Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890 resulted in the appointment of General Leo von Caprivi, who had formerly been the inconspicuous minister of the navy, and hereafter served as personal director of the government expressing the will of the emperor, without independently formulating German policy. It was evident that William II’s chief motive was to give the impression that he governed Germany himself, which he could not do alongside Bismarck as the head of state affairs. A new course was pursued by the von Caprivi government between 1891 and 1894 to conciliate a range of different interest groups. A series of commercial treaties benefited industrialists by acquiring valuable markets by reducing tariffs. There were slight modifications of the tariff and arranging commercial treaties with Switzerland, Austria, Belgium and Russia, which was supposed to begin returning to opposing Bismarck’s trade regulations that proved to be unpopular. New commercial treaties contributed to making Germany the leading industrial nation in Europe by 1900, which was definitively the most important historical development during this time, capitalizing on the early initiation of industrial growth during the 1870s.
There was evident economic prosperity with a very rapid growth of the new industrial working class transitioning from the countryside to the factories in the cities. Caprivi allowed the anti-socialist legislation to expire, which did not result in gaining any further support for the government. In fact, the socialists appeared to be disappointed that their persecution ended, since it had given them the only real importance they possessed. Caprivi introduced five bills int the Prussian Landtag regarding economic and social welfare legislation and extending regulating working conditions. These included a finance bill featuring an unprecedented progressive income tax and a bill to reform rural administration. An 1891 act was passed forbidding Sunday work and employing children under thirteen years old, women were forbidden to work for more than eleven hours, and youths under sixteen more than ten hours. The Bundesrat applied its granted authority to fix maximum working hours in factories. Courts with representatives from both sides of industry to arbitrate in industrial disputes were set up, which became obligatory in most municipalities by 1902, which enabled industrial cooperation as a result of allowing the anti-Socialist legislation to lapse.
The subsequent Hohenlohe government from 1894 and 1900 sought to represent compromises between leading industrial and agrarian interests, which continued to be balanced during the Bülow government from 1900 to 1909. The population appeared to be willing to accept the burdens of national prestige in terms of compulsory military service with heavy taxation to support a large army and navy, and having essentially achieved national unity among all classes and political classes adhering to the sovereign and the government while enjoying stable living conditions, and also envisaging increased national prestige for Germany becoming a world power. Bethmann-Hollweg who became the new chancellor in 1909, however, failed to establish a stable parliamentary, and the government therefore relied to a greater degree on the emperor, the military, and the bureaucracy to overcome parliamentary deadlocks to maintain decision-making processes, while building a naval fleet continually caused financial crises. An aggressive national leadership became dissatisfied with maintaining Bismarck’s vision for maintaining the European balance of power he had striven to establish, which would lead to risking becoming embroiled in a new war. German diplomacy thus acquired a new character. Bismarck’s unscrupulous diplomacy between 1862 and 1890 effectively warranted applying arbitrary authority that the government could exercise in foreign affairs thereafter, which was not sufficiently checked by authorities in an autocratic system with limited democratic reforms in Prussia as the leading German state.
An egregious consequence of Bismarck’s dismissal from office was the gradual disintegration of his system of alliances that had maintained peace in Europe for twenty years, which had worked as long as he was in control. However, the secrecy involved in his system fostered apprehension, and led military leaders to consider the possibility of preventive war against Russia, while there were also visible international tensions. German diplomacy was determined by events in four different stages of events: 1. the separate German states coalescing into an empire led by Prussia that was enabled with influencing European affairs. This first period extended from Bismarck becoming chancellor in 1862, through the formation of the German empire, and then the first years of its prosperity until an economic downturn in 1875. Bismarck governed Prussia with scant regard for the constitution that was to protect the population’s interests, which led to waging three wars of German unification that increased Prussia’s power and prestige, while pursuing Prussian foreign policy aims. These events led to the destruction of the Austrian Hapsburgs’ influence over the German states and toppling Emperor Napoleon III, while combining the German states into Europe’s most powerful empire, and crowning the king of Prussia as the German emperor. 2. Maintaining constructive internal policy measures while establishing Germany’s hegemony in European political life from 1875 and Bismarck’s enforced retirement in 1890 involved consolidating the empire’s resources of the Prussian-German state and its prestige.
