in turn help preserve the Hapsburg Empire from the danger of dissolution as a result of Slav nationalism within its borders, and also maintain a check on Russian expansion westward, and therefore preserve the German empire itself.
In addition to motivations for bringing about war, the only war plan that the German General Staff had, the Schlieffen Plan to survive a two-front war, would not work once Russian strategic railroads were completed in 1917. Convinced that a two-front war was inevitable and hoping that Britain would remain neutral, the German General Staff had prepared this strategy for preventive war as early as 1905 that demanded implementation before France and Russia became stronger. Since a war against Russia could not be won in a short term, France had to be neutralised as quickly as possible. This called for quickly mobilised German troops to encircle the French army by breaking into neutral Belgium and Luxembourg to circumvent the French fortifications on the French-German border as the only way to overcome a two front war to achieve a rapid and decisive blow against France, and then turning back toward Alsace-Lorraine in a big pincer movement around Paris, and then pressing the French army against the French-German border and be forced to surrender. Next, the bulk of the German army would be sent eastward by railroad to defend against the Russians, who were expected to mobilise at a much slower pace that either the Germans or the French. However, Schlieffen and his successor in 1908, Helmuth von Moltke, could not envisage or anticipate the high numbers of casualties that would be incurred as a result of advances in weaponry technology, including artillery and machine guns, and amounts of resources that would be expended upon launching a German offensive in western Europe, and whether it could remain sustained with limited resources, upon its completion and thereafter. It only remained for a suitable time for an attack to be launched, which would occur after an outbreak of another European crisis.
The German military authorities concluded that Germany should support whatever claims Austria-Hungary would consider appropriate to impose on Serbia for redress, while facing the risk of war with France and Russia. This was to ensure the dominance of the Balkans, including provoking a war with Serbia through which German aims could be achieved. Austria-Hungary was to take hostile action against Serbia, while Germany would deal with the powers that would become involved in a conflict following an attack on Serbian independence. This primarily concerned Russia that had long aspired to an outlet into the Mediterranean that was not blocked by winter ice or controlled by the Baltic states, which had led to earlier warfare in the Balkans against the Turks that had culminated in their liberation of most of the Balkan states by 1878. This plan to have access to the Mediterranean was again cut off by Austria-Hungary and Germany, which was being consolidated through the planning of the Berlin to Baghdad railway corridor. Any attack on Serbia was thus a grievous affront to the Russian Empire, which was still slowly recovering from its defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and the revolutionary outbreaks that had followed. German military planning meanwhile anticipated that Russian military mobilisation would take six weeks, and could not constitute an effective offensive force in less than two or three months, which would be sufficient time to crush France that was treaty bound to intervene after an attack on Russia. The priority was thus an attack on France to conclusively prevent future attacks on Germany, whereas the French planned for war against Germany as a continuing progression of earlier military plans. During this time, Britain was likewise opposed to Germany in what appeared to be a forcible culmination of a new rivalry for colonial empire-building and the control of sea shipping, in contrast to Germany’s continued plans for establishing a great power standing outside of the scope of Europe that Bismarck had attained. The Serbian plot for its own national aspirations was thus merely a lever that would set machinery of hostility into operation in view of these mutual conflicting national interests, and would thus extend a regional conflict onto a European-wide scale.
Austria-Hungary sent an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July 1914 with ten unreasonable demands that were to be met within forty-eight hours, which were intended to be rejected. The most egregiously contentious clause was allowing Austrian police to conduct their own investigation in Serbia. These terms would lead to the end of Serbian independence to effectively becoming a vassal state dependency comparable to Bosnia while sacrificing its independence and sovereignty that would effectively mean disregarding its national constitution, and also greatly undermine Russia’s prestige in the Balkans, which demonstrated the intention to launch a war against Serbia. Austria-Hungary blamed the Serbian government for the assassination, and therefore demanded that the Serbian press immediately cease anti-Austria propaganda; demanding the removal of hostile officials, and allowing the Austrian police into Serbia to look for the Black Hand members and arrest them. The Serbian government rejected the ultimatum, and prepared for war against Austria-Hungary by ordering general mobilisation, with support from Russia
Although the German government assumed that the Russians could never mobilise to support a small country that had lent support to the assassination of a monarch, the world was surprised by the Russian Tsar’s abrupt reaction on 23 July that “Russian cannot allow Austria to crush Serbia and become the dominant power in the Balkans.” Any attempts to find a modus operandi to preserve the status quo in the Balkans were to no avail in view of the competing inimical interests. Complying with Austria’s demands would in fact lead to ending any questioning about its annexation of Bosnia, whereas Austria was intent on preserving its integrity of its continued existence, and also its existence as a great power. Relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia remained tense, with the Russian foreign minister Sergei Sazanov rebuked the Austro-Hungarian ambassador for planning to wage war against Serbia, and the tsar ordered a partial mobilisation in four military districts on 24 July, and ordered further preparations to be in a state of readiness for war on 26 July, which raised international tensions by instilling motivations among other European powers to prepare for the outbreak of war.
