History of Germany: 1890-1914. II.

Bismarck’s alliance system became unravelled as France and Russia signed a military alliance in 1894. England and France later formed an Entente Cordiale on 8 April 1904 by being drawing into an understanding owing to their common suspicion of Germany’s foreign policy ambitions. This agreement permanently resolved all past and present disputes between France and Great Britain as a result of their conflicting colonial claims. France recognised British special interests in maintaining a presence in Egypt, while Great Britain granted France a free hand to develop its interests in Morocco, and both signatories pledged to support each other’s diplomatic efforts for these purposes. Although this entente agreement did not provide for defensive military measures and was not specifically directed against any other country or coalition of countries, in contrast to the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance, it marked the end of Great Britain’s isolation policy and initiated a renewed participation in European political conditions, while also reinforced France’s foreign policy initiatives. This development caused alarm in Germany as a challenge to its primacy as a European power, which provided an impetus for a more aggressive foreign policy to counteract further such challenges to Germany’s international position.
       As German leadership in European affairs that had been a common element since 1871 was threatened by French diplomatic initiatives, German policymakers sought thwart Entente challenge to German hegemony through taking aggressive foreign policy measures when Russia was weakened, at a time when Russia had just suffered a decisive defeat in the Russo-Japanese War near Mukden (21 February – 9 March 1905), and in the face of public unrest in Russia. Russia’s continuing debacle in the Russo-Japanese War, including suffering the catastrophic destruction of its fleet in the battle of Tsushima on 27 May, appeared to provide an opportunity for Germany to reinforce its position with Russia, and thereby weaken Russia’s alliance with France through attempting to conclude an understanding between Germany and Russia, with prejudice to France. William II met with the Tsar in the Baltic in Björko in Finland on 24 July 1905 and made a personal attempt to revive the old agreement for mutual defence in Europe in order to place Germany at the centre of a coalition that would also involve France accepting the status quo if Russia would bring France into the alliance after this treaty was ratified. However, this was never ratified due to Russia’s earlier commitment to France and its dependence on French financial support, while the German chancellor von Bülow maintained that the mutual defence in Europe would not put sufficient amounts of pressure on Great Britain by potentially threatening its colonial interests.
During this time when Germany was estranged from Britain and Russia, and Russia was powerless to render assistance to its ally against Germany during the Russo-Japanese War, whereas Britain could only muster naval strength in a potential conflict with Germany, the German government attempted to exploit to isolate France by deliberating provoking a crisis. A German demonstration of exercising strength took place of French influence in Morocco, one of the yet unclaimed African countries and among the richest in terms of its fertile agricultural land and undeveloped resources, by staging a protest against French aims to establish a protectorate by introducing a program of economic, financial and military reforms while disregarding international agreements with British support, and thereby re-establish German prestige. It appeared that Russia’s recent military defeat against Japan and tensions against the government of Prime Minister Émile Combes regarding lowering of mandatory military service from three to two years and eliminating certain middle class draft exemptions appeared to provide an opportune time for foreign policy intervention against France. Emperor William II disembarked from a cruise in the Mediterranean on 31 March, ostensibly for a goodwill visit to the sultan of Morocco in Tangier and pledged to support its independence and support German commercial interests, which was a challenge to the entente cordiale between France and Russia. German decisionmakers invited the sultan to demand convening a European conference to determine the country’s future, which directly challenged France’s privileges in Morocco.
    The subsequent Algeçiras Conference from 16 January to 7 April 1906 led to a compromise solution between German demands and the French position that resulted in Morocco maintaining its independence, albeit with French control of the police force and financing as special interests, and therefore maintained its primary role, but also greatly undermined French aims to establish a protectorate, as well exposed Germany’s aggressive foreign policy that led to its diplomatic isolation in the face of reinforcing the entente cordiale. Although important concessions were made to introduce international free trade in Morocco, France’s dominant position was maintained, whereas Germany suffered a severe diplomatic defeat. British authorities were also convinced that Germany’s overbearing colonial and naval ambitions resulting from alleged fears of preventing vulnerability while striving to maintain its major power status composed the major threat to European stability, as well as the security of the British empire, while France encouraged a reconciliation between Russia and Britain. At worst, a European war could have been considered to be in prospect among the contemporary observers of the time. This conference thus subsequently reinforced the entente between Britain and France, while the representatives from Britain and other nations supported French interests, which benefited French relations with Britain, Italy and Russia, whereas only Austria-Hungary supported Germany.