Disturbances in European affairs that had been caused by Bismarck’s policies was certain to cause suspicions about Germany’s ambitions had to be hereafter be allayed while maintaining peace. This entailed retaining friendship with Russia, including during the tension resulting from the Congress of Berlin, and keeping France isolated while Germany retained its international position as the leading power in Europe. During this time, Bismarck also advanced industrial and social measures that advanced Germany’s material prosperity. 3. During the next phase from 1890 until 1911, Emperor William II proposed maintaining firm control of the empire, albeit while lacking Bismarck’s experience and skill. Other great powers outside of German influence, beginning with Russia and France, followed by Great Britain, which ended the earlier discord among them. German foreign policy led to these three powers recognising the potential dangers of German foreign policy, and consequently created a defensive coalition aimed at containing Germany potentially menacing their interests, which could be rapidly converted into an offensive alliance. Germany’s failed diplomatic actions led to arming for future threats in the face of this hostile coalition, including building a navy that could challenge Britain. 4 Increasing international tensions between 1911 and 1914 in the atmosphere of mutual suspicion culminated in the outbreak of the First World War challenging Germany and its allies, when the German government’s aims became more clearly distinguished, which then met with the determined opposition of the Great Britain, France and Russia.
Bismarck’s diplomatic strategy ceased to function immediately after his dismissal from office, beginning with removing a German alliance with Russia as a key element of his defensive system. Bismarck had delayed rapprochement between diplomatically isolated Russia and France by advising the Russian tsar against creating an alliance between his autocratic government and France as a country subject to revolutionary strife, while encouraging Russia’s far eastern policies, and also encouraging France engaging in costly colonial acquisitions, while striving to maintain cordial relations between Germany and Russia and France. Bismarck’s major diplomatic problem in the final years of his office as chancellor was maintaining a balance between England and its allies on one hand, and France and Russia on the other, which was challenged by William II coming to power in 1888. While Bismarck appeared to have been willing to allow Russia to intervene in the Balkans, and forcing England to become involved in stemming Russia’s influence, William II was suspicious of Russian intentions in the Balkans. Bismarck had also intended to create an alliance with England as a balance against Russia, which made Russia suspicious of Germany. Meanwhile, William II also became increasingly anti-Russian, following the military leaders’ talk about preventive war against Russia. Negotiations for the renewal of the reinsurance treaty between Russia and Germany during the autumn of 1889, were strained, until Bismarck was forced to resign, which resulted in abandoning the complexities and ambiguities of his foreign policy that concentrated on international relations in Europe, and extending Germany’s interests toward a worldwide scale.
William II decided that the reinsurance treaty was allowed to lapse in March 1890, and pre-empt the possibility of straining Germany’s foreign relations with other states in the event the Russian would disclose its terms (See H-German: Bismarck’s Fall from Power, 1890), which potentially subjected Germany to being vulnerable to Russia attempting to extract concessions by revealing the terms of this alliance. The reinsurance treaty greatly benefited Russia without necessarily providing reciprocal advantages for Germany, since its terms would not prevent a French attack, or preclude Russia from concluding a treaty with France, while Russia also sought personal advantages with prejudice to Germany’s interests during earlier international crises. Its terms were also in conflict with Germany’s other commitments to supporting Austria-Hungary’s imperialist ambitions, including allowing a free hand in Bulgaria and Constantinople, which was in conflict with Russian Pan-Slavism sentiments. There could also be negative outcomes for Germany’s alliance terms with Italy and Rumania, in the event of a conflict over Russia’s interests in extending its influence in the Balkan peninsula. This was in contrast to Bismarck’s reasoning that maintaining the tie with Russia would preclude it from seeking to escape isolation by establishing an alliance with France, and also preserved Germany’s leverage with its own allies, Austria-Hungary and Italy, rather than having to depend on them. Slight contradictions never influenced Bismarck’s decision-making, who believed that ambiguities would prevent a state from going to war, and therefore attached more importance to a good understanding with other nations, rather than following precise treaty terms. Hence, Bismarck believed the presence of the Triple Alliance and the German-Russian reinsurance treaty were not necessarily incompatible, which contributed to restraining Austria-Hungary’s competition against Russia for influence in the Balkans. In contrast, the belief in the von Caprivi administration was that renewing the reinsurance treaty would perpetuate a disingenuously needlessly complicated policy that engendered potential dangers, and therefore chose to follow a more coherent foreign policy. The renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891 along with Germany no longer maintaining an alliance for mutual defence with Russia and tensions between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans were separate factors that led to establishing diplomatic relations between France and Russia.