Upon Serbia’s response on 25 July containing a surrender on most of the points in response to Austria “chastising” a hostile state while acting on Russian advisement, but agreeing to submit the remaining points to arbitration at the Hague Tribunal, to which Austria-Hungary refused to comply. Austria-Hungary then broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia while being determined to conclusively eliminate Serbian nationalist machinations, with support from Germany, and with Serbia having support from Russia. When all of the demands went unanswered, which would mean Serbia foregoing its sovereignty, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914 with the support of Germany, and entered into Serbia as far as Belgrade. Bethmann-Hollweg, the chancellor, and many other Germans were obsessed by fears of Russian expansion and favored a preventive war. Emperor Wilhelm II encouraged the use of armed force against Serbia with the assurance of his support with the remark in a telegram on 6 July that he appreciated the necessity of “freeing your Serbian frontiers of their heavy pressure,” and encouraged Austrian authorities to deal with clarifying relations with Serbia as they saw fit. As German political and military decisionmakers were preparing for the outbreak of war during the summer of 1914, this statement was interpreted by the Austrian government as the offer of a “blank cheque” of unconditional support from Germany as a form of necessary defensive support. The French regarded the new crisis between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as simply another test of the strength of their alliances, similar to the Moroccan crises, and assured Russia of their support. Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary, proposed an international conference of the four great powers not immediately concerned in the dispute, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. However, Germany declined to take part while being aware of standing alone, and Austria refused point-blank to submit “a question of national honour” to arbitration, and claimed this was merely a local affair in which the other powers had no right to intervene. The Russians would not capitulate as they had done in with the Hapsburg empire’s annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and came to Serbia’s aid against the Austrians. Russia responded to this invasion by mobilising its southern command, and then ordered general mobilisation, which necessarily escalated tensions by staging this provocative action that encouraged Serbia to resist Austrian demands, while Austria-Hungary’s mobilisation was at a partial status. International tensions escalated further as the British fleet was dispatched to war stations in the North Sea on 29 July, to which the German embassy informed the British government on 31 July Germany was prepared to meet the threat of Russian mobilisation through its own mobilisation, which appeared to make the outbreak of war imminent, while Russia did not opt to retreat from its mobilisation. Full mobilisation was ordered in Austria-Hungary on 1 August, and Germany declared war on Russia in reaction to its refusal to retreat from its demobilisation, and recognising that a conflict could not be contained to one between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, while anticipating that Russia remained unprepared for a confrontation with both Germany and Austria-Hungary, and anticipating the prestige of Austria-Hungary could remain entrenched by extracting concessions from Serbia.
These developments had a domino effect on the nations of Europe, as the peril of imminent war between Austria and Russia involved Germany and France, as well as Britain that had been challenged by Germany’s threats that would worsen if Germany overcame France, while Germany assured its support to Austria on the basis of its alliance, and would not restrain Austrian aggression to maintain its continued international prestige, or even existence in the face of ethnic nationalism within the Hapsburg empire. Germany insisted that a war could only be averted by Britain and France restraining Russia from intervening in the dispute between Serbia and Austria, while Britain maintained Germany had to compel Austria-Hungary to submit its dispute with Serbia to a European conference. Unfortunately, such purposes were irreconcilable and were doomed to fail unless one side were to yield its interests unconditionally, just as France had yielded at Tangier, and Russia had yielded over Bosnia. France did not otherwise express any visible aggressive plans, and withdrew troops from its border with Germany during July as a demonstration of peaceful intentions, and would not otherwise either restrain or encourage Russia to take any further action during the escalating tensions.
