French public opinion reacted to the shift in the European balance of power with demands to maintain its international status in reaction to the establishment of the North German Confederation in 1867 led by Prussia, created from among the coalition of German states that had overcome the earlier political influence had exercised. While Bismarck was concluding alliances with the southern member states of the former German Confederation, Napoleon III was pressing for compensation for French neutrality during this conflict between Prussia and Austria, according to his interpretation of the Biarritz conversations. Vincent Bendetti, the French ambassador in Berlin, called on Bismarck on 5 August 1866 about possibly establishing a secret convention to restore the 1814 French eastern boundaries, which would entail ceding the Saarland, the cession of the Bavarian Palatinate and the Hessian districts west of the Rhine, and Luxemburg to France, as well as the possibility of sanctioning the annexation of Belgium. Since Bismarck rebuffed these proposals, which induced Napoleon III to realise that acquiring territory would necessarily entail applying force.
Bismarck peremptorily refused to countenance these far-reaching demands for German territory, while remaining vague about the disposal of Belgium to placate French demands for compensation, while France was yet unprepared to enforce those demands by waging war against Prussia. Bismarck clarified in these negotiations that he did not aim to pursue Prussian interests, but at a sincere reconciliation and the union of these states for the wider field of the German nation. While revealing Napoleon’s demands for territorial compensation to the southern German states during the negotiations, in order to show their representatives the danger of remaining neutral, rather than joining Prussia in a defensive front, Bismarck also envisaged when their military resources could be marshalled in a united German alliance against an external enemy. These southern German states were also compelled to provide support for mutual military purposes, prior to the signing of the peace settlement with Austria, which stipulated ensuring their independent status, but in fact they had already been reduced to permanent conditions of dependence on Prussia.
The troops of the contracting parties were to be united for a common purpose in the event of an outbreak of war, and would then be placed under the command of the Prussian king. Rather than the southern states expecting to look to France as a protector against Hohenzollern tyranny, Prussia setting these secret military conventions meant not ceding any German territory, and any threat from France would lead to the southern states joining with the North German Confederation in a united resistance that would dispose of threats from Napoleon III by becoming French allied satellite states. Although they remained independent states, they could no longer expect defensive military support from Austria. Württemberg accepted Bismarck’s proposals on 13 July 1866, Baden on 17 July, and Bavaria on 2 August. The terms of the preliminary peace settlement with Austria were superseded by the Treaty of Prague that was signed on 23 August 1866.
Austria was compelled to agree to dissolving the German Confederation, and the subsequent creation of a Prussian dominated North German Confederation to the north of the Main River, which excluded Austria. Apart from the transfer of the union of the Lombardo-Venetia kingdom to the kingdom of Italy through Napoleon III, the integrity of the Austrian empire was maintained. Prussia also secured the right to impose territorial annexations, apart from the kingdom of Saxony that maintained its territorial integrity and its monarchy. Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg were annexed to Prussia. The populations of the districts in northern Schleswig could be reunited with Denmark, subject to a free vote, which was not implemented between 1867 and 1879, when it was expunged with the consent of Austria. The northern part of Hesse-Darmstadt, or Hesse-Homburg, Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Kassel, and the city of Frankfurt to rectify the southern Prussian boundary on the Main River were also annexed to Prussia, with the added justification that they had waged war against Prussia. Austria was hereby excluded from the German states and from all interference in matters pertaining to them, while they would form their own independent union composing a southern German federation. Austria agreed to pay Prussia the sum of twenty million Prussian thalers in an indemnity to defray expenses incurred by Prussia on account of the war. The territorial integrity of Austria, and its allies, Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and Saxony was left intact, at the cost of paying war indemnities to Prussia. Austria’s political influence among the German states definitively concluded, leaving Prussia taking precedence as the prevailing power with the largest army in Europe and the leading German state.
Overwhelming Austria led to Prussian territory constituting a solid block extending from France and Belgium in the west to Russian Lithuania in the east, which constituted Prussia’s military, political and economic preponderance. Prussia consolidated the connection between Berlin and the Rhineland territories that were acquired in 1815, in addition to securing access to the North Sea and the Baltic Sea that enabled mercantile marine enterprises. Prussia became composed of four-fifths of the population of North German Confederation that was formed out of twenty-two northern German states, which Austria was compelled to recognise. The new confederation was established very rapidly. When the Prussian delegate had withdrawn from the Frankfurt Diet in June 1866 and signaled the outbreak of war, Bismarck had issued an invitation to the northern German states to create this new confederation, which he renewed upon the peace settlement with Austria, and was then accepted by all of the states north of the Main River within weeks.