      A unified Germany was perceived as the world’s greatest military power that had experienced an abnormally rapid development of its territory, population, commerce and resources, following overwhelming wartime victories and successes in international politics. In addition to international tensions concerning the balance of power, there was a new phenomenon that influenced foreign politics until 1914. Foreign politics became a more popular concern than they had been, as the proliferation of daily newspapers and progress in the establishment of the telegraph made it possible for many Europeans to receive daily updates on world politics. At the same time, Europeans started to identify more closely with their nation states and considered its prestige a matter of public interest, which put pressure on governments to acquire greater degrees of national prestige. Apart from maintaining Austria as the primary ally that would entail extending Germany’s influence in the Balkans, there was a break from Bismarck’s foreign policy. William II aimed at pursuing a nebulous Weltpolitik foreign policy aimed at establishing Germany’s international status on a worldwide scale, which was first introduced on 6 December 1897 by State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Bernhard von Bülow, calling for Germany to demand “a place in the sun.”
  This notion entailed establishing a large navy was aimed at challenged British naval supremacy that would enable Germany to join the competition for acquiring colonies worldwide on equal terms, which would have domestic advantages by harnessing public opinion to support the monarchy, and diverting support for socialist demands. Another underlying element was Social Darwinism as an increasingly aggressive and antagonistic nationalism in most countries that was often blended with arrogant racism, which was imported into political life from biology following Darwinist elements, with led to the belief that the world appeared as a fighting ground among enemies, where only the fittest could survive that motivated justification for war and expansionist drives, in view of the concept of maintaining the balance of power as a third element, particularly in view of Britain’s claim for world supremacy based on its naval power and worldwide colonization, against which Germany became what appeared to be a menacing new competitor. Hence, readiness for war seemed appropriate while people identified with their nation and its prestige. However, the passage of Germany’s naval bill in 1898 and supplementary warship construction caused alarm in Britain, as these shipbuilding plans would change the ratio from two to one to three to two, while Germany already had the strongest army in Europe, and was striving to build the strongest navy as well.
  German Weltpolitik foreign policy caused further concern in Russia. German  initiated intervention in China, which signaled other great powers to acquire their own strongholds along the Chinese coastline. At a time when all of Europe was greatly interested in Chinese affairs, Germany used the pretext of the murder of two missionaries in the Shantung province to seize the Kiao Chiau harbour in November 1897, and a subsequent convention gave Germany a lease for this port and a large commercial and financial concession throughout the Shantung province. This acquisition greatly contributed to worsening relations between Germany and Russia, as this intervention was considered to be an egregious intrusion into the Russian sphere of influence, and a threat to their projected dominance of northern China.
         Additional territory in China was seized in Qingdao in 1898, and became Germany’s most lucrative colony that returned the highest dividends, which became Germany’s most lucrative colonial possession, in contrast to the high administrative expenses that did not correspond to income returns in its other overseas colonial possessions. During the Spanish-American War, Germany compelled Spain to sell them the Caroline, Palau and Northern Mariana Islands in 1898, and an agreement was reached with Britain in 1899 to acquire two of the Samoan group of islands. However, these possessions were not held sufficiently long enough for their successfully sustained economic development, while the purchasing power of the indigenous inhabitants were inconsiderable. These colonial possessions were theoretically to provide new markets for German goods while acquiring supplies of raw materials. In practice, only 0.1 percent of German exports were sent to the colonies, and likewise only 0.1 percent of imports were drawn from them, while most German international trade was conducted with the British empire.