The German government pressured Austria into resuming direct negotiations with Russia immediately after the Austrian declaration of war on July 28, while it tried to separate France from Russia and offered Britain a guarantee that it would not annex any part of France or Belgium in return for a British promise of neutrality. Neither France, which mostly had a defensive policy although they hoped to regain Alsace-Lorraine, nor Britain would make a firm commitment while neither Britain nor France took action to discourage Russia from escalating tensions. Britain merely demanded that Germany respect the neutrality of Belgium, to which Germany would not commit itself due to military considerations. Germany would be exposed to attack on two sides from Russia and France, while expecting that French war mobilization would be as rapid as that of Germany’s, while Russia’s would be relatively slow. It was therefore essential for German prospects of success to crush France before allowing sufficient time to free forces to withstand Russian forces. A direct attack against France across the French-German border would mean facing strong line of French defensive fortifications, which compose the direct line of French mobilisation that would be costly in terms of time and manpower, and would not be certain of success. On the other hand, an attack through Belgium would be countered by a weak Belgian army with the element of surprise, as well as attack mobilizing French armies on an exposed flank. The moral issue of infringing Belgian neutrality would be disregarded in view of vital interests disregarding international law.
While there had been military planning discussions between British and Belgian officers concerning British assistance in the event of Germany violating Belgian neutrality, this proposal was rejected by Belgian authorities, and England could not press its assistance on a neutral state, with which it did not have a treaty to defend, which had expired in 1872. The treaty of 1839 regulated the international status of Belgium, which merely bound the five signatory powers to not violate its neutrality without obliging them individually or collectively to resist its violation, and this was expected to be a permanent settlement. Hence, the German general staff did not appear to consider this treaty to be a serious obstacle for a German right of way for an invasion of France in view of loose “international morality,” as military planning considerations took precedence to enable the encirclement of French defensive positions. An admission of technical guilt by the German Chancellor would be compensated by a promise of full reparation after the war, but this would not be forgiven by the allies. Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary initiated aggression against Serbia that upset the balance of power in Europe, which then brought opposing alliance systems into motion for the purpose that they were intended to be deployed – preparing for war, and any upset could tip the balance toward armed aggression on a wide scale when threats failed to achieve to achieve results to serve individual national interests. The balance in 1914 remained particularly hazardous as Germany expected requiring assistance to maintain defending territorial gains and national unity that were acquired by 1871 by force, Austria-Hungary expected requiring assistance with developing its Balkan policy, as well as preserve this empire in view of nationalist hostility from minority population elements.
Russia was the first nation to respond to this regional conflict. All other decisive steps had been taken long before this decision was made, culminating in Austria’s aggression toward Serbia with Germany’s encouragement, while Russia could not stand by and see Serbia attacked. Tsar Nicholas II ordered the full mobilization of the Russian army, calling up the troops and sending them to the frontier on 30 July, which practically constituted an act of war. This also meant that Russia was going to take on Germany as well as Austria in accordance with its mobilization plans that could not be easily modified. The Russian government, which had ordered a general mobilization of the army immediately on receipt of the news of the Austrian declaration, changed its order to limited mobilisation as preparation for war against Austria when informed of the apparent German efforts to make peace. When the final Austrian-Russian negotiations broke down, it again ordered general mobilisation with France’s support. Regardless of earlier expressions of aggressive intentions in the foreign office in 1913, the French government took precautions to introduce safeguards from any possible charges of initiating a conflict with Germany. The French cabinet acceded to the French general staff’s demand on 30 July to dispatch troops ten kilometres away from the frontier to prevent any incidents from occurring, prior to giving the order for general mobilisation on 1 August, nearly at the same time as mobilisation was ordered in Germany. German troops occupied Luxemburg and sent patrols into France on 2 August, while the Chief of the French General Staff Joseph Joffre instructed his commanders not to pursue German troops into Germany.
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