All of the delegates from the separate states assembled in a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Berlin on 15 December 1866, when Bismarck presented them with a draft constitution with the general principles of guaranteeing their independence, safeguarding the confederation’s territories against external aggression, and allowing local self-government within the member states under their accepted forms in order to attain their goodwill to ensure its endurance. The conference continued until 7 February 1867, when the amended draft was recommended by the governments to be accepted. The Reichstag of the North German Confederation, functioning as the lower chamber, was elected by universal, secret, manhood suffrage on 12 February, which then met in the king’s palace in Berlin on 24 February to discuss the recommended draft, which was later passed on 17 April. It was then accepted by separate parliamentary state governments, beginning with the Prussian Landtag on 1 June. A Bundesrat, or federal council, was to be composed as a syndicate of delegates in assigned numbers from the sovereigns of the separate states, who voted as units representing the assigned vote on the instructions of their respective governments. Its deliberations were made in secret, and its decisions were taken on a majority of votes. It has the initiative in legislation, and could reject bills passed by the Reichstag, and dealt with defined subjects through various committees. The parliament was an assembly of representatives in a single chamber, and was elected by direct and universal manhood suffrage from equal electoral districts. It voted the federal budget, and its consent was required for all legislation. The chancellor as the sole federal minister was appointed by the presidency, who was responsible to the Bundesrat as a whole, and functioned as the head of the federal executive and administration, while not being responsible to either the Reichstag or the Bundesrat. He could not be dismissed as a result of a parliamentary vote, but was intended to act as the spokesman of the Bundesrat in all matters of policy, administration or legislation, and was obligated to submit to the presidency in all matters in which it was the executive organ, and countersign all notifications in which the presidency acted on behalf of the Bundesrat.
The king of Prussia was to become the head of the confederation in which the presidency was vested. The king of Prussia as president was not a member of the council, and did not require his consent for federal legislation or taxation. A chancellor would preside over the Bundesrat as the chairman of the upper house federal council, and the Reichstag as the lower house parliament. The president summoned and dissolved the Reichstag, concluded treaties, declared peace and war, represented the Bund in all external relations, and promulgated legislation, and functioned as the commander-in-chief of the combined federal forces during wartime. Legislation and taxation were shared between the federal council and the parliament. The concurrence of both organs was required for the validity of legislation and taxation. The military throughout all of the states was to be based on the Prussian model as another slight step forward toward the direction of a federal Germany under Prussian leadership. The constitution for this North German Confederation was duly promulgated on 1 July 1867. Bismarck was appointed as the Federal Chancellor on 14 July, combining the duties of this new office with the Minister-Presidency of Prussia. He hereafter had the power of Prussia at his disposal, which could veto parliamentary proposals that Prussia did not initiate by having seventeen votes out of forty-three, and was also empowered with making rapid decisions when external circumstances could lead to dealing with urgent situations. Bismarck believed that policy and the responsibility thereof had to be vested to organs outside of parliamentary control, the military was to be withdrawn from parliamentary interference, and Prussia was to exercise its authority over the North German Confederation. These conditions were fulfilled through the federal council, the alliances that preceded establishing the confederation and a clause in its constitution that fixed the composition and numbers of the federal army for five years, and placed it under the supreme command of the presidency, and incorporating Prussia into the upper house. The military general staff could hereafter complete its preparations for waging war against France, while Bismarck could formulate and direct foreign policy while being unimpeded from parliamentary influence. The status of the Confederation as an acting government was thus completed, superseding the previous conglomeration of German states.
Bismarck’s foreign policy after 1867 focused on diplomatically isolating France. Although Bismarck was not concerned about the possibility of France acquiring the support of an ally against Germany, in view of the Austria would not renew hostilities against Prussia, the French occupation of Rome precluded an alliance with Italy. Russia was pacified through establishing a working entente by supporting repudiating the Black Sea clauses of the 1856 Paris Treaty at a favourable opportunity, and Bismack inviting Russia in early 1870 to denounce the prohibitive clauses secured its benevolent neutrality. Russia denouncing those terms would put Britain out of action, as it meant that Austria as a signatory to this treaty, and was bound by a secret alliance with Britain and France formed in 1856 to resist a forcible revision of the Black Sea articles would lead to Russia taking military action against Austria. Italy would not support France for as long as French troops were occupying Rome. Meanwhile, influential French individuals in Napoleon III’s administration were hoping for circumstances to arise that would provide the pretext for a war against Prussia to contain its increasing influence in the German states, as French claims to international prestige could not be reconciled with the ambitions of a rejuvenated new German state. Bismarck’s statesmanship was thus directed toward his determination to secure Prussia’s political control of the North German Confederation through its constitution, and ultimately reaching a settlement with France that would eventually led to establishing a unified German state that would become the prevalent power in central Europe.