A material basis for a mutual understanding between Russia and France was established that weakened Bismarck’s diplomatic manouevres. France could not recover from the humiliating defeat of the Franco-Prussian War and the loss of Alsace and Lorraine. Russia remained holding Germany responsible for not supporting its interests at the Congress of Berlin, while the conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary as Germany’s primary ally over interests in the Balkans remained irreconcilable. Russia also needed loans to restore their military force as well as exploit it enormous natural resources, and the French were willing to give them as a material basis for friendly relations following the lapse of the reinsurance treaty when Russia provided positive credit conditions. France thus invested heavily in Russian industralisation that led to establishing successful financial transactions that in turn created a highly favourable atmosphere for diplomacy, while France was also in need of an alliance partner. Bismarck’s dismissal also provided an opportunity for French authorities to conclude negotiations for this purpose. In 1890, the French minister of the interior oversaw the arrest of Russian terrorists in Paris who were preparing explosives for an assassination attempt on the tsar. The French minister of war also contributed to friendly relations by allowing the Russians to use a huge arms manufacturing centre at Chatelleraut. A final act that was staged for the purpose of acquiring positive public opinion was a goodwill visit by a French fleet to the Russian naval base at Kronstadt in the summer of 1890.
Concerns over diplomatic isolation led to signing a treaty on 22 August 1891, in which France and Russia agree to confer on all peace questions and reach an understanding on measures to take in case of aggression, which was largely directed against Britain. An understanding between the General Staffs of the French and Russian armies was reached on 17 August 1892, in which they would formulate concentration against threats from Germany and Austria. This treaty of mutual defence thus adopted the same nature as the Triple Alliance, which altered the international political situation in Europe by creating a balance of power between these two opposing alliances, which also undermined Germany’s pre-eminence as the hitherto leading political power. Although they were both defensive in nature, France’s position to potentially launch a war of revenge against Germany increased a probability of potential success in this new balance of power. The formation of these opposing alliances entailed preparing more effectively for the possibility of the outbreak of war between them while maintaining the mutual interests of the separate member states, and therefore widened the possibility of international conflict, rather than individual states that could have theoretically submitted disputes to a European congress, as had been a common practice since 1815.
During this time, the Russians and the British were also involved in a controversy over spheres of interest in Afghanistan, and the French and the British were engaged in disputes over Siam. As a result, these considerations led to the ratification of the Franco-Russian Treaty in January 1894 that ended France’s diplomatic isolation, which envisaged Germany as a potential adversary, as well as checking competing British colonial interests that in conflict with both French and Russian expansionist aims in North Africa and Asia in the foreseeable future. This development altered the international political situation in Europe by permanently widening the scope of individual member-states disputes between two opposing alliances. The terms of this Dual Entente stated that if France was attacked by Germany or by Italy assisted by Germany, Russia would fight Germany. If Russia was attacked by Germany or by Austria assisted by Austria, France would fight Germany. If any of the Triple Alliance powers mobilized, France and Russia would mobilize immediately. Hence, the two most powerful nations bordering directly on Germany became allies, and Germany would face a two-front war as a result of France and Russia having come together to escape diplomatic isolation and economic ties, and thereby faced the challenged that the Triple Alliance posed to other nations with its own resources. Besides, growing pan-Slavic nationalism and Germanic racism as an element of aggressive nationalist sentiments made the alliance between Russia and Germany increasingly unpopular among the populations in both countries.