  Germany’s colonial pursuits in the interest of playing a role in worldwide politics as an underlying ideology in its foreign policy also aroused suspicions and hostility among other European nations. Its expressions of pursuing an aggressive foreign policy spurred renewed British naval power development, and a corresponding naval arms race with Germany that was supported by public opinion. During this time when German statesmen considered Germany’s leadership in international affairs to be threatened, potential threats to peace continued during the ongoing its warship building programme that began between 1898 and 1900 to compete against British naval superiority. Russia’s crushing defeat in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and subsequently facing the turmoil of domestic social unrest followed by the revolution in October 1905 led to alleviating British concerns about Russian threats to its national interests. Russia then settled the most menacing issues with Great Britain, which led to forming a separate entente cordiale on 31 August 1907, as the British considered Germany to be a greater threat than Russia. This agreement settled outstanding disputes, dealing with limitations of political influence and sovereignty in central Asia that allayed concerns of Russia creating an invasion route toward India, agreeing to divide Persia into three zones of influence, consisting of Russian and British spheres and a neutral buffer region between them, yielding influence over Afghanistan to Great Britain, and respecting the territorial integrity of Tibet and Chinese sovereignty. The Algeçiras conference that isolated Germany and this subsequent agreement between Britain and Russia consolidated divisions in European powers into two alliances to preserve their mutual interests, composing the Triple Entente, which augmented existing suspicions among the opposing member states, and further commitments to building armaments in the event of the outbreak of hostilities in the event of a decisive conflict to acquire greater influence in the balance of power that was created through international events. Bülow’s Weltpolitik was thus dealt a crippling blow, in the face of Russian and British animosity toward Germany that appeared to be striving to establish hegemony in Europe.
      In addition to the pursuing Weltpolitik, German foreign policy then shifted from a central European power to one focused toward a policy of preserving Austria-Hungary’s interests in the Balkans in reaction to the creation of the Triple Entente, which risked a conflict between Germany and Russia. This shift also entailed cultivating interests through the Balkans toward the Middle East and beyond, as demonstrated by plans to build a Baghdad railway to extend commercial interests, as well as reaching across the Atlantic and the Pacific, which made Great Britain Germany’s primary rival for influence, in addition to aggravating the antagonism in the Balkans between Austria and Russia. Germany’s economic penetration that was developed in Turkish Asia Minor posed a potential threat to the Suez Canal and India more directly than Russian ambitions for control of the Dardanelles Straights as a vital economic artery, while Turkey was passing under increasing German influence, and the German navy was being built faster than the British as a challenge to its maritime supremacy that they considered to be a sheer necessity. German policies also aggravated tensions with Russia, as East Elbian landholders demanded compensation for supporting appropriations for naval construction, and they were thereby granted a new tariff in 1902 that practically excluded Russian grain exports to the German market. Furthermore, German banks, industrial firms and railway interests penetrating the underdeveloped lands of the Ottoman empire that had begun during the 1880s became accelerated with William II’s support, and building the Baghdad railway extending to the Persian Gulf aroused suspicions about threatening both Russian as well as British interests in this region.  Establishing an entente between Great Britain and Russia became feasible in view of the potential advantages, which also appealed to Russia as a result of the losses that were incurred in the war against Japan, in addition to animosity caused by German policy that was inimical to Russian interests.
  France could not be reconciled to its defeat in 1871, and was able to recover as a valuable ally. These developments allowed for three separate allies to be united against Germany in a defensive alliance, but could be instantly converted for offensive purposes. Europe thus became divided into two hostile alliances. As a result of a change in German foreign policy, the Triple Alliance had been outflanked by the Triple Entente in which France, Russia and Great Britain accrued their own advantages by reconciling their differences and serving joint interests that directly opposed those of the Triple Alliance. This presence of two opposing nominally defensive alliances inevitably led to aggravated military rivalry to prepare for the potential outbreak of war. When diplomacy failed, Germany’s recourse was military force to maintain its hegemony in the face of a hostile coalition, and also a worldwide scale through acquiring distant overseas colonies with connections maintained by a powerful navy. The aims of the German government became increasingly apparent as a result of its foreign policy measures on a worldwide scale, which inevitably led to determined opposition from Great Britain, France and Russia in an atmosphere of increasingly greater suspicion between two hostile alliances, with international incidents potentially upsetting the balance of power between them as a result of their competing interests.
Tensions remained in the Balkans where Austria-Hungary, which had lost its control of Italian territory in the wars of 1859 and 1866, remained competing for territorial gains, further to having acquired control of Bosnia and Herzogovina in 1878, against Russia’s attempts to acquire influence, while Italy sought control over the Turkish province of Albania to secure predominance over the Adriatic Sea. Meanwhile, Germany had acquired important railroad and commercial development concessions in Turkish Asia Minor, and remained heavily investing in Turkey, which were expected to allow Germany to acquire economic and political control in this region, which could be extended toward central Asia or the Persian Gulf, and thereby creating a transportation link for products to be conveyed to western Europe. These aims raised concern in Great Britain, where it was feared that Germany and Turkey could be in a position to attack Egypt and the Suez Canal, and extending the railway to the Persian Gulf and central Asia could deprive British shipping of economic opportunities.  Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece had conflicting claims in Turkish controlled Macedonia and Albania.