A provisional form of German national unity was established on military and commercial terms under Prussia’s sphere of influence, exercising exclusive control over military and foreign affairs. It had a parliament representing the male populations of the member states, whose representative delegates were elected on the basis of the electoral law that revolutionary elements formulated in 1849. Political union appeared to be foreseeable. However, it remained for the representatives of these southern German states to have the authority to vote on all subjects in a national parliament to constitute a unified German nation, while also being unified in resisting foreign interference. Another consequence was the liberal representatives in the Prussian national assembly could no longer dispute the legitimacy of military reforms, and also considered how national unity that could be achieved on the terms that Bismarck proposed could yet form the basis for further political and constitutional progress by establishing a more rational political order in the German states under Prussian leadership. Prussian Landtag elections on 3 July 1866 resulted in a crushing defeat for the liberals who remained alienated due to the ongoing military expenditure conflict, with conservatives returning with 142 from previously held 38 seats. Bismarck thereupon requested an indemnity for the illegal collection of taxes in violation of the constitution on the basis of dealing with a national emergency, which the earlier liberal majority had refused to sanction in violation of parliamentary prerogative in 1862. This measure sanctioning the justification for the monarchy admittedly violating constitutional propriety passed on 3 September 1866 with a majority vote of 230 to 75 from conservatives and moderate nationalist liberals, which ensured their support for governing the new German Confederation that Bismarck would control after it would be established in the following year.
The continued unification of Germany as a whole by incorporating the southern German states was contingent upon seizing the next opportunity to exploit another external threat, especially as public opinion in the southern states was thoroughly opposed to a closer union. More significantly, France would oppose a further extension of Prussian influence, which Emperor Napoleon III considered to threaten French national interests. France would not tolerate the North German Confederation to absorb the southern German states and pose a new threat to France as a new great European power. Moreover, the readiness of the French army was questionable, having been weakened in its failed intervention there, in which he had conceived the notion of establishing a new empire in Mexico with his own nominee, Maximilian of Austria, as emperor with the support of French troops and funds. This plan later ended with French troops being forced to withdraw on 5 February 1867, rather than risk engaging in war with the United States following the end of its Civil War, without achieving any advantages. France therefore was not in a position to lend support to the anti-Prussian states whose own military forces were also in a poor state of affairs, and a complete disregard for the potential of the Prussian military. Bismarck exploited these tensions to generate further support for continued German unity, while he was convinced that Napoleon III would eventually be forced to wage war against Prussia in order to regain his prestige, and welcomed the impetus that a war against France would provide as part of the ongoing development for the unification of the remaining German states by marshaling their combined armed support, while the largest army in Europe came under Prussian military command in the North German Confederation.
The momentous victory of Prussia over Austria injured France’s prestige as a traditionally important power in European political life, for which Napoleon III, as well as French population, would expect compensation, as was expressed by the common belief that France, and not Austria, was defeated at Sadowa. Hence, there were distinctive elements in France seeking revenge against Prussia for having overwhelmed Austria. The creation of the North German Confederation on the French eastern border composed an additional severe reverse for Napoleon III political interests. Bismarck hereafter prepared for a war with France, which he considered to be inevitable to achieve the unity of the German states, while French foreign policy remained aimed at acquiring territory in western Germany, which had only been met with the southern German states preparing for the possibility of a forthcoming war with France by forming military alliances with Prussia.
The strength of German nationalist sentiment was demonstrated over the disposition of Luxemburg in April 1867, following the creation of the North German Confederation that eliminated the legal and political status of this duchy on the basis of the defunct German Confederation, while having remaining a possession of the king of Holland through the house of Orange-Nassau since 1815 and maintaining a confederation fortress with a Prussian garrison. Napoleon III sought to acquire Luxemburg as compensation for Prussia’s aggrandisement by purchasing this duchy from the king of Holland, and Prussia’s approval for France to invade Belgium, which Bismarck had vaguely agreed to sanction during conversations with Napoleon III, and had Napoleon record these demands in writing, prior to merely demanding the annexation of Luxemburg, akin to having received Savoy and Nice on the basis of supporting Italian unification. This prospect of transferring German subjects to French control sparked nationalist outrage, and Bismarck published the secret military conventions with the southern German states on 19 March 1867 with the intention of claiming to represent German nationalist interests. This was a clear warning that France would meet a united Germany over the acquisition of any German territory. Moreover, whereas Bismarck agreed to confer with France about the possibility of staging an armed intervention into Belgium and Luxemburg, he did not have any intention of Prussia going to war with Britain over French interests, or cede German territory on the French frontier, such as the Saar and the Bavarian Palatinate. An additional consequence of envisaging potential French military expansionism led to Hesse-Darmstadt concluding a military alliance with Prussia on 11 April 1867 that had comparable contents to the alliances that were concluded with the southern German states in the summer of 1866.