France and Russia establishing an alliance caused difficulties for German diplomacy to replace Russia with another alliance partner. Caprivi sought to establish an alliance with Britain, which refused to abandon its “splendid isolation” course of foreign policy that was protected by the world’s largest battle fleet. The British therefore would not commit themselves to Germany that expected to be recognised as an equal partner to the British at the head of an immense worldwide empire, after Germany had been a latecomer in acquiring colonies in Africa and Pacific islands in the interest of encouraging German traders who could contribute to acquiring overseas raw materials for Germany’s continuing industrialisation. Colonial expansion as a result of new racist sentiments was also propagated in different countries, including in Germany where nationalists believed acquiring overseas colonies was a matter of prestige befitting a great power.
A Pan-German League was established for this purpose after Caprivi rectified colonial boundaries that had been under discussion from 1883, and culminated in the Anglo-German agreement of 1 July 1890. The boundary of German South West Africa was slightly extended to provide access to the Zambezi River. and contested German territorial claims in Zanzibar and Witu in eastern Africa were ceded to Britain, while accepting British claims to vast tracts of land that gave them possession to the sources of the Nile River and access to this river from eastern African coast, and set the new boundary between German East Africa with the Belgian Congo, and laid the foundations for establishing German East Africa, in exchange for acquiring the island of Heligoland, off the mouth of the Elbe River on the German North Sea coast in the Anglo-German agreement that had been occupied by the British navy since the Napoleonic wars, which would later become an important German naval fortress defending the North Sea coastline.
Regardless of a colonial administration being reached, frictions between Germany and Britain would remain as a result of German foreign policy aiming at a “world policy.” Britain remained ambivalent about entering into an alliance system, until antagonism resulting from abandoning Bismarck’s continental foreign policy would lead to provoking anti-German sentiment in Britain. They hereafter become fierce trade rivals as German industrial capacity was rapidly comparable to Britain’s, and therefore caused resentment in Britain against Germany. There was also domestic opposition against Germany establishing good relations with Britain, including among conservative Germans who resented the British liberal political system, while William II and his advisers believed remained obstinately convinced that the differences between Britain and the Dual Alliance were irreconcilable. Moreover, the Germans did not believe that Britain would ever come to terms with its main overseas rivals, France and Russia. With the Triple Alliance in place facing the Russian-French alliance, Europe was roughly in a balance of power. An additional consequence of the French-Russian alliance was Germany compensating by moving closer to Turkey in the 1890s through establishing economic ties, including establishing banking interests and building the Berlin-Baghdad railway with plans for lines toward the Persian frontier and the Persian Gulf that was interpreted as posing a potential threat to British and Russian interests in Persia and India, and modernising its military. A day after proposing to Tsar Nicholas II of Russia to pursue the idea of a continental league against Britain, William II recklessly aggravating British interests in South Africa by sending a congratulatory telegram to Paul Kruger, president of the South African Republic on 3 January 1896 to congratulate him on repelling the Jameson Raid against the republic carried out by British colonial administrator, Leander Starr Jameson, caused great indignation in Britain. This telegram was interpreted as the Kaiser supporting the Transvaal’s independence in what the British considered to be their sphere of influence, and intimating that assistance would have been available from Germany if necessary and that such assistance might be available in the future, which consequently led to a further deterioration in Anglo-German relations.