    Austria-Hungary aggravated them further following the Young Turk revolution and subsequent reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire while Russia was unprepared for war in support of Serbia’s interests by the forcible annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Turkey on 5 October 1908, which had been administered by Austria-Hungary from July 1878, in exchange for a retreat from a more advanced Austrian military position in the Ottoman territory of Sanjak of Novi-Pazar. This was orchestrated between the Russian foreign minister Alexander Isvolsky and his Austrian counterpart Alois von Aehrenthal on the former’s initiative to help Russia regain security and prestige following its defeat in the Russian-Japanese War, essentially exchanging Russian consent for this annexation for Austro-Hungarian support of changes at the Dardanelles Straights favourable to Russia.
     The annexation was in violation of Article 26 of the 1878 Treaty of Berlin that had placed these provinces under Austria’s administration, albeit under nominal Ottoman sovereignty to consolidate the status quo, which was opposed by Serbia and its immediate ally Montenegro that intended to unite with these provinces to acquire access to the Adriatic Sea, along with claiming large parts of Macedonia, which was claimed by both Bulgaria and Greece, and parts of Albania, all of which shared a common heritage. Slavic interests were sanctioned by Russia that was yet powerless to act against Austria-Hungary, which was aided and abetted by Germany. In addition to this treaty violation that was left as a fait accompli that caused ongoing resentment from Serbia and Russia as Serbia’s ally, while Russia remained powerless to resist Austria-Hungary’s increasing influence in the Balkans. Bulgaria declared its full independence from Turkey at the same time.
The resulting growing sense of Slav solidarity and hostility toward Germany and Austria led to the Chief of the German General Staff, Helmuth von Moltke, pledging to his Austro-Hungarian counterpart, Conrad von Hötzendorff, that should Austria-Hungary attack Serbia and go to war against Russia, German would provide its unconditional support. Moltke thus effectively modified the 1879 Dual Alliance treaty from a defensive to an offensive stance, which made Germany’s foreign policy subject to Austria’s policy toward Austria, which would in turn lead to waging war against Russia and France according to the exceedingly rigid prescriptions of the operational plan as a miliary solution for waging a two front war fighting on eastern and western fronts had appeared to be unavoidable in the future, and preventing a lengthy war of attrition.
Count Alfred Schlieffen, the chief of the general staff from 1891 to 1906, began devising a plan in November 1892 for this contingency of effectively fighting on two fronts. Schlieffen believed that war under modern conditions could be waged for a few weeks, and it therefore followed that a belligerent had to win decisive victories in the opening stages of a war, which specifically required driving France out of the war in a few weeks in an all out crushing offensive on the flank and rear of the French forces to stage a wide envelopment to separate them from German forces in the west, prior to confronting Russia, while dismissing the potential of British military power as an influential factor as a result of defeating France. The outbreak of a war against both France and Russia would necessarily lead to the Schlieffen Plan going into effect, Launching this operational plan had dangerously disadvantageous political implications, as it would necessarily cause a European conflagration by limiting Germany’s diplomatic freedom of action to resolve a peaceful resolution in the event of a major international crisis rather than encouraging waging war as a rapid solution, as well as necessarily violating international law by dismissing Belgian neutrality in the interest of military expediency. Chancellor von Bülow, fearing losing Germany’s only reliable ally, likewise provided his unconditional support to the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister von Aerenthal “an unlimited blank cheque for the future” in dealing with Serbia.
The international crisis that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina precipitated France and Russia intensifying their preparations for war, whereas th Dual Alliance counted on England’s continued neutrality while ignoring Italy, which became an increasingly unreliable Triple Alliance ally. Like France in 1902, Russia also contributed to undermining Italy’s alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary. On 23 October 1909. the King of Italy and the Russian Tsar signed a secret agreement following discussions during the summer of 1909 at Racconigi, providing that neither government would make any future agreements concerning the Near East without mutual consultation, and thereby maintaining the status quo in the Balkans. This agreement entailed sharing a common policy of preventing further Austro-Hungarian encroachments in the Balkan peninsula in view of Russian Pan-Slavic ideals and Italy’s territorial ambitions on the Adriatic Sea littoral, following the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was further reinforced by the Ottoman government recognizing Austria-Hungary’s seizure of these provinces in exchange for monetary compensation in January 1909. The Racconigi agreement supplemented the early agreements with France, and thus further weakened the strength of the Triple Alliance in the event of a future conflict with the Triple Entente, although both alliances maintained their defensive postures in the face of escalating tensions that could lead to the outbreak of war, which were further aggravated by the sharp deterioration of British-German relations as a direct result of their ongoing naval rivalry.