Napoleon III began reorganising the French army and recalled the troops deployed in Mexico, and then attempted to take advantage of the dissolution of the German Confederation by offering to purchase Luxemburg from the kingdom of Holland in the spring of 1867, which had been garrisoned by Prussian troops as a part of the German Confederation from 1849. This plan was blocked by protests from the North German Confederation. The Dutch king William III responded to tension between France and Prussia by declaring in February that he would only agree to France purchasing the Duchy of Luxemburg for five million gulden, along with a French guarantee of Luxemburg and the Netherlands, if Prussia consented. A subsequent conference of European powers, Austria, Russia and Great Britain, which had adjudged the relations between Belgium and Holland in 1939, along with envoys from France and Holland, resolved this crisis, which had led to expectations about an outbreak of war. This conference that convened in London in May 1867 resolved that the Dutch monarchy could dispose of Luxemburg as it saw fit, and William I was requested to withdraw the Prussian troops therein. The Treaty of London of 11 May resolved Luxemburg was a neutral and demilitarised state under the protection of a collective guarantee by the signatory powers, and was allowed to enter into the Zollverein. The representatives also guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium. Prussian fortifications in Luxemburg were razed in May 1867, and the Prussian garrison was withdrawn as it ceased to be a part of the North German Confederation. Although war was averted, Napoleon III considered this settlement to be a new humiliation for the international prestige of France by being deceived by Bismarck who had intimated at allowing for French territorial expansion.
Bismarck anticipated further developments in the unification of the German states by successfully overseeing marshalling Prussia’s military and economic power to apply the unification of the German states, initially through the Schleswig wars that established Prussian dominance over German states outside of Austria, and then the Seven Weeks War that established Prussia as the leading German state. There was French opposition to unifying the North German Confederation with the southern German states, which remained to be pacified as France was seeking to bolster its national advantages, Bismarck consolidated these gains. The abolition of the German Confederation and establishing the new North German Confederation completely suppressed Austrian prestige in the German states, and the postwar settlement agreements among the southern German states led to accomplishing economic unity of Germany through combining the interests of the southern states with the North German Confederation. The renewal of the tariff union between the north and the southern states was declared to be dependent on the acceptance of the defensive and offensive military conventions, which the southern state parliaments were thus pressured to ratify, rather than face economic sanctions. Bismarck implemented the Zollverein beyond its earlier form and scope by also creating a tariff parliament of deputies that was chosen by direct universal suffrage, and a Tariff Federal Council (Zollbundesrat) on the model of the Federal Council of the North German Confederation to authorise the economic legislation of the future, which was supplemented with a Zollparlament to complete the creation of a Customs Parliament that further joined the southern German states with the North German Confederation.
The first session was held at Berlin on 27 April 1868, which included elected representatives from all of the German states, excluding Austria, in a representative organisation that met to discuss common German matters for the first time since the defunct 1848-1849 Frankfurt National Assembly, which included deliberations on both economic and political disputes between the northern and southern states. All of the German states, along with Luxemburg, thus had a representative organisation for common economic purposes, akin to the military union between the northern and southern German states, which preceded a forthcoming political union. Bismarck was nevertheless conscious of this situation could have led to France declaring war, as Bismarck rebuffing Napoleon III’s demands for territorial expansion in the states of the German Confederation would need to be accomplished by force. This required defeating France by marshalling German nationalism against France refusing to allow further German unity, in the face of French nationalist sentiments that required a foreign policy success to restore national prestige, in the face of Prussia’s growing influence in the German states through military and economic ties, which conventional French foreign policy sought keeping them weak and divided. While Napoleon III sought to maintain the French empire and his dynasty, these interests conflicted with Bismarck’s ultimate objective to achieve the final reunification of the German states that he believed was inevitable. The Treaty of Prague placed the initiative into Prussia’s hands in the event of a future armed conflict with France, which Napoleon III could not refuse to face at the risk of facing another national humiliation and ultimate ruin.
Although Bismarck acknowledged that waging war would accelerate this process, he maintained it was necessary to wait for optimal conditions as a practical matter. This decisionmaking followed the underlying element of avoiding the possibility of foreign intervention in the event of Prussia provoking war, particularly in view of French policy of preventing the southern German states from joining the North German Confederation for their mutual defence against external threats to their sovereignty, and abandoning their earlier national independence. Bismarck was conscious of how public opinion needed to become accustomed to the possibility of unifying all of the German states, particularly due to the recalcitrant attitude of the southern German states opposing this possibility. Whereas Bismarck sought to proceed with continued unification with caution, tensions with France appeared to be inevitable. While it was apparent that it was necessary for France to take decisive action to forestall the German unification movement, Napoleon III counted on eventualities that could be applied to assert French hegemony in western Europe, along with stabilising his own government that experienced chronic domestic tensions through launching a war to prevent Prussia from strengthening its position in the German states and Europe.