Meanwhile, Italy’s adherence to the Triple Alliance was undermined by Britain refused to renew the Mediterranean agreement in 1897 to maintain the status quo, which encouraged the Italian to realign its national interests with those of Britain and France, while a British offer of an alliance with Germany in 1901 was rebuffed. Shifts in French foreign policy composed an additional factor that undermined Germany’s international position. The appointment of Theophile Delcassé as foreign minister in June 1898 led to attempting to secure France’s international position against external opposition, particularly from Germany, by establishing positive relations with other European powers. The Fashoda between France and Great Britain over the succession of Egyptian sovereigns was resolved in a colonial agreement that delimited their respective spheres of influence in a dual system of administrative control in Egypt, and relations between Russia and France were consolidated during personal visits to St. Petersburg in 1899 and 1901. A cardinal point of French foreign policy was also allaying hostility between France and Italy due to establishing a French protectorate over Tunis, which Italy coveted for its national security and providing economic opportunity, and France supporting the papacy in its conflict with the Italians occupying Rome. Communications between the French and Italian governments between 1900 and 1902 led to reaching a cordial understanding, by which Italy conceded to regarding the nature of its Triple Alliance engagements as purely defensive, and therefore would not constitute any form of aggression against France, while France would allow Italy to have a free hand in extending its interests throughout Tripoli, and Italy recognised French interests in Morocco. France’s security was thereby secured in the western Mediterranean while developing its influence in Morocco, and also weakened the Triple Alliance that was aimed at isolating France, while Italy only remained an unreliable nominal member. When Italy renewed its Triple Alliance membership in 1902, a new secret clause was introduced that pledged Italy would not take aggressive against France, which neutralised Italy in a potential conflict between France and Germany. The establishment of an Entente Cordiale between France and Britain in 1904, by which they recognised each other’s respective interests in Morocco and Egypt, along with maintaining military and naval conversations, further strengthened France’s international position with regard to Germany, where this agreement between Britain and France was considered to be hostile to its interests. Successive diplomatic crises would mainly be provoked by Germany in Morocco, as well as raising suspicion against the British naval supremacy.
William II was ambitious yet shortsighted, while also intending to enshrine his place in history, and that meant a dangerous challenge to British supremacy at sea, since Germany’s expansion overseas required a large navy, since it otherwise it would have to depend on the goodwill of its rivals. The German government expressed sentiments about avoiding losing its voice in international matters. Wilhelm II therefore initiated a Weltpolitik, or policy of extending Germany’s influence worldwide, by which he claimed that Germany would have a say in world matters with parity with Britain and other world powers. This would commensurate with its growing industrial capacity, while France, Russia and Britain possessed huge colonial empires and Germany had some unconnected territories that no one else wanted, which seemed unjust in view of its industrial power, and many Germans felt something had to be done do avoid that their nation would lose their influence in international matters. Wilhem II appointed two ministers in 1897 who represented a new quality of foreign politics: Bernhard von Bülow, an outspoken proponent of Weltpolitik (“world politics”) as foreign minister, and Admiral Alfred Tirpitz as the Secretary of State for the navy. who proposed building a high seas battle fleet from 1898 onward as the key element to pursuing this policy, which enjoyed widespread public support in the interest of joining the ranks of the imperialist powers. This marked a shift from Bismarck’s foreign policy after 1871, which was completely defensive and aimed at preserving the status quo. His successors were convinced that the status quo would lead to decline, and that Germany had to expand to maintain its national power in what became a new course for its foreign affairs planning on a worldwide scale, which would be interpreted by other European powers as being dangerously reckless.
Tirpitz was convinced that Great Britain was Germany’s primary enemy, and building a heavy fleet of battleships was necessary to counter British sea power worldwide. William II supported naval expansion that Tirpitz promoted that was directed against Britain. Whereas Bismarck did not need a navy since his was essentially a continental system, William II wanted a world policy. This also came at a time when German industrialization reached a typical point at which the agrarian sector was diminishing in comparison with the industrial sector, and Germany became dependent on imported goods and raw materials, which forced Germany to take more interest in overseas affairs while it became more vulnerable to external influences. At the same time, the German battle fleet was unable to protect the influx of essential imports in case of war with the Franco-Russian alliance or Britain. Although Germany needed Britain’s support in Europe against potential threats from Russia or France, their relations were greatly undermined by Germany’s imperial world policy aspirations, while German authorities could not envisage how Britain would ever join Germany’s opponents in view of British-Russian and British-French foreign policy antagonisms as immutable factors in international relations.