      Germany was thus placed at a weakened position while the Dual Alliance remained in effect since its inception, as Austria’s own Slavic elements could not be relied on in the face of local nationalist sentiments, and nevertheless remained bent on incorporating further Slavs in the Balkans in the interest of the Austro-Hungarian empire’s own self-preservation, which necessarily drew the animosity of the Russians. Austria-Hungary remained Germany’s only reliable ally, as Italy’s lengthy coastline could make it vulnerable to British and French sea power, as well as Austria-Hungary having a stronger economic base. As Russian Pan-Slavism and Austria-Hungary’s imperialist interests in the Balkans remained in hostile contact, it no longer became possible to maintain Bismarck’s policy of entente with Russia. Other aggravating factors were Germany’s continued possession of Alsace-Lorraine that continued being an issue with France, and German foreign trade continued causing tension with Great Britain. The overall international tension continued worsening in the face of reactions to further international developments that causing greater suspicion between the two major European alliances.
Further tensions also heightened between France and Germany over competing interests in Morocco a second time, which reinforced the Triple Entente ties as a result of further German heavy-handed diplomacy through attempting to intimidate France. When internal unrest in Morocco required French military intervention by occupying Rabat and Fez to be quelled in clear violation of the Algeciras Act, German diplomacy further aggravated tension with a show of its own military force to contain increased French control and maintain its own interests by dispatching a warship, the Panther gunboat, to Agadir on 1 July 1911, ostensibly to protect German economic interests and residents, while reinforcing demands for territorial compensation in the Congo. Although Germany had legitimate concerns about protecting their interests endangered by civil unrest, the French were disposed to interpret this threat of force as the German government attempting to intervene in an independent country to acquire a permanent colonial presence in this rich territory that would extinguish Morocco’s nominal independence. Since the French were unwilling to risk a war without the assurance of Russian support, this crisis was defused through arriving at a peaceful settlement over maintaining French interests in Morocco by establishing it as a French protectorate in 1912, and compensating Germany with adding territory to the Cameroons at the expense of 275,000 square miles of territory in the French-controlled Congo, and ceding German-controlled land in Togo to France. This recent crisis escalated suspicions about aggressive German foreign policy toward imperialist expansionism in France, as well as Great Britain that supported French interests by dispatching battleships to Morocco in a show of force to demonstrate solidarity with France. This crisis raised suspicions among the Triple Entente regarding potential German aggression, and led to confidential discussions between British and French military leaders to plan for war against Germany, involving dispatching British troops to northern France, and France establishing its naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea.
      There was also suspicion in Germany regarding British as well as French malevolence with prejudice to German proponents of establishing world power status aspirations, which entailed political as well as economic considerations for a growing industrial power that required markets for manufactured goods and importing cheap raw materials. These tensions were followed to further conflicts that broke out in Turkish empire in which attempts at reforms were largely ineffectual, which then lead to the outbreaks of the Italian-Turkish War in 1911, the Balkan-Turkish War in 1912, and then war among the Balkan states in 1913. The Triple Entente allies remained suspicious of German aims in Turkey that fell increasingly under its influence in the course of providing financial aid, as well as further modernising its military from May 1913 under the direction of General Liman von Sanders as a result of its losses in the Balkan wars, which threatened Russia’s vital interests in the Dardanelles Straights, and consequently led to Russia launching a vast rearmament programme to counter potential threats from Germany. The realization of these rearmament plans including the combined Russian and French armies would more than double those of Germany by 1917, while Austria could not raise many more troops than Serbia. Tensions in the Balkans further aggravated tension between the alliance systems through weakening the German-Austrian alliance when Russia persuaded Rumania to sever its connection with the Triple Alliance by offering it Transylvania in exchange for a pledge of neutrality in the event of an outbreak of war.