Firstly, Napoleon III was confident about the use of the new machine gun (mitrailleuse) that was expected to concentrate a great deal of fire on particular points in the enemy’s line than any other form of military weapon in existence, along with deploying audacious French soldiers, by which he expected to acquire success at the outset of a future military conflict, and thereby establish French lines on Prussian territory. Moreover, he believed that Austria, Bavaria and Denmark would join in attacking Prussia, while Victor Emmanuel would likewise side with France against Prussia, which were false presumptions. However, he had not taken the view of Alexander II of Russia into account, which would not support France against Prussia. An additional element was Austrian’s indifference to French war aims, which did not conform to their own interests, which were attached to consolidating the interests of the dual Austro-Hungarian monarchy, while the Hungarians would be unwilling to fight for a renewal of Austrian predominance in the German states, which had always been associated with German hegemony in the Hapsburg empire. Moreover, the Austrians regarded that France was provoking a conflict over the matter of the Hohenzollern candidature over the succession of the Spanish monarchy, which practically constituted a declaration of war against Prussia.
A revolution in Spain that deposed queen Isabella in September 1868 led to the new provisional government in Madrid seeking to establish a constitutional monarchy, and nominated Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, a member of the Catholic branch of the ruling house of Prussia, on 27 February 1870 to become the new king. At a time when France was devoid of international allies, Spain as a client state allied with the North German Confederation would complete its diplomatic isolation, and a succession question in Spain played into Bismarck’s hands for this purpose. Bismarck ardently supported this candidate on 28 February, while being fully aware that France would not accept this Hohenzollern candidature, as it would strengthen Prussia’s overall position in Europe. He was certainly intending to challenge France to deliberately provoke a European war by isolating France through raising the prestige of the Hohenzollerns to a European position like the Hapsburgs, strengthening the monarchical principle, and gaining commercial concessions for German trade in the Mediterranean through establishing economic ties with Spain, as well as Spain possibly becoming an ally in a future war in which France would have to fight on two fronts.
The formalisation of the news of this candidature, for which the French government received notification on 2 July, which Leopold accepted on 3 July, triggered nationalist outrage in France, just as Bismarck had anticipated in view of French security concerns against German spheres of influence, while welcoming the opportunity to provoke France into waging war against the North German Confederation. The French government sent a telegram of inquiry to the foreign office in Berlin on 4 July 1870, about which position Prussia would take regarding Leopold’s candidacy, which was met with the reply that king William I did not have any interest in this matter. The new French foreign minister, Antoine Agénor, Duke of Gramont, the French foreign minister, reacted by denouncing Prussia on 6 July, promising that Leopold would never be allowed to ascend “the throne of Charles V,” referring to the when the German Hapsburg dynasty had threatened to encircle France during the sixteenth century, and intimated about going to war of a Hohenzollern becoming the new Spanish monarch. At the same time, Gramont requested the Prussian ambassador to France, Baron von Werther, to inform William that Napoleon expected him to prevent Leopold from accepting the Spanish throne. Gramont also announced in the Chamber of Deputies that France would not allow a neighbouring nation to upset the European balance of power by uniting two thrones in one royal family. After this Hohenzollern candidature was withdrawn, Vincent de Benedetti, the French ambassador to Berlin, was instructed to discuss this matter with the Prussian king at Bad Ems on 9 July where he was spending his summer holiday, assuming that Prussia was responsible for the nomination of Prince Leopold. William I responded in a conciliatory manner that he did not have any such responsibility or control over the prince’s decision, which was to be determined in Spain rather than Prussia, and accepted Benedetti’s proposal for Leopold to renounce the claim, whereas active support for this candidacy would otherwise have dangerous complications with the considerable underlying risk of war.
Prince Leopold’s withdrawal was announced to the German courts on 12 July, which should have removed any pretext for a conflict between France and Prussia, and could have ended as a striking diplomatic victory for France that would bolster its declining prestige. However, the French population was anticipating an outbreak of war against Germany. Gramont then recklessly aggravated the tension by making further demands on the same day, and then made a fatal error by dispatching Benedetti a second time on 13 July at Bad Ems. The French government instructed Benedetti to “be rough to the king!”, which led to presenting an arrogant note in an insulting manner demanding further and more far-reaching assurances that the Prussian king would never again support this candidacy by making a distinct avowal to Napoleon to effectively state that having empowered Leopold to accept the Spanish throne did not constitute any intention to cause injury to the interests of France, or offend the French nation in any manner. William was thus expected to make a public apology for the act of a third person, who he had never encouraged, in order to inflict a personal as well as a political humiliation. Following a delay in relaying this message after Bismarck told Werther to take a leave of absence, Gramont sent further word to Benedetti on the following day to further demand William’s definite approval of Leopold’s disinclination, and also provide an assurance that not any member of the Hohenzollern family should again become a candidate for the Spanish throne. Having nothing further to state about an incident he considered to having already had been concluded, William refused to comply with giving any such pledge, which was evidently intended to be an insult by denigrating William I as a vassal of Napoleon, and thereby place him in a degrading position in all of the German states under the guise of France taking action to maintain peace in Europe. William then sent a brief account of this interview with Benedetti, and authorised Bismarck to publish a similar statement at the discretion of the cabinet.