Bülow encouraged William II to make a reckless attempt to drive a wedge between Britain and France by visiting Tangiers on 31 March 1905 to declare his support for the sultan of Morocco to declare its independence from France, which claimed Morocco as being in its sphere of influence, which only led to strengthening relations between Britain and France. Wilhelm II also initiated an independent attempt without consulting his ministers to set a secret defensive alliance with Tsar Nicholas II of Russia to undermine the Franco-Russian Alliance, while strengthening Germany’s position with regard to Britain. The Treaty of Björkö, also known as the Treaty of Koivisto, was a secret mutual defence accord signed on 24 July 1905 in Björkö. They had agreed, at least in principle, to come to each other’s assistance in the event of an attack by a third European power, and to not conclude a separate peace with any common adversary, and was to come into effect upon the conclusion of the Russian-Japanese war, with the added provision that Russia would take the necessary steps to initiate France to this agreement, and engage it to join as an ally. Although Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow eventually offered to continue negotiations, the Russian government rejected the agreement altogether since it was incompatible with prescriptions of the Franco-Russian Alliance. This diplomatic demarche was thus soon repudiated by both the German and Russian governments, and never took effect.
While Germany did not reconcile itself with France and Russia, another option was to form an alliance with Britain. However, this approach would entail placing Germany at the mercy of its most powerful economic rival during a time when the expansion of Germany’s international trade caused tension against Germany in Great Britain, and the British did not have any immediate interests on the European continent. Germany therefore had little to offer in return while it could become junior partner of the British empire and be drawn into its colonial conflicts with other European powers, particularly against Russia in its competitions for spheres of influence in central and eastern Asia. A second option would be to build a stronger fleet while trying to remain on good terms with Britain, and Germany could become more of an equal partner in the event that an alliance would be formed. However, it was doubtful whether the British would want to be allied with a country with a powerful battle fleet while it was already the strongest trade rival of the British Empire and had the strongest army. Besides, anti-liberal conservatives in Germany were against large scale fleet building that would further increase industrial power at the expense of the agrarian sector, and anti-British feeling was notorious among the conservatives and radical German nationalists. The third option, fleet building without commitment to Britain, involved a high probability of antagonising British interests as the world’s pre-eminent naval power.
Tirpitz proceeded to develop his “risk theory” in 1897 to compete against the British Royal Navy, and ultimately convey German political influence worldwide without being subject to British interference. This theory rested on the assumption that a German fleet powerful enough to do damage to the world’s largest existing navy would compel that navy to preserve its supremacy by avoiding the risk of conflict. He expected that Germany would not need to outbuild the Royal Navy to pose a threat to Britain, since British sea power was committed worldwide. If the Royal Navy went to battle with a numerically inferior but modern German fleet, it would probably win, but would suffer such heavy losses that another sea power rivaling Britain would be able to destroy it thereafter. Thus, Britain would run a risk if it went to war against Germany, and its diplomacy would have to take a more supportive attitude toward German colonial aims, and a comparatively small but efficient German battle fleet concentrated in the North Sea would represent a diplomatic lever and deterrent. This theory envisaged that a powerful German fleet stationed in home waters could take offensive action against the British home fleet in the event of war, which would force the British to recall its naval squadrons from the Mediterranean and eastern Asia, at the cost of leaving its interests vulnerable to attacks from other powers in these regions. The British would therefore perceive that this potential threat and consequently be inclined to avoid facing an armed conflict with Germany, or seek a settlement on terms that would reinforce Germany’s continental position, among bringing other advantages, including lucrative economic benefits and applying political leverage that would benefit the state.
The Tirpitz plan failed to meet its expectations in the long term. Firstly, it overestimated Germany’s economic capacity while presuming that the British population would be unwilling to bear the costs of maintaining their superior naval strength. More importantly, it was singularly unreceptive to the possibility of Britain forming an alliance with a foreign power other than Germany, particularly if it was a naval power. The risk theory that was designed to ensure British neutrality in the event of a continental war therefore became dubious as Britain concluded agreements with different rival sea powers, including the 1902 treaty with Japan that marked a new turn in the international situation. Great Britain thus abandoned the earlier policy of diplomatic isolation, and approached Germany’s enemies to reach peaceful understandings on disputed issues as a result of increasing animosity caused by the extent and nature of Germany’s foreign policy. Increasingly greater development of German industrial and commercial capacity brought rising consciousness of the potential power of Germany’s political importance on a worldwide scale, which entailed developing an adequate battle fleet to protect Germany’s international commerce and overseas colonies in these new circumstances, and challenge any other great sea power as a matter of sustaining international prestige. Germany’s success in world trade, in terms of developing industrial activity and an attempt to create a corresponding great navy that could menace British national security and economic interests caused suspicion among British public opinion, considering that Great Britain’s fleet had been its sole powerful form of defensive and offensive armament for a nation that was exceedingly dependent on international trade, and ensured the safety of Great Britain’s vital international commerce and communications. Growing German economic and political strength thus led to suspicions that would threaten Great Britain by creating a competing worldwide empire that would challenge its own established pre-eminence.