     Prior to the resolution of the dispute over competing interests between France and Germany in Morocco, tensions resumed over Turkey’s possessions following Italy’s intentions toward establishing its interests in northern Africa that its government had expressed as early as December 1900, when France had sought Italy’s consent for French penetration in Morocco in return for France’s approval for Italy’s having free rein in Tripoli, which was consolidated in a protocol signed in November 1902. Italy thus followed cultivating friendly relations with members of both the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance that had recently engaged in enterprises that could provide a reasonable justification for Italy engaging in hostilities against Turkey. Austria-Hungary had seized Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 with Germany’s support for this fait accompli, while France acquired control over Morocco with Italy’s approval in exchange for taking action in Tripoli, and therefore could not expect any opposition at the expense of the decaying Turkish empire. Germany and Austria-Hungary also consented to Italy claiming a free hand in Tripoli on the occasion of the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1908.
The Italian government dispatched an ultimatum to the Turkish government on 26 September 1911 over its grievances regarding its interests in Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and thus threatened to proceed with the military occupation of these two Turkish provinces. The Italian government was indisposed to Turkish conciliation, and consequently declared war on 29 September. Italian successes against Turkey led to the Treaty of Lausanne on 18 October 1911, with Italy acquiring the Turkish provinces it had coveted, although this new colony would be subject to the Triple Entente’s naval supremacy in the Mediterranean Sea, the Entente objected to Italy occupying Turkish islands in the Aegean Sea and becoming a first rate power in the Mediterranean Sea by holding naval bases in its eastern reaches. On the other hand, the British government tacitly supported the consequences of Italian control over Tripoli by preventing Turkey from sending reinforcements through Egypt to Tripoli, which bound Italy by gratitude and expediency to Great Britain and France. The Triple Entente appeared likely to be in a position to neutralise Italy’s opposition to its interests, in view of potentially supporting its territorial ambitions in the Balkans that conflicted with Austria-Hungary maintaining its interests that likewise were opposed by Russia, while its presence in Tripoli was subject to potential threats from the French and British presences on the northern African coast in Tunis and Egypt, as well as having been in a position to threaten Italy’s extensive coastlines with their combined naval power.
       Other Balkan states likewise sought to displace Turkey’s territorial possessions in Europe, and Italy’s direct attack and success appeared to demonstrate that they could follow this precedent that tore the Ottoman empire apart. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece composing the Balkan League waged war against the Ottoman empire in the First Balkan War from October 1912 to May 1913, which led to seizing a great deal of the empire’s European possessions. Since Bulgaria was dissatisfied with the division of territory in the First Balkan War peace settlement, it attacked its former allies, Serbia and Greece, on 16 June 1913. Bulgaria’s defeat resulted in the Treaty of Bucharest, in which Bulgaria had to cede portions of its First Balkan War gains to Serbia, Greece and Romania in the Treaty of Bucharest on 10 August, and Adrianople to the Ottomans in the Treaty of Constantinople on 30 September. Although these two Balkan wars ended with treaties that did not involve Europe as a whole, they considerably contributed to the bitter relations between different nations with direct interests in the Balkans or were indirectly related through the competing alliances. The dramatic expansion of Serbia as the most militarily powerful state south of the Danube also aroused grave concerns in Austria-Hungary regarding its continued existence as a result of Slav nationalism. Serbia’s anti-Austria machinations were the subject of secret discussions among the members of the Triple Alliance, whereas Serbia’s nationalist ambitions were supported by Russia, which was in turn supported by its Triple Entente allies. While Germany and Austria-Hungary posed a threat to Serbia, which remained Russia’s sole ally in the Balkans that could contribute to protecting the Dardanelles Straights controlled by Turkey, which was benefiting from German military assistance. Russia could also expect military assistance from France and Britain.