Gramont had anticipated he could receive a statement from William I that would demonstrate he had yielded to French pressure, which would placate French public opinion by inflicting a humiliation on Prussia that would be equivalent to a military defeat. Bismarck exploited the French demand to Prussia’s advantage by publishing contents that would make Napoleon III make ridiculous in the view of the world, while nevertheless maintaining their accuracy. Bismarck released a terse substance of these meetings in a text on 13 July for publication and to all Prussian diplomatic representatives, as “a red flag for the Gallic bull,” that led to the effect that Bismarck expected, which was also what the French government desired, due to the form of the message contents that made the announcement decisively appear to be devoid of William II’s conciliatory gestures, making it appear that the French ambassador had overstepped the bounds of propriety by making importunate demands on the Prussian monarch. French efforts to humiliate Prussia was thus turned back against them. Popular opinion in France was uncontrollable, and newspapers were calling for war against Prussia on the next day in view of what was perceived to be a brusque rebuff to an impertinent petitioner, while the French government had already determined to wage war on Prussia. The “Ems telegram” also spurred German public opinion in a united determination to resist French attempts at imposing their political power through a message that appeared to be dismissive and insulting, which superseded earlier suspicions against Prussia and particularism sentiments in the southern German states. Both Napoleon III and king William issued general mobilisation orders on 15 July, owing to the dangerous drift of popular nationalist sentiments over what could have been settled peacefully as an otherwise trifling matter that had serious underlying elements of international tension.
Popular opinion in both the northern and southern German states against a common enemy, which abruptly led to the outbreak of war with France launching aggression against Prussia. Bismarck attempted to negotiate with the English foreign ministry for arbitration, which was rejected on 17 July due to the British primarily intending to preserve worldwide commercial interests and material prosperity, and otherwise expressing disinterest in this matter, as Prussia was not considered to be a threat to France. Bismark had already secured promises of neutrality from Russia on 12 July by confirming to the denunciation of the prohibitive clauses of the 1856 treaty. Russia was also engaged in maintaining Austria’s neutrality, and Italy maintained that it would not take any action while the French garrison remained in Rome.
Prussian generals provided assurances of the preparedness of the Prussian army, and the southern German states were informed that they would be vulnerable to French aggression by Bismarck arranging for the Times of London to publish a draft treaty about annexing Belgium, without citing the date, on 25 July, which exposed Napoleon III’s ambitions and proposals regarding Belgium, and added a Prussian guarantee of Belgium’s security, which practically obtained British neutrality. While Prussia was prepared for war both diplomatically and militarily, France declared war on Prussia on 19 July to maintain its privileged status within the European international balance of power, which Bismarck had anticipated as a possibility that would serve other objectives, whereas Napoleon III anticipated detaching the southern German states from their ties with the North German Confederation, revolts in Hesse and Hannover, and forming alliances with Austria and Italy.
The French mobilisation and subsequent French declaration of war sparked nationalist sentiment throughout Prussia and the southern German states where popular sentiment expressed opposition to France in the interest of maintaining their independence against what was considered to be a premeditated French assault on the sovereignty of the German states, and superseded earlier concerns about overbearing Prussian power. Popular opinion expressed fighting for maintaining this sovereignty, rather than being overrun by France in what became a conflict between Germany and France, rather than France against alliances of German states. The defensive treaties with the south German states went into immediate effect without any opposition or hesitation to taking action against France, which established a common German front under Prussian leadership. Plans were already set for coordinating military operations with the southern German states under the terms of the military alliances. Statesmen in both the northern and southern German states sought the idea of complete German unity from the outbreak of the war. The necessary appropriations for mobilisation were voted immediately in Bavaria, Baden and Württemberg. The delegates to the North German Confederation Reichstag proffered unconditional support by voting for a large loan for mobilisation of the troops who would fight for the sake of the nation, rather than merely as professional soldiers in the pay of the state.
This conflict would hereafter determine whether France or Prussia would become the leading power in Europe. Prussia had consolidated its power in northern Germany, and intended to establish political control over the southern German states, whereas France intended to preclude this drastic alteration in the European balance of power, along with arresting its own declining international prestige. In both countries, nationalism provided an additional impetus for waging war to resolve national standing – either establishing French hegemony in Europe, or achieving the conclusive unification of the German states. Napoleon III was confronted with a united Germany at the very outbreak of hostilities, and the diplomatic situation was likewise auspicious, as Austria was in the process of undertaking domestic reforms to establish its dual monarchy and pacifying nationalist sentiments among the minor states in the Hapsburg empire. Italy would not support France while French troops continued occupying the remaining Papal States, which the Italian government demanded to be withdrawn in order to absorb into the kingdom of Italy. Catholic influences in France precluded Napoleon III from consenting to this demand while defending the papacy’s possession of Rome that was occupied by French troops, which irrevocably alienated Italian interests. Britain would not oppose the creation of a unified German state under Prussia. Russia openly sympathised with Prussia’s aid in the Polish rebellion of 1863, and was also placated by Bismarck’s promises in 1870 to support revising the most burdensome stipulations of the Crimean peace settlement of 1856 concerning lifting the neutrality of the Black Sea, and could therefore be relied on to threaten Austria in the event that there were any visible signs of intervention against Prussia.