The British refusal to renew the commercial treaties of 1862 and 1865 also moved William II to support Tirpitz’s strategy, while the British maintained the “two power standard,” which required their navy to be the size of the next two largest naval powers combined. Tirpitz also expected a German fleet would have an “alliance value,” since it would make Germany an attractive ally for other rivals of Britain, or at least potentially induce Britain to seek an agreement with Germany. He was certain that Britain would be unable to keep pace with Germany in a naval arms race, and the British would refuse to make the great national sacrifice necessary to preserve their naval hegemony. Meanwhile, there would be a “danger zone” period when the German fleet would not yet be strong enough to make an attack by the British fleet a significant risk, and could run the risk of a pre-emptive attack by the British navy. Underlying these considerations was the fleet building program was necessary to allow Germany to achieve world power status through rivalry with the British Empire, with Tirpitz having made it clear in private that the German battle fleet should be a lever for colonial concessions by the British empire, and also a deterrent for a British attack on German colonies and trade or defend its coasts in the event of a German blockade, or achieve world power by concentrating a great battle fleet at a short distance from the strongest sea power.
Germany thus engaged Britain in a naval shipbuilding race by passing the first naval law of 1897-98, which projected building 19 battleships to be sufficiently powerful to break a blockade and protect its colonies, while also challenging the French and Russian fleets, 12 large and 30 small cruisers, and 8 coastal defence ships in a program that was designed to extend from 1898 to 1903, but it was just the beginning, with further planning for expanding the navy being introduced in 1900, by which Germany would add 2 flagships, 8 battleships, 8 large cruisers and 24 small cruisers, as well as 4 battleships, 3 large cruisers and 3 small cruisers in reserve. This was a deliberate challenge to Britain’s two power standard, while presuming that France and Russia would not ally themselves with Britain.
Additional causes for the naval expansion included many Germans believing that Britain resented German industrial growth and rising international trade, which they thought could lead to commercial warfare, regardless of how German economic competition was not markedly affecting British prosperity before 1914. On the other hand, there was no popular opinion in Britain about a commercial war, and therefore it was presumed that Germany’s new fleet would be used to bolster German demands, and not resist British aggression, while the German naval program forced Britain to spend additional money to increase naval strength. Furthermore, Russia exercised influence in the Balkans, which imposed pressure on Austria, while France and Italy competed for influence in the Mediterranean. There had been a possibility of war between Italy and France in 1888, which compelled Britain to send a fleet to the Mediterranean. Italy increased its military expenditure, and Russia and France began new naval construction. The net effect of these actions was British concern about their naval supremacy, which led them to adopt the Naval Defence Act of March 1898 to build eight first class battleships with heavy armament and the most powerful guns that would have limited range of operation due to their fuel capacity, and could therefore threaten Britain in the North Sea in a decisive battle, or at least reduce its naval superiority, and also help prevent a British naval blockade of Germany. This marked the beginning of the naval race between Germany and Britain, which was a large part of the military escalation before the outbreak of the First World War.
The naval arms race between Germany and Britain was one aspect of a general military escalation involving most European countries, which was underpinned by widespread popular militarism, and this was especially strong in Germany. A series of international crises after 1890 also became almost inevitable as a result of Germany’s aggressive world policy while German foreign policy under Wilhelm II and von Bülow assumed a different tone. Whereas Bismarck’s premises for foreign policy after 1871 were defensive while he wanted to preserve the status quo, his successors were convinced that the status quo would lead to decline, and therefore, Germany had to expand to remain strong. Besides, Germany became depended on imported foodstuffs and raw materials as its industrialisation outweighed the agrarian sector, and therefore this forced Germany to take a greater interest in overseas affairs.
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