The German navy could not be expected to protect the influx of essential imports in the event of war with France and Russia or Britain. One possibility for addressing this issue was forming an alliance with Britain as the power with the world’s largest navy. However, Germany would thus be subjected to the authority of its most powerful economic rival while could not reciprocate the value of this military force when the British had no immediate interests on the continent, as well as face the possibility of being drawn into British colonial conflicts. A second possible course of action was building a stronger fleet while remaining on good terms with Britain to establish Germany as an equal partner. However, it was doubtful whether the British would be interested in allying themselves with its strongest trade rival that had the strongest army in Europe. Besides, it remained difficult to raise funding for military expenses with the approval of the Reichstag parties, especially with the presence of anti-British anti-liberal conservatives and more radical German nationalists. A third possible course was building a fleet without any commitment to Britain at the risk of conflict, which was aggravated by German anti-British propaganda. A second navy law was passed in 1900 when Tirpitz made use of widespread anti-British feeling in Germany that was provoked by the Boer War, which prescribed doubling the size of the German navy by 1907 to build a battle fleet that was to be as powerful as the world’s greatest naval power. This plan directly challenged Britain’s own fleet building program with the introduction of a new faster and more heavily armed battleship, the “Dreadnought” in 1906, which was inspired by the lessons of the Russo-Japanese naval war, that stressed their defensive interests. Tirpitz reacted by facing this challenge and convincing the Reichstag to vote for further funding increases for the German naval building programme in 1906, 1908, and 1912 as a symbolic representation of its great power status, rather than addressing strategic requirements, which in turn led to Britain also reinforcing naval construction.
    William II attempted to promote improve relations with Great Britain by requesting a meeting with the British minister of war Richard Haldane in February 1912 to discuss the possibility of drafting a treaty of friendship, by which Great Britain and Germany would pledge to maintain mutual benevolent neutrality between them in the event of a continental war. During this time, British authorities had grave concerns about the extension of Russian influence in Persia, was prepared to establish peaceful relations with Germany in exchange for accepting the extant level of German fleet building, on the condition of not any further increases. This effort to seek establishing a détente with Germany and reduce dangerous tension between Britain and Germany as a result of their escalating naval arms race, while Britain sought to maintain a two to one ratio of warships with a possible ratio of three to two, was unsuccessful. Tirpitz insisted on reinforcing Germany’s naval strength, which Britain flatly rejected, and would not remain neutral in the event of German waging war against France. Germany’s navy building programme momentum remained unimpeded, while Britain remained committed to a policy of non-hostility against Germany and maintaining its defensive Entente obligations to both France and Russia. Negotiations were discontinued in the autumn of 1912 owing to Germany’s demand for a pledge of unconditional neutrality, while the British fleet maintained its superior naval strength, and therefore refused to be intimidated into agreeing with Germany’s terms.
      Foreign policy implementation later led to embroiling the competing alliances when tensions on a European scale that would not be contained, which included a new element of irreconcilable antagonism between Britain and Germany over naval strength related to colonisation and international trade. The Entente nations interpreted German foreign policy actions as ambitions toward undermining their power, including through undertaking “peaceful penetration” through pursuing economic policies, including establishing German commercial power in world markets through manufacturing high quality products and engaging in overseas banking that alarmed the Entente powers by composing a major economic competitor, along with building a railway link toward Baghdad, making loans to Turkey, receiving a colonial concession in China, establishing a colonial office in the central executive that assumed jurisdiction of German overseas colonies in 1907 as an element of administering an overseas empire as a world power at a time when the world was largely divided among colonial powers, and fleet building with increased economic means.
In contrast, the German government considered every Entente move as efforts to thwart Germany’s legitimate international aspirations commensurate to its size and power, including establishing a British-Russian sphere of influence in Persia and a French protectorate in Morocco, and essentially interpreting the main currents of Entente policy as being directed against Germany. Hence, the German government faced a group of powers opposing striving to advance its interests in which other powers maintained their own interests, which caused a false conception of an aggressive British policy that had dangerous potential consequences in conjunction with the combined French and Russian war aims directed against the Dual Alliance. Germany thus remained in a disadvantageous diplomatic position as a result of William II’s antagonistic foreign policy that caused suspicion among the Triple Entente powers, including Germany’s colonialism in Africa and eastern Asia, imposing tariffs on Russian grain imports, the naval construction programme, the Baghdad railway planning, and provoking Britain by William II encouraging the Boer revolt in South Africa in the Kruger telegram of 3 January 1896 to President Paul Kruger of the South African Republic, congratulating him on repelling the Jameson Raid on the Transvaal. In contrast, Germany found its national security endangered by potentially hostile powers as a result of reconciliation between Russia and France while tensions between Russia and England had subsided and Italy’s interests shifted toward the interests of the Triple Entente, while only Germany’s alliance with Austria prevented complete isolation. The German General Staff therefore planned to launch a preventive war through executing the Schlieffen Plan as international tensions escalated, which culminated in provoking armed conflict by encouraging Austria-Hungary to dispatch an ultimatum to Serbia on 23 July 1914 that was intentionally unacceptable.