The Prussians were well-prepared for this conflict with technological advantages, an advanced conduct of operations, superior knowledge and quality of leadership at all of the command levels, and effective discipline in the ranks. They used rifled cannon incorporating the latest technology, and having improved tactically deploying artillery in supporting the infantry with increasingly greater skill, as well as a larger and more disciplined and well-trained army than the French that outperformed them in terms of tactics, such as coordinating independent infantry platoons attacking from various directions against defensive French entrenchments, often composed of incompetent troops, and military unit manouevres, composed of rapidly mobilised one million troops who had undergone military training for up to twelve years, including as reservists following full time regular service. The Prussians also exploited their marginal superiority in artillery with increasing skill, as well as making fewer mistakes than the French, which contributing to offsetting the inferiority of the Prussian needle gun with an accuracy of fire of up to 600 yards in contrast to 1600 yards for the French chassepot rifle. The French army placing a great deal of confidence in the rudimentary machine gun with an accuracy of up 2000 yards, but this ultimate secret weapon could not be swept from side to side on a firing line. These weapons generally failed to meet their expectations, particularly when they were arrayed against superior German artillery and mobility tactics that overwhelmed French military advantages, which were undermined by proving to be unable to counter the rapidity of the combined movements of the well-organised German forces, who greatly outnumbered the French during the early battles, while the French were slower to take action as a result of defects in their mobilisation system, conscript troops lacking sufficient training, and deploying inferior artillery that could not be fired as rapidly and from longer distances than those of the combined German forces, which coordinated artillery fire with the movements of cavalry and infantry units.
The French began the fighting by invading Saarbrücken on 2 August 1870, but German victories soon followed at the battles of Wissenbourg on 4 August and Wörth on 6 August, in which German forces outnumbered the French, as well as had a superior command structure allowing for swift and reliable relaying of orders, along with benefiting from superior training and equipment. Although French forces had greater numerical strength at the battle of Mars-la-Tour on 16 August, French commanders failed to exercise this advantage, as German forces launched a rapid attack that disorganised French defences.
The French further lost a series of decisive battles by early September, which culminated in the crushing defeat and capitulation of the French forces on 1 and 2 September that were concentrated, and actually besieged by the German Third Army while holding a defensive position, at Sedan, where they were trapped against the neutral Belgian border while being unable to manouevre, and were subjected to artillery shelling from five hundred Prussian guns with improved ordnance from the surrounding heights that made prevented any French counterattack or breakout through enemy lines. Emperor Napoleon III himself surrendered there on 3 September while facing a hopelessly indefensible situation. Crushing the emperor’s army broke France’s resistance, and effectively brought the French empire to an end on the next day, when a Third French Republic was proclaimed in Paris under President Adolphe Thiers. Paris was then completely surrounded on 20 September. The war nevertheless continued upon the establishment of a provisional government of National Defence, which declared France to become a republic, with a deposed emperor who was in Prussian custody. French attempts to acquire support for armed intervention from Denmark and a peace settlement from Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Italy were inconsequential, as these non-combatants remained non-committal as potentially interested nations in their continued neutrality, while attempts to attempt a peace settlement with Bismarck were likewise dismissed while German military forces were pressing their advantages. Strassburg capitulated on 28 September, and Metz then capitulated on 27 October in a major decisive defeat, which doomed the armies of the Loire and of Paris, and further weakened the French negotiation leverage, as these armies could have otherwise been deployed to reinforce the siege of Paris. Russia then took advantage of France’s weakness and issued a note on 31 October that formally declared the neutrality of the Black Sea, as defined in the 1856 treaty, to be abolished. Although the French won a single battle at Coulmiers on 9 November, Paris was besieged. The French provisional government that was formed on 4 December continued the fighting in reaction to the Prussian demands for the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine as a defensively strategic buffer against future French aggression, which was spurred by nationalist demands among the German public
Bismarck sought fixed principles upon negotiations with any French authority that would grant his terms: not any submission of the terms to a European Congress; rendering France powerless for a generation to undo the peace settlement; the foundation of German unification at France’s expense. Germany’s acquisitions that were taken by force would thus henceforth be maintained by force, which included the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, along with the payment of an indemnity and an occupation of French territory at France’s expense until the indemnity would have been paid in full, along with the guarantee that France would always accord to Germany the most favoured nation privilege in its tariffs.
Although military operations continued in central and southern France, they did not have any effect on the final outcome of the peace negotiations between French and German political leaders. Another outcome of this conflict was withdrawing French troops that had been stationed in Rome to join the national defence effort, which left it open to being seized by Italian nationalists who completed the unification of Italy in 1870. Following French forces failing to press earlier offensive advantages and a failed attempt to break the siege of Paris on 16 January, the republican government agreed to an armistice on 22 January 1871 that it was compelled to sign on 28 January. The war with France continued until the French representatives signed the preliminary a provisional peace settlement on 26 February 1871, which was later prolonged until 1 March when preliminary peace conditions were resolved and hostilities came to an end, and the peace settlement ratified on 3 March.
The final peace treaty was signed in Frankfurt-am-Main on 10 May 1871. This settlement demonstrated how a future reconciliation between German and France was not deemed to plausible, and were therefore aligned with the underlying matter of maintaining security against renewed anticipated French aggression, while expecting that any generosity would not be reciprocated. Hence, a defensive buffer was to be established to secure the defence of southern Germany that was considered to conclusively complete the 1813-1814 war of liberation. Germany annexed the French provinces of Alsace, excluding Belfort, and a third of Lorraine with much of its industry in the northeast, along with the city of Metz that was unquestionably French-speaking, in contrast to Alsace where the local populations largely spoke German dialects. The French were ordered to pay an indemnity of five billion francs, while maintaining a German army of occupation until the indemnity was paid. Germany was to have favourable commercial treatment from France. France would hereafter seek any possibility to contain German power on its eastern border, which became a permanent element of the newly established European order. It would remain for Bismarck to continue maintaining the security of the new unified German states in both domestic and international affairs. This included maintaining the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine that he claimed had been German territories that were wrested from a divided Holy Roman Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which Bismarck claimed a new empire could not be formed without them in order to protect the Rhineland frontier, and thereby reduce France to a power subordinate to Germany. In practice, these regions introduced new sources of economic power, owing to the lucrative textile industry in Alsace, followed by later discovering and developing valuable potash deposits in the 1890s, and valuable agricultural land and iron ore reserves in Lorraine, which later contributed to Germany’s rapid industrial development by supplying existing heavy industry in the Ruhr and the Saar, following seventy percent of the German population living in the countryside in 1867, in addition to destroying the previous balance of power and ensuring the lasting enmity of France. On the other hand, most Germans believed that Napoleon III would have annexed the left bank of the Rhine, broken up the North German Confederation, reversed the developments of 1866, and reversed the unification of the German states.
The joint effort by the German states to overcome France led to the southern states agreeing to a nationwide union, while Bismarck aimed at creating a form of unity in which the various states would be satisfied with the membership conditions by offering necessary concessions to each of the separate southern German states. The four southern German states stated their intention to enter the North German Confederation, which superseded the earlier defensive-offensive agreements that had established a common front for national defence, which became further consolidated through new political ties. Treaties for this purpose signed first with Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt on 15 November, followed by Wurttemberg on 23 November. Bavaria particularist interests were mollified in a settlement on 25 November, which included an independent administration of the kingdom, retaining a separate postal service, excluding the Bavarian army from federal control during peacetime, and the presidency of a new Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundesrat that excluded Prussian representation. These treaties were then successively confirmed by the Confederation, its governing council, and the respective provincial parliaments.
Following the conclusion of various treaties with the southern German states, and William I receiving the consent of the German princes to become the emperor of a united Germany, a new German empire was formally created on 1 January 1871 as the natural political result of the military victory, before Paris capitulated, owing to the cooperation of the three southern German states. The genuine foundation of the Second Reich was proclaimed on 18 January 1871 on the anniversary of the day in 1701 when Prussia became a kingdom. Bismarck created a unified Germany as a Second German Empire from above on separate populations, and then sought to consolidate national unity as a combination of Prussian-dominated and confederate state. The leader was the hereditary emperor who expressed his leadership through the Reich Chancellor, who was Bismarck from 1871 to 1890. Bismarck assumed during this time that there could be no meaningful conflict with the German empire between the rights of the citizen and the rights of the state. The aims of the individual and the state were the same, and any dispute was artificial while there was widespread belief in Germany that the emperor, who voluntarily imposed certain restrictions on himself in his relations with his subjects, and the citizens were united in pursuing common goals. There was thus no need for any separation of power within the state, each checking on the other. In Bismarck’s view, the health and progress of the state was the principal purpose of his policy, and was concerned with making first Prussia and then Germany as strong as possible, after it had emerged into an exposed position in the centre of a system of great powers, with large borders strips unprotected by natural barriers. Authority was not to be fragmented, and this emphasis on unity forced Bismarck into the attempt to eliminate any influences that could be strong enough to compete for the allegiance of German citizens for a unified Germany. There were different concessions to placate the interests of the various German states that composed the newly unified nation, with the first opening of parliament that had been elected by the direct vote of the population on 21 March 1871